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PREFACE 
This dissertation was born out of my desire to help make the world a better place 
and to conduct a study that speaks to the many felt needs that exist in the world around 
us. It is my effort to help people see (in the moral sense of see) beyond race, sex and 
class, and to recognize and appreciate diversity. I am interested in how we might account 
for what we see, especially when it comes to social, political, and economic 
responsibility. One of the greatest challenges I had as a pastor was trying to get my 
congregation to know the “felt” needs of those around them as Jesus did for the 
Samaritan woman at the well. Jesus was able to see beyond her race, sex and class and 
recognized her needs in such a way that she had to share her experience with the entire 
community of Samaria. I contend that much human suffering experienced today exists 
because of the lack of attention directed toward the needs of those who are in pain by 
those who have the power to alleviate (their) pain but because of neglect, perpetuate a 
type of violence against those who suffer. This happens, especially, among middle and 
upper middle class congregations, both Black and White, to the point that some become 
almost immune to the plight of lower socio-economic individuals in their own 
communities.  
I hold that the ethics of vision helps us to see and act responsively, and, in doing 
so, our “seeing” can help alleviate much of the suffering that exists in the world today. 
The ethics of vision allows us to see (in the moral sense of see) what is otherwise 
vi 
 
invisible. It directs one’s attention away from one’s self toward the needs of others 
through a “loving and just gaze,” with the support of moral effort and a moral 
imagination. It is then this “loving and just gaze,” with moral effort and a moral 
imagination, which enables one to see that which would otherwise be missed. I employ 
this understanding of vision as I examine the works of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
Christian womanist theologian Emilie Townes in order to provide greater insight into 
King’s and Townes’s works as I develop select themes to help us see and improve 
morally in ways that would bring about a better world. 
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ABSTRACT 
 To this day, philosophical ethics and dominant discussions in Christian ethics 
have paid insufficient attention to how vision shapes the moral life. Too much focus is 
given to moral decision-making and action, while too little focus is given to the way 
vision and patterns of attentiveness ground our capacities for genuine morally responsible 
action. Therefore, in this study, I draw on important works in philosophical and Christian 
ethics to examine both the ethics of responsibility and the central role that an ethics of 
vision plays in our attempts to live responsibly. I use the “ethics of vision” as method and 
correlate it with certain themes of Black theology and experience. In so doing, I focus 
chiefly on Iris Murdoch to engage Black thought and experience, as it is presented by 
Martin Luther King Jr. and Emilie Townes. An engagement with these two sets of 
materials enriches our understanding of vision and expands our concept of moral agency. 
 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This project explores the importance of the “ethics of vision” for Christian ethical 
reflection.  I examine the importance of the training of attention and vision in the moral 
life.  A concentration on the ethical centrality of attention and vision has been given its 
classic expression in the work of Iris Murdoch, especially in her book, The Sovereignty of 
Good, published in 1970.
1
  Parallel to Murdoch’s stress on vision in ethics, H. Richard 
Niebuhr, in 1963, published an important book, The Responsible Self: An Essay in 
Christian Moral Philosophy.
2
  Together, these two books put forward powerful 
arguments for a paradigm change in ethics, especially in their critique of the then 
dominant understandings of moral agency.   Both Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s books 
engage densely philosophical issues in both normative ethics and in the philosophical and 
theological anthropology that lies behind and grounds the common understandings about 
right action and goodness. Both diagnosed what they took to be serious inadequacies in 
the two influential schools of normative ethics—deontology and utilitarianism. 
          Both Murdoch and Niebuhr were prolific and complex writers.  Murdoch was both 
a marvelously creative philosopher, who taught philosophy and ethics for fifteen years, 
from 1948-1963, at St. Anne’s College, Oxford, even as she proceeded regularly to 
publish a wide array of novels, totaling, eventually, twenty-six.  In fact, she gave up her 
                                                          
1
 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London and New York: Ark Paperbacks, 1970). 
 
2
 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1963). 
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teaching post to concentrate more time on her literary work.  Similarly, she published a 
number of philosophical books dealing with a broad range of topics, always including 
ethical issues.  Her interests in philosophy were quite broad, and her key reputation in the 
area of ethical theory came from her short masterwork The Sovereignty of Good that 
called for an important paradigm shift in ethical theory and has caused the name to be 
long associated with the “ethics of vision.”  While I attend to some of her essays in 
ethical theory that appeared in two of her later collections of essays, namely Metaphysics 
as a Guide to Morals, published in 1992, and Existentialists and Mystics, published in 
1998, I concentrate on her classic statement on the moral importance of vision in The 
Sovereignty of Good.
3
   Similarly, while Niebuhr wrote a number of important books in 
Christian theology, his most sustained work in Christian ethics remains The Responsible 
Self.  Accordingly, I focus my attention to some of his arguments in this work. 
             Murdoch, especially, centered her critical attention on the understanding of 
human nature and experience that is expressly stated or implied across broad streams of 
Anglo-American analytical ethics and Continental existentialist ethical approaches during 
the World War II period and the post-War decades. She identified how a number of 
streams of modern philosophy came to reinforce a picture of human moral agency as 
rooted in acts of will as individuals grapple with moral problems requiring decision and 
action.  Analytical and existentialist schools of ethics that dominated the scene in those 
decades privileged the publically observable and, thus, centered ethics in problems, rules, 
decisions, and acts of will. This stress on the publically observable arose, in part, from 
                                                          
3
 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New York and London: Allen Lane/ The 
Penguin Press, 1992) and Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature, 
ed. Peter Conradi (New York and London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press, 1998).   
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the broad influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and his followers’ stress on the public 
character of language and Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist emphasis on the radical 
freedom of the self to create meaning and value via decision and action.
4
  Both pushed 
main conversations in philosophical ethics in England and across Europe to turn attention 
away from the inner world of personal feeling and experience.  But, for Murdoch, this 
erosion of concern for the interior life, the realm of personal experience, and feeling, 
pulled ethics away from attending to the critical processes of personal transformation and 
growth in virtue and sensitivity that had long been held among ancient and classic 
philosophers as the core concern of ethics.  In her classic, The Sovereignty of Good, she 
argues forcefully for the primacy of moral attention and vision, as prior to, and 
foundational for, decision, and action.   
        Murdoch’s great achievement lies in her careful deconstruction of the cluster of 
streams in twentieth century philosophical understanding that came to establish a 
dominant model of moral agency-- as centered in the will, problem-solving, decision and 
action.  In one of her early essays, first published in 1956, she refers to this dominant 
picture of moral agency as simply the “current view.” She holds that while not all 
subscribe to its assumptions about the moral life, still it is an accurate account of the 
dominant thinking about  ethics in both Anglo-American and Continental philosophical 
circles.
5
   She argues that this understanding of ethics simply ignores the significance of 
how individuals in quiet, gradual, and deeply personal ways build up moral attentiveness, 
                                                          
4
 Murdoch, Sovereignty of Good, 4-9. 
 
5
 Iris Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Dreams 
and Self-Knowledge, Supplement no. 30 (1956):32-58. This essay is reprinted in Murdoch, Existentialists 
and Mystics, 76-98.  See p. 77. 
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sensitivity, and virtues, and sadly, vices prior to any confrontation with discrete moral 
problems demanding decisions.  While appreciative of much of the rigor of philosophical 
ethical work dominating the scholarly discussions in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Murdoch draws deeply on Plato’s emphasis of the “transcendence of the good” 
and Simone Weil’s emphasis on the primacy of moral attention to develop a broader and 
more complex understanding of moral agency, in which vision and attention are 
understood as providing both energy and direction for right decision and good action.  
             Her main contribution in ethics may well be her critique of the generally 
optimistic picture of the dominant moral image of the “rational moral agent” in control by 
exerting will and making free decisions in response to moral problems.  Murdoch draws 
on Sigmund Freud’s views to articulate a non-Christian and non-theological account of 
“original sin.”6  As she articulates it, the human condition is marked by powerful personal 
drives that obsessively pull our attention and concern back onto our own self-interest.  
The psyche, she argues, is an “egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy. . .”7  
Egoism, by pulling attention and concern so obsessively back on oneself, leaves little 
energy of attention and care left to be engaged outward beyond the self to others and to 
the greater world.  With the energies of attention and care so typically monopolized by 
the self, Murdoch believes that most of us engage others and the world only as we have 
already painted them via our personal projections and in colors distorted through the lens 
of our own self-interest.  Thus, we engage not reality but a sphere of self-imposed 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., 51. 
 
7
 Ibid. 
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illusion.  And the failure to see accurately contributes massively to ongoing failures to 
choose well or to act rightly. 
           Murdoch is well aware of Christian theological classics and also great works of 
western mysticism that also discuss egoism and excessive “self-love” as a corrupting 
energy, but her main agenda is to develop a philosophical vision that can speak to the 
many people of her day for whom classic religious terminology and appeal have ceased 
to be persuasive.  But, surely, one of the reasons that many Christian theologians and 
ethicists remain attracted to Murdoch’s ethical understanding lies in how much her non-
theological Freudian influenced view of “sin” shares with ancient and core 
understandings of Christianity.
8
  Jesus’s words about the importance of love of the 
neighbor and of the enemy remain so challenging across the centuries, because they call 
for an overcoming of excessive self-love that blocks attention to and concern for others 
around us and, especially for our adversaries. Augustine, famously, in The City of God 
stressed, like Murdoch, the tendency of the self’s love and interests curving back inward  
and pulling all love and attention away from God and our neighbors.
9
 This, for 
Augustine, is the key mark of the “Earthly City.” Murdoch holds, like Augustine, that this 
propensity toward self-love and egocentrism is the core problem of the moral life.  In her 
view, we are so structurally blinded by egoism that seeing others and the world around us 
as they really are is a profound moral achievement.   
                                                          
8
 Stanley Hauerwas was one of the first Christian theologians to try to draw other theologians and 
Christian ethicists to attention to the importance of Murdoch’s work.  See his essay “The Significance of 
Vision: Toward an Aesthetic Ethic,” in his book Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection 
(Notre Dame: Fides/Claretian, 1974), 30-47. 
 
9
 Saint Augustine, The City of God trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1950), 477.   
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         Murdoch’s central theme in The Sovereignty of Good, her most sustained and 
influential work in ethics, critiques the modernist reduction of ethics as a reflection on 
rules and principles to guide agents confronting problems.  Realism, for Murdoch, is such 
a profound achievement, because egoism is such a dynamic system of energy that so 
persistently corrupts our vision. And, as our vision becomes corrupted, our decision and 
action become biased and distorted.   Accordingly, for Murdoch, the key goals of moral 
development and schemes of moral education are to increase capacities for the extension 
of clear attention and vision beyond one’s self-interested fixations outward to others and 
to the world beyond.    In Christian vocabulary, it is the achievement of seeing neighbor 
needs and loving both the “neighbor” and even the “enemy.”  Even as Murdoch 
emphasizes a non-theological account of “sin,” her core ethics lies in her praise for an 
extension of attention, care, and moral concern outward beyond the self to others and to 
the rest of the world. This she refers to as a non-theological account of “love.”   It should 
not be so surprising that many Christians find Murdoch’s analyses so compelling, for she 
charts out core Christian emphasis on sin and the challenge of the command to love.
10
  
        In ways quite parallel with Murdoch’s views, Niebuhr, one of America’s most 
prominent Protestant theologians, focused his book The Responsible Self as a strong 
critique of the tendencies of the dominant deontological and utilitarian approaches to 
normative ethics to concentrate on distinctive moral problems and to view ethics as 
offering agents “action-guides” for points where decision and action are required.  He 
                                                          
10
  James M. Gustafson discusses how both Augustine and Jonathan Edwards understand sin, like 
Murdoch, as inordinate “self-love.” As Edwards puts it, sin pulls the self into a tight circle of “selfishness” 
in which God and “fellow-creatures” are “forsaken.”  See Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric 
Perspective, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 305-306.  
7 
 
examines how deontology and utilitarianism hold divergent pictures and assumptions 
about moral agency.  Underlying the utilitarian tradition, Niebuhr believes there lies a 
powerful understanding of the self as “man-the-maker.”  The core understanding of the 
self is one who acts “for an end.”  Underlying the deontological tradition, with its stress 
on obligation and duties, Niebuhr argues, there is a powerful picture of “man-the-citizen, 
living under law.”11    While both understandings of moral agency, rooted in these 
powerful pictures, have broad explanatory power, Niebuhr still critiques both schools for 
inadequately capturing the dynamism in the moral life in which persons act always in 
responsiveness to situations, challenges, and concerns before them.  Niebuhr attends to 
Aristotle’s emphasis on the “fitting response” to highlight how the moral life is 
fundamentally a life lived within a web of relationality. It includes occasions of activity 
and agency, but, also, equally important, occasions of receptivity.  It includes times of 
decision and action, but, also, times of quiet attentiveness, seeing, and listening.  
Accordingly, Niebuhr holds that the category of “responsibility” better captures the heart 
of the moral life, for it better accounts for the dynamism of agents engaged with people 
and the world around us in a complex sequence of being aware of action and demands on 
us and the need for us acting fittingly in response.  The ethics of responsibility, for 
Niebuhr, insists that the first question in ethics is not “What shall I do?” but rather “What 
is going on?”12   So, it is clear that his stress on “responsibility” includes an affirmation, 
like Murdoch’s, on the critical importance of moral attentiveness and vision.   
                                                          
11
 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1963), 49, 51. 
 
12
 Ibid., 60-61. 
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           Both Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s agendas are on a high level of theoretical and 
constructive philosophical work.  But I am convinced that their shared emphasis to place 
moral vision and attention at the core of our understanding of ethics offers an important 
lens for interpreting the operative ethical theory employed by many liberationist ethical 
thinkers and activists engaged in criticizing patterns of structural violence and in  
promoting policies of social justice.  Liberationist thinkers have long understood how 
violence and oppression can become institutionalized and structured into the “business as 
usual” practices of everyday life in societies and nations.  Because these practices are so 
widespread, they often appear simply as normal, as basic “givens” of social or national 
life that are just part of reality.  As such, they often go unattended to and systematically 
ignored by the dominant media and the eyes of general society.  Liberationist voices 
often refer to such patterns of oppression as “covert” violence, because they tend to 
remain “hidden” from mainstream society in the sense that mainstream society has 
developed powerful capacities for turning a blind eye to such glaring problems and 
injustices.
13
  
         While this project is centered on the contributions of Murdoch’s insights in her 
“ethics of vision,” I do wish to engage Niebuhr’s reflections on “responsibility” to 
suggest some of these writers’ shared convictions about the need to rethink our model of 
moral agency.  I argue that Murdoch’s “ethics of vision” and Niebuhr’s “ethics of 
responsibility” offer important hermeneutical lenses for helping us to understand some of 
the distinctive features of the ethical theories and agendas of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
                                                          
13
 On “covert” patterns of structural violence, see Robert McAfee Brown, Religion and Violence: 
A Primer for White Americans (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 8, 35-38. 
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and those of Emilie Townes, a noted Womanist theologian and ethicist.  King and 
Townes share a commitment to unmasking practices and understandings that sustain the 
structural violence of racism and injustice.    Their agendas carry forward a strong 
critique of patterns of social injustice that continue to cause needless pain and suffering to 
so many.   
        While Murdoch’s early essays on moral issues and her book The Sovereignty of 
Good are widely appreciated, still many find strong tensions in her overall attempts to 
link a defense and celebration of the individual in all of our particularity and denseness of 
personal experience with an appropriation of many Platonic themes that structure so 
much of Murdoch’s moral agenda.  Martha Nussbaum, for one, raises concerns that 
Murdoch’s Platonism pulls her vision of the moral life toward a contemplative model 
concentrating on the generalistic account of the challenges of selves needing to overcome 
egoistic distortion to clarify their personal vision.  For Nussbaum, Murdoch has a rather 
abstract universalist account of the core obstacle to moral honesty and responsibility, and 
seems to show little sustained interest in social justice concerns or the way political 
systems and societal and economic systems shape and condition individuals’ capacities 
for moral vision.
14
        
       Accordingly, in chapters two and three, where I examine the ethics and leadership of 
King and Townes, respectively, I employ Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s stress on moral 
vision to help highlight key moral elements in their respective agendas of liberation and 
in their operative understanding of ethics. But I believe that Nussbaum’s critique of 
                                                          
14
 See Martha C. Nussbaum, “When She Was Good,” The New Republic (December 31, 2001 and 
January 7, 2002): 28-34.  This is a review essay of Peter J. Conradi’s book, Iris Murdoch: A Life (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2001). See p. 32. 
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Murdoch’s agenda is generally fair, so I employ my focus on the liberationist ethical 
agendas of King and Townes to illustrate how strong social justice agendas draw from an 
ethics of vision, but, also, add a critically important illustration of how such moral 
philosophical and psychological emphases, like Murdoch’s stressing vision and attention, 
must be opened up to broader ranges of social, political, and ecclesial  concerns for social 
justice and human rights.  This dissertation, by engaging the models of ethical theory of 
Murdoch and Niebuhr, offers a lens for helping us to discern distinctive features of the 
social justice agendas of both King and Townes even as their thinking and focus on 
concrete areas of societal oppression and the concrete realities of racial bias and violence 
highlight areas where Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s programs can be developed and 
thickened.   
         King is certainly acknowledged as a great preacher, activist, and leader, but many, I 
believe, miss how-- across the decades-- he sustained a core ethical agenda of moral 
education centered in helping to nudge white Americans to attend to, and see, the 
suffering of the African-American community under the legacy of racist laws and 
prejudices.  Central to his leadership of the Civil Rights Movement was a careful 
attention to the need to help white American society come to focus attention upon and to 
see—to get it—that racist laws cause vast real suffering to fellow citizens.  I argue that 
the ethics of vision and responsibility analysis provides a most helpful lens for 
interpreting and appreciating a distinctive and sustained agenda in King’s practices, 
preaching, and speeches.    King was a moral educator par excellence and a moral 
paradigm focusing on vision and responsibility allows us to appreciate the ethical 
11 
 
sophistication of his actions and words. Likewise, I believe that King’s moral education 
agenda, rooted in helping white America to see, helpfully concretizes key aspects of the 
ethics of vision approach.  While Murdoch advanced her thinking primarily by engaging 
the philosophical discussions of her age, it seems that her emphasis on moral attention 
and vision has broad and concrete implications for social ethics and for liberationist 
movements.   
            In chapter three, I argue that the work of Emilie Townes also is best understood in 
light of Murdoch’s ethics of vision and Niebuhr’s reflections on the centrality of attention 
and responsibility. Townes, an African-American theological ethicist, helpfully widens 
the range of attention to a number of issues of structural violence that confront Black 
Americans in the decades after the successes of the Civil Rights movement. 
   
12 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE ETHICS OF VISION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Introduction  
This study explores how the ethics of vision and responsibility illuminate ideas in 
the works of two Black liberationist thinkers, Martin Luther King Jr. and Emilie Townes, 
in ways that move from theory to practice as they expose how concrete forces, such as 
appetites, motives, and fears in divided communities, condition one’s moral response to 
the world. This exploration also demonstrates how vision and attention provide energy 
and direction for making the right decisions and actions and how attention helps moral 
agents gain a truthful depiction of what is happening in the world to have the best tools to 
respond appropriately. Throughout the history of Christianity, there has often been 
concern about powerful personal drives pulling one’s attention back to the self. In fact, 
much of human suffering experienced today exists because people who have power to 
alleviate pain do not pay attention to the needs of individuals who are in pain. Those who 
ignore the pain of others perpetuate a type of violence against those who suffer. This is 
because those who ignore the pain of others are quick to focus on their own needs. This 
insensitivity continues to be one of the major problems in America in terms of race.  
Although most racism today may be subtle, racism continues to be a corrupting 
energy that distorts our vision. Similar to classism and genderism, racism reinforces the 
obsessive pulling back of the ego not only to one’s self, but also to one’s group or race, at 
13 
the expense of others. Racism, like egoism, leaves little energy to be engaged with others 
in the outward, greater world, which is beyond the self of one’s group.  Racism exhausts 
the perceiver’s energy because it becomes the lens through which the agent sees. It 
distorts the agent’s vision because it creates what Christian womanist ethicist Emilie 
Townes calls a fantastic hegemonic imagination. Attention and care are typically 
monopolized by racial concerns. This suggests that most racists engage others and the 
world only as they have already painted it, which can be through personal projections and 
in colors distorted through the lens of self, class, or race. Failure to see accurately 
contributes greatly to ongoing failures to choose well or to act rightly, resulting in 
irresponsible action. Racism, therefore, highlights our failure to demonstrate responsible 
actions toward one another; this failure has plagued America for centuries. Although 
vision is not the only moral tradition, when we attend to the role vision plays in the moral 
life as a precondition to responsible action, we enrich our opportunities to become moral 
agents and to see others as they really are, namely, as human.  
In this chapter, I move from theory to practice as I consider how we might 
account for what we see, especially when it comes to social, political, and economic 
responsibility. This chapter explores how the practical application of an ethics of vision 
can increase our capacity for the extension of clear attention and vision beyond self-
interest, outward to others and to the world beyond, something that liberationists have 
sought to do over the years.  Because liberationist thinkers have long understood racism 
and other forms of oppression can become institutionalized and structured into the 
“business as usual” practices of everyday life in societies and nations, an ethics of vision 
helps to highlight some of the distinctions of their approaches to the moral life.  The 
14 
liberationist approach provides a lens that exposes unjust structures that often are 
systematically ignored by the dominant media and the eyes of general society.  
An Introduction to the “Ethics of Vision” 
In this chapter, I introduce the ethics of vision and discuss in detail the 
contributions of one of its most accomplished proponents, Iris Murdoch. Examining her 
contributions to an “ethics of vision” will assist me in highlighting and evaluating some 
of the distinctive moral contributions in the works of Black liberationist thinkers Martin 
Luther King Jr., and Emilie Townes, in later chapters. In this chapter, I introduce 
Murdoch’s and other scholars’ emphasis on an “ethics of vision” and note its close 
connection to what H. Richard Niebuhr and others call the “ethics of responsibility.” 
Both approaches to ethics reject the standard philosophical ethical approaches of 
deontology and utilitarianism as too reductionalistically focused on decision-points and 
discrete moral problem-solving.
1
 
As Murdoch argues, too much of the ethical reflection of her day concentrates on 
human agency, exertions of will, and decision making.2 Standard approaches to ethics in 
the 20
th
 century then understandably depict ethics as primarily an affair of making right 
decisions and engaging in right action. As Charles Taylor, a student of Murdoch’s, notes, 
much of “Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy has tended to see morality as concerned with 
questions of what we ought to do and to avoid questions about what it is good to be or 
                                                 
1
 Both approaches are also central to Christian ethics and both share a common interest in truth, 
justice, freedom and love. In this way, Murdoch’s work is useful to Christian ethics because it recognizes 
the value of such concepts and seeks to preserve them in making our lives better. Also, I must note that 
deontology and utilitarianism are not the only two approaches to ethics today. 
 
2
 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 7-14. This is 
still true now although it probably was more true in the 1950s and 60s. 
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what it is good to love. The focus is on ‘obligatory action.’”3 In this endeavor, Murdoch’s 
great contribution is the unmasking of a reductionistic account of the self that pervades 
much of 20
th
 century Anglo-American ethical theory. Namely, Murdoch concludes that 
major streams of Anglo-American ethics have uncritically accepted an existentialist-
informed understanding of the moral life as one punctuated by discrete dramatic moral 
problems requiring an imposition of radical will in a moment of decision-making and 
agency. Where will, decision, and agency are highlighted, other equally foundational 
dynamics of the moral life are ignored, such as a focus on one’s inner life, one’s 
consciousness and one’s vision. Murdoch’s achievement is based on her highlighting the 
core role that attention and vision play in the moral life. Prior to right decision and right 
action, she argues, we must have a sustained and trained attention and habits of careful 
vision. Whereas decision and action are perhaps dramatic highlights of the moral life, 
Murdoch, in her classic, The Sovereignty of Good, seeks to make manifest the equally 
important drama and function of the training of moral attention and vision.
4
 Before we 
can decide and act well, we must first “see” clearly.5 
                                                 
3
 See Charles Taylor, “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy” in Maria Antonaccio and William 
Schweiker, eds., Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 3. See note 22. 
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 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Attention is 
the name that Murdoch gives to the activity of mind, which affects the transformation of the self, and, 
thereby, helps one to achieve a truthful depiction of reality. Attention, in the words of Murdoch, is the 
characteristic of the moral agent. The concept of vision refers to a whole range of mental activities which 
form the backdrop to one’s actions and choice. Its content consists of the “ramification or ramifications” of 
concepts that determine one’s moral outlook or total vision. As Bridget Clarke states, “A person’s total 
vision… reflects her character and everyone has a total vision insofar as everyone has a character.” For a 
valuable discussion, see Bridget Clarke’s The Lens of Character: Aristotle, Murdoch and the Idea of Moral 
Perception, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2003). 
5
 As she describes her main argument in Picturing the Human, Antonaccio, on page ix, states: 
“The book [meaning Antonaccio’s Picturing the Human] advances the claim that Murdoch’s philosophy is 
best characterized as a form of ‘reflexive’ moral realism, rather than a naïve or simple version of realism.  
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A second distinctive modern movement in philosophical and Christian  
Ethics has stressed the category of “responsibility,” and this movement parallels many of 
the insights of those, like Murdoch, who espouse an “ethics of vision.” In the 1950s and 
60s, those stressing responsibility argue in similar fashion that the standard modern 
account of Anglo-American ethical theory concentrates on decisions, will, and action. A 
key leader in popularizing an “ethics of responsibility” was H. Richard Niebuhr, a 
Protestant theologian who taught at Yale.  His book, The Responsible Self, was published 
in 1963, and it made a strong impact on a generation of Christian theologians and 
ethicists.
6
 Other voices joined Niebuhr in emphasizing how “responsibility” captures an 
important aspect of the dynamic relationality that marks human decision and action, as 
we engage the needs and realities of others around us. Bernard Häring, a major Catholic 
moral theologian, for example, published a widely influential three volume work, The 
Law of Christ, in which he argued that the core of life lies in “God’s call” and the human 
individual’s “response.”7 Accordingly, he argued that ethics should not be centered in 
obedience to rules or moral principles, but rather in a morality of “responsibility.”8 
Similarly, Hans Jonas, a major German philosopher, came to emphasize the importance 
                                                                                                                                                 
Interpreting Murdoch, in this light, makes sense of the fact that she continued to defend the idea of moral 
truth as something real and objective, even as she acknowledged that the human grasp of truth is never 
direct or transparent, but always mediated through the structures of language and consciousness.  The 
central insight that emerges from reading Murdoch’s realism reflexively is that what we perceive as  real or 
true is always at least partly our own fabrication, both for good and for ill.” See Maria Antonaccio, A 
Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xi. 
 
6
 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1963). 
 
7
 Bernard Häring, The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, 3 vols., (Paramus, 
N.J.: The Newman Press, 1961-1966). 
 
8
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of an “ethics of responsibility” for an age witnessing the vast extension of raw human 
powers of action.
9
 
Like the “ethics of vision” school, those stressing the primacy of “responsibility” 
in the moral life argue that the foundation of the quality of our “response” lies in the 
accuracy and truthfulness of our patterns of attention and vision. As H. Richard Niebuhr 
puts it, prior to the question of “What must I do?”—often described as the core question 
of ethics—we have the question of “What is going on?”10 Niebuhr’s major point is that 
the moral adequacy of our “doing” depends upon the adequacy of our attention, seeing, 
and receptive understanding.
11
 Thus, those ethicists and theologians stressing the “ethics 
of responsibility” typically focus on the key categories highlighted by Murdoch and 
others of the “ethics of vision” school. Both approaches critique the decision-point model 
of the moral life as reductionistic, and both stress that responsible moral decision-making 
and action depend on the adequacy of our moral attentiveness and sensitivity.  
In this chapter, my aim is to examine the significance of the ethics of vision 
approach as it challenges many entrenched assumptions built into the moral 
understandings of wide streams of 20
th
 century religious and philosophical ethics. I 
engage in a close reading of Murdoch’s early writings, especially her collection of three 
essays in her masterwork The Sovereignty of Good, that highlight her arguments for the 
importance of vision and attention as core energies of the moral life. Since the 
publication of The Sovereignty of Good in 1970, two other major philosophical works of 
                                                 
9
 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
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Murdoch’s have been published. Murdoch was asked to present the prestigious Gifford 
Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1982. In 1992, these were published as 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals.
12
 In 1997, Peter Conradi edited a broad collection of 
Murdoch’s writings, including the essays that make up The Sovereignty of Good, under 
the title Existentialists and Mystics.
13
 These two books offer further elaboration on 
Murdoch’s core critique of the picture of moral agency offered by both Anglo-American 
analytical ethics and continental existentialism and her elaboration of an alternative 
approach. But Murdoch’s analysis in The Sovereignty of Good remains her core and most 
powerful articulation of an understanding of the moral life. 
However, before I continue this study, it should be noted that certain terms used 
by Murdoch such as “imagination,” “image,” and “imagery” are, as in the words of 
Altorf, notoriously difficult to define or describe. This point is clearly evident among 
many Murdochian scholars, including Maria Antonaccio, Marije Altorf, and Charles 
Taylor. I agree with Altorf, who argues that Murdoch’s philosophical arguments change 
according to the use of indescribable terms, featuring images, imagery, and metaphors, 
receiving their fullest expression in Murdoch’s understanding of imagination and fantasy 
in relation to her understanding of Plato’s concept of the Good.14 Here, her understanding 
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 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto and Windus, 1992). 
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 Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature, ed., Peter 
Conradi (New York and London: Allen Lane/ Penguin Press, 1997). 
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 For further discussion on this matter, see Sharin N. Elkholy who contends that “Murdoch's 
notion of the ‘Good’ is hard to decipher and the reader will not gain a definite sense of this idea in Altorf's 
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Altorf also expresses her frustration over what she perceives as Murdoch's ‘empty character of the Good.’ 
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further discussion on his matter, see, Sharin N. Elkholy, “Iris Murdoch and the Art of Imaging,” review of 
Iris Murdoch and the Art of Imaging, by Marije Altorf, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, June 24, 2009, 
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of the Good is central but vague. I believe Murdoch is clearly aware of this as she 
struggles to demonstrate the indefinability and the indescribability of Good in light of 
Plato’s Myth of the Cave. I will focus on this term, in light of Murdoch’s understanding 
of the moral life, as it relates to the concept of vision.  Vision, too, is also vague, but 
illuminating. 
Thus, I engage a close reading of Murdoch’s The Sovereignty of Good, knowing 
that the three essays are not only unsystematic, but are three lectures presented over a 
number of years, and that they were not written to be presented together as one cohesive 
text. In many cases, therefore, the arguments overlap in many ways and, at times, can 
seem redundant.  However, it is necessary to note that all three essays are written to 
address the contemporaries of her day. On this note, The Sovereignty of Good, compared 
to her most recent Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, remains the most influential 
constructive account of ethics. As noted by Antonaccio, many moralists have read the 
first of the two.  Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals is very difficult to read.
15
 Here, I 
agree with Altorf that reading Murdoch’s text can be an exhilarating and also 
exasperating activity, but, as she notes, Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals is 
an especially difficult text. Altorf argues, and I agree, that “she refers to many different 
texts, from philosophy and literature to theology, and . . . the reader encounters various 
unfamiliar arguments, ideas and thinkers, which are often referred to only in passing. 
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 David Tracy notes how some critics argue the Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals lacks the  
“systematic drive” that “seems more present in the briefer but more methodical arguments of The 
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Understanding of these ideas and thinkers seems assumed, but it would be impossible to 
study all these different ideas, as well as Murdoch’s use of them.”16  
As I engage these texts, I am mainly concerned with how Murdoch approaches 
the subject of vision. What is of great interest to me is her core question. “How do we 
make ourselves morally better?”17 I comment on her essays as they are developed in The 
Sovereignty of Good and, then, focus upon key themes that are essential to her thought. 
This is an exploration neither of her novels nor of the influences of her novels upon her 
philosophical work or vice-versa. I am only interested in Murdoch the moral philosopher. 
Thus, although I may cite some of her other work, an exploration of her novels is not 
necessary for this work.  
I intend to show that Murdoch’s understanding of vision is one approach among 
many that can help illuminate African American moral thought as it is reflected in the 
works of Martin Luther King and Emilie Townes.  I am inspired by Murdoch’s 
contributions as a way of helping to systematize some of the prominent ethical concerns 
of the African American religious thought as it provides concrete illustrations of her 
theoretical positions. Further, I attempt to enrich the concept of vision with the help of H. 
Richard Niebuhr. Niebuhr’s ethics of responsibility focuses both upon vision and fitting 
action within societal interaction and it enriches Murdoch’s ethics of vision.  
In sum, this work will explore the role of vision in the moral life when it comes to 
two critical questions addressed by Murdoch in her first essay: how to live morally, and 
how to improve morally. I will also examine the power of imagery, metaphors, concept, 
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 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 51. 
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conception, perception, and consciousness, realities that are both hard to describe and to 
define. For instance, the concept of the Good and the myth of the Cave are key elements 
in this study. “Good” is described by Murdoch as indefinable, indescribable, and 
transcendent. Further, one can talk of “loving Good,” but it is hard to understand 
Murdoch’s meaning of loving the Good. These concepts are vague. In Murdoch’s words, 
they cannot be “taped.”18 In this way, my discussion will be unusual, because, with the 
vagueness of certain concepts, I will also be discussing imagery, story, and ideal types, 
including the Myth of the Cave, Murdoch’s classic example of an experience between a 
mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law, her discussion of the “Kantian man,” and the 
scrupulous man among others. In the words of Altorf, “Such examination may seem 
unusual, as it can go against the grain of the text or of ordinary interpretations.”19 In 
doing so, I use the blending of two approaches: one that traces the development of 
Murdoch’s thought;the second, a conceptual approach, that identifies significant themes 
in Murdoch’s work and elaborates them to give a thicker understanding of what Murdoch 
is doing.
20
 Antonaccio uses this blended approach for interpreting Murdoch in Picturing 
the Human.
21
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My goal is to trace the development of the ethics of vision and examine it, to 
show how “vision” and patterns of attentiveness ground our capacity for responsible 
action. It is my belief that character grows out of vision and that vision is one of the chief 
elements that makes responsibility possible. While I concentrate my focus on Murdoch’s 
early writings, toward the end of this chapter I note how Niebuhr’s stress on the dynamics 
of responsibility offers a constructive description of moral agency that integrates vision 
and attention into human response, decision, and action in a broader social context. I 
believe that Niebuhr’s discussion of the dynamics of “responsibility” directly 
complements Murdoch’s stress and offers a helpful clarification regarding the sort of 
active moral agency that Murdoch advocates.  
Iris Murdoch’s Life: A Brief Sketch 
Murdoch was born in 1919 in Dublin to middle class Irish Protestant parents. 
Soon after her birth, her family moved to London where she grew up.  Her parents later 
sent her to the progressive Badminton School in Bristol. In 1938, when she was 19 years 
old, she was accepted into Somerville College, Oxford, where she read the “Greats,” a 
famous regimen of study in ancient history, Greek, Latin, and philosophy. During her 
years of study at Oxford, as World War II’s tragedies grew, she developed close 
friendships with a remarkable set of young women studying philosophy, among them 
Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Elizabeth Anscombe. After the war, they all became 
major philosophers and ethicists in their own right. During her undergraduate years, she 
also became interested in politics and joined the Communist Party, and, for a short while, 
became very vocal about the party’s objectives and concerns. After Murdoch graduated 
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in 1942, she worked as Assistant Principal at the Treasury from 1942-44. From 1944-46, 
she became an officer with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), where she worked with war refugees in Belgium and Austria. This experience 
had a profound impact on her novels and moral philosophy, especially concerning her 
views on the uniqueness of individual personal experience, a concern that would form the 
core commitment in her philosophical and literary work.
22
 
After the war, Murdoch attended Cambridge for one year, 1947-1948, where she 
studied the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who unfortunately had just stopped lecturing. 
Still, Cambridge gave a wonderful stimulus to Murdoch’s thinking and career. In 1948, 
she was chosen to receive a Teaching Fellowship at St. Anne’s College, Oxford, and she 
taught and wrote both novels and important philosophical works there for fifteen years, 
until 1963, when she gave up her position to devote her full energies to writing. She 
became a well-known author with twenty-six novels and five books in philosophical 
ethics. She has also become the subject of many writers who have sought to understand 
her novels and philosophical works. Although she is primarily known for her fiction, a 
recent renewed interest in her philosophical works has emerged because of its impact 
upon several philosophers and theologians, such as Charles Taylor, Alasdair McIntyre, 
Maria Antonaccio, Stanley Hauerwas, and Craig Dykstra, among others.
23
 Hauerwas 
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24 
played a critical role in drawing the attention of Christian ethicists to the significance of 
Murdoch’s agenda. In The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics, Stanley 
Hauerwas states,  
Murdoch’s powerful critique of contemporary philosophy’s pretensions to 
objectivity in the name of analysis seemed to me decisive. Moreover, her 
emphasis on vision as the hallmark of the moral life struck me as exactly what 
was missing from most accounts of the virtues. While I had some difficulty with 
Murdoch’s account of how we come to see, in particular, her Platonic tendency to 
treat language as always distorting truthful vision, she, nevertheless, helped me 
understand how the virtues teach us to see the world without illusions or false 
hopes.
24
 
 
Her philosophical breadth quickly became visible in her powerful writings, 
ranging from her engagement with continental existentialism to her encounter with 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy shaped so powerfully by G. E. Moore’s and 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis that ethics is centered in language, and by her long abiding love 
for Plato.
25
 Her philosophical breadth is conveyed in The Sovereignty of Good and her 
most recent work, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. 
Drawing from G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein, and Plato, with help from Simone Weil 
and Sigmund Freud, Murdoch offers what she calls the technique of vision to give a 
better account of the moral life. Murdoch also presents a depiction of the moral life based 
on a pessimistic view of humankind, where the greatest enemy of the moral self is the 
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ego. She believes being moral has much to do with conquering one’s ego through the 
power of careful attention. In so doing, rather than over-emphasizing an autonomous will, 
Murdoch vehemently criticizes her contemporaries concerning their depiction of the 
moral life and calls for an understanding of the person as involved in degrees of freedom 
as opposed to being totally free, with freedom existing in the will. In other words, 
Murdoch puts forth a call for an enriched conceptualization of life beyond consolation 
and fantasy. In this way, she is a realist who believes that morality begins with the self 
and that one’s personal experience is a fundamental core of morality. This puts her in 
direct conflict with what she calls the “current view” of her contemporaries. Rather than 
accept their view, Murdoch presents her own philosophy, described by Antonaccio as an 
attempt to “preserve as irreducible the value of the individual and its freedom from 
deterministic modes of existence.”26 
Murdoch’s Major Dialogue and Debate Partners 
Murdoch’s periods of study at both Oxford and Cambridge and her experiences 
with war refugee work in Europe provided her with a remarkably broad mastery of 
diverse philosophical and ethical traditions and contemporary conversations. George 
Steiner has rightly suggested that there are five major philosophical “partners in 
discourse” that Murdoch engages across the decades and that this breadth of argument 
and perspective is one of the main reasons that her project is so creative and distinctive.
27
 
First, Murdoch draws on the “Greats,” the canon of classics that she closely studied 
during her years of study at Oxford. She sustains a life-long admiration for the power of 
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Plato’s philosophical agenda and for the power of the way he does philosophy in a highly 
literary and expressive way. As she expresses it in an extended interview, “Plato is not 
only the father of our philosophy, he is our best philosopher.”28 She, likewise, stresses 
that Aristotle, Kant, Hume, and Mill remain giants and deeply influential in her 
understanding of the moral life.  
A second school of dialogue partners for Murdoch are the “moralists, logicians, 
and language analysts among her predecessors and contemporaries” dominating the scene 
at Oxford and Cambridge. Among this cluster of figures are G. E. Moore, whom 
Murdoch, at one point, dubs “the father of modern philosophy” and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
whose emphasis on the function of language pulled so many of his Cambridge students 
into an overall emphasis on language as the key to moral decision-making and agency.
29
 
Those among this group are Stuart Hampshire, Richard M. Hare, A. J. Ayer, and Gilbert 
Ryle, whose work Murdoch understands as supporting an inadequate account of moral 
agency that leaves out the inner life —the realm of personal experience, thoughts, and 
emotions —and depicts the center of ethics as lying in the publicly observable and 
describable terrain of engagements with discrete moral problems via exertions of will 
guided by rules.
30
 
A third major conversation partner for Murdoch is the powerful writing of Jean-
Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and other continental existentialist writers. This dynamic 
movement spoke to the sense of a loss of meaning experienced by the generations who 
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had experienced the chaos and destruction of two major wars in Europe. Murdoch met 
Sartre briefly in 1945, and was deeply impressed by his political commitments and the 
way he passionately developed his philosophical statements in a remarkable literary 
way.
31
 In fact, her first book, Sartre, Romantic Rationalist, was published in 1953 and 
was one of the first works to introduce existentialist thinking to the English speaking 
world. Her title suggests that, while she has great respect for much of Sartre’s agenda, she 
still holds strong reservations regarding the adequacy of his picture of human agency, as 
rooted in a rugged individualist model of a self unencumbered by relationships or 
personal history.
32
  
Murdoch’s fourth main dialogue partner, Steiner rightly notes, is Simone Weil 
with her emphasis on “attention” and the importance of meditation as a technique for 
calming egoism and achieving a clarity of vision of other people and the world around us. 
In 1956, Murdoch published a review of Weil’s Notebooks, and, in this essay, Murdoch 
interprets Weil as a Platonist who holds that “Good is a transcendent reality, and that 
Good and Evil are connected with modes of human knowledge.”33 Murdoch sees Weil as 
offering us a “psychology whose sources are in Plato, in Eastern philosophy, and in the 
disciplines of Christian mysticism. . .”34 Weil holds that “we do not know what we are” 
and that our energies are “at the mercy of mechanical forces” that,  like “gravity,” pull us 
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down.
35
  Murdoch also admires Weil’s deep compassion for the victims of war.36 It is 
clear that Murdoch, while not agreeing with all of Weil’s views, was strongly shaped by 
Weil’s emphasis on techniques for dampening egoism and illusion and Weil’s 
tremendous compassion for those suffering.
37
 
A fifth source of inspiration for Murdoch are the powerful visions of Karl Marx 
and Sigmund Freud. It is the wide influence of the Marxist vision that forces Murdoch 
and others to engage in defining a liberal-pluralist alternative view. But the impact of 
Freud is, perhaps, more directly seen in the way Murdoch, in her novels and 
philosophical works, takes Freud as offering us a post-religious account of a “fallen 
humanity,” whose natural energy is misdirected and tightly constricted by egoist drives.  
Freud’s account of the dynamism of self-interest allows Murdoch to connect moral 
blindness to a failure to love and to extend basic care for others.
38
 
Murdoch’s Identification and Critique of the “Current View” 
In her essay “Vision and Choice in Morality” published in 1956, Murdoch gives a 
sustained description of the two dominant schools of philosophy and ethics of her day, 
namely, the “Oxbridge” analytical philosophers and language-analysts influenced by G. 
E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein and the continental existentialists influenced by 
Sartre and Camus.  Where most observers stressed the broadly divergent origins of these 
two schools, Murdoch sees surprising parallels in their shared understanding of the moral 
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life as rooted in the will, in decision making, and in action. Murdoch acknowledges that, 
while these two philosophical schools have divergent styles, ethical claims, and focal 
concerns, they share and promulgate a common understanding of moral agency.  
Murdoch refers to this understanding as simply the “current view.”39 
In “The Idea of Perfection,” the first essay in The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch 
begins her critique of the privileged status of the “current view.” It ignores “certain facts” 
and imposes a “single theory” that “admitted no communication with or escape into rival 
theories.”40  In so doing, she holds that this dominant model of ethics offers a deeply 
inadequate understanding of moral agency. It does not address activity of the mind and 
the “inner life.” Further, it ignores forms of morality that are just and loving absent of 
outside observers; and lastly, it provides no response to rival philosophies. Murdoch 
constructs a “picture of ‘the man’ of modern moral philosophy” in part by drawing on 
Stuart Hampshire’s Thought and Action. She holds that his views offer a clear summary 
of the prevailing understanding held by so many of her contemporaries.
41
 In so doing, she 
attempts to display the assumptions in the “current philosophy of mind” that “underlie the 
inarticulate moments of modern ethics.”42  Hampshire and so many others, Murdoch 
argues, privilege a view of a “continual flow of intention into action.”43 For Murdoch, 
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this view holds that “Nothing counts as an act unless it is a ‘bringing about of a 
recognizable change in the world.’”44 For Murdoch, the power of Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis that there are no “private languages” has influenced a generation to concentrate 
attention on the publicly observable features of human experience and to question the 
moral significance of the realm of human interiority. As Murdoch puts it, this dominant 
understanding holds: “What is ‘real’ is potentially open to different observers. The inner 
or mental world is inevitably parasitic upon the outer world; it has a parasitic and 
shadowy nature.”45  For Murdoch, this broadly held account in the philosophy of mind 
has pushed philosophers to understand the core of the moral life as centered in intention 
and will as they are channeled into the assessment of problems, the making of decisions, 
and overt acts. To Murdoch, this understanding holds that “Our personal being is the 
movement of our overtly choosing will. Immense care is taken to picture the will as 
isolated. It is isolated from belief, from reason, and from feeling and is yet the essential 
center of the self.”46  As Murdoch puts it, “Morality is a matter of thinking clearly and 
then proceeding to outward dealings with other men.”47 
Murdoch gives a bold summary of the key characteristics of the moral psychology 
that grounds the general consensus view. In Murdoch’s words, “It is behaviorist in its 
connection of the meaning and being of action with the publicly observable, it is 
existentialist in its elimination of the substantial self and its emphasis on the solitary 
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omnipotent will, and it is utilitarian in its assumption that morality is and can only be 
concerned with public acts.”48 It is also. . .  “a democratic view, in that it suggests that 
morality is not some esoteric achievement, but a natural function of any normal man.”49 
For Murdoch, this dominant view, on display in the works of Hampshire, R. M. Hare and 
many other Oxbridge philosophers, arises from a “happy and fruitful marriage of Kantian 
liberalism with Wittgensteinian logic solemnized by Freud.”50 
Murdoch’s critique of this dominant picture of the self is eloquent and forceful. It 
presents an “alien and implausible” understanding of human life. She has “empirical 
objections” to this picture—she believes it is reductionistic and inaccurate. She has 
“philosophical objections,” because she finds the arguments weak, and she has “moral 
objections,” because she believes damage is done by this entrenched “current view.”51 
Murdoch contends that this “current view,” by stressing the moral significance of 
“will,” “decision,” and “action,” pulls attention away from the ordinary ranges of 
personal experience that make up the bulk of people’s lives. Thus, we lose any sense that 
it is in these quiet times and experiences of ordinary life that important aspects of moral 
development can occur.
52
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Murdoch illustrates her point by suggesting a case of a mother-in-law “who feels 
hostility to her daughter-in-law.”53 In Murdoch’s telling, over time the mother-in-law 
comes to closely observe her daughter-in-law and to change “her mind” regarding her 
first impression of the younger woman. Where once the mother-in-law thought the 
daughter-in-law “brusque, sometimes positively rude,” and “always tiresomely juvenile,” 
now, the mother-in-law, after training “careful and just attention” upon the younger 
woman, comes to understand her as “delightfully youthful” and “refreshingly simple.”54 
Murdoch argues that the mother-in-law, while not engaged in publicly observable action, 
has, in fact, been engaged in critical moral action rooted in the focusing of her attention.
55
 
The moral significance lies in that the mother-in-law is not just trying to see the daughter-
in-law “accurately, but to see her justly or lovingly.”56  For Murdoch, the mother-in-law 
is “engaged in an endless task” in a progressive opening up in “love” and “justice.” And, 
this “idea of progress” connects to the “idea of perfection.”57 
Murdoch notes that her own understanding of morality, based on vision, in a 
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progressive attempt to see reality, is not a new view, but one rooted in much of Plato’s 
writings and in much of Christian ethics down through the centuries.
58
 Murdoch 
acknowledges her debt to Simone Weil whose stress on the critical moral significance of 
“attention” inspired Murdoch’s concentration on an “ethics of vision.”59 Against the 
optimistic view of the “current view” about the individual’s employment of rationality in 
moral agency, Murdoch holds that real moral development for individuals is a strenuous 
process and a real moral achievement.
60
  Vision is key to moral agency because, as 
Murdoch holds, “I can only choose within the world I can see. . . .”61 In her view, the 
“existentialist behaviorists” model of agency is reductionist in that it highlights discrete 
problems and decisions, and that it “identifies freedom” with the moment of choice and 
action. For Murdoch, however, a stress on how vision is the progressive development of 
agency diminishes a stress on the category of free choice. She holds: 
But if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, 
and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value around about us, we shall 
not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of 
choosing is already over. . . .[T]he exercise of our freedom is a small piecemeal 
business which goes on all the time and not a grandiose leaping about unimpeded 
at important moments. The moral life . . . is something that goes on continually. 
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Murdoch’s Secular Account of Sin and Ethic of Love 
Murdoch believes that the “current view” paints too optimistic a view of people 
applying reason to cases of decision and action. She holds that both the portrayal of a 
heroic, rugged individual of the existentialist writings and the portrayal of the rational 
moral agent of the Anglo-American analytic school fail to engage the core obstacle of the 
moral life, namely, the dynamic power of egoism. If one has an optimistic view of human 
rationality, then an “ethics of vision” sounds easy and somewhat irrelevant, because it 
may be viewed as a given or ignored. But Murdoch’s stress on the power of egoistic 
energies systematically to distort our attention to the world and others in it highlights the 
great necessity of such a stress on the achievement of clear vision. 
In “On ‘God’ and ‘Good,’” the second essay in The Sovereignty of Good, 
Murdoch draws heavily upon Sigmund Freud’s understanding of the powerful energies of 
the ego to parallel an account of what Christianity has long described as “original sin.” 
The “current view,” with its description of what she calls “linguistic analytical man,” 
stresses “freedom,” “rationality,” and “self-awareness,” but makes “no mention of sin, 
and no mention of love.”63 Murdoch, however, holds that Freud offers us a “realistic and 
detailed picture of the fallen man.”64 As she puts it,  
Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. He sees the psyche as 
an egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined by its own 
individual history, whose natural attachments are sexual, ambiguous, and hard for 
the subject to understand or control. . . [F]antasy is a stronger force than reason. 
Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings.
65
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In her words, “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego.”66 She argues 
that moral philosophy once sought to discuss this energy of selfishness and also along 
with religion sought to recommend “techniques” for the defeat of the ego.  She holds that 
a key question of moral philosophy must be “[A]re there any techniques for the 
purification and reorientation of an energy which is naturally selfish in such a way that 
when moments of choice arrive we shall be sure of acting rightly?”67 She notes that Plato 
and much of classic religious teaching shared this generally pessimistic view of the 
powers of selfishness and delusion and that both recommended ways of overcoming 
egoism. Historically, religion, she argues, has attempted to break the ego by calling 
people to “prayer,” which Murdoch calls an “attention to God which is a form of love.”68 
But she asks, is there a comparable “technique” available “in a world without God?”69 
In distinctive fashion, Murdoch explores what might count as a moral substitute 
for God for a society in which many no longer believe in God. For Murdoch, the “Good” 
understood rightly can help sustain the techniques of unselfing once sustained by 
religious traditions.  “I shall suggest that God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent 
non-representable and necessarily real object of attention; and I shall go on to suggest 
that moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central concept which has all these 
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characteristics.”70 For Murdoch, the “Good” is that reality that requires a pulling away 
from illusion and fantasy to train attention beyond the self. “I would suggest that the 
authority of the Good seems to us something necessary, because the realism (the ability 
to perceive reality) required for goodness is a kind of intellectual ability to perceive what 
is true, which is automatically, at the same time, a suppression of self.”71 In this way, she 
holds that “realism . . . [is] a moral achievement.”72 The core of Murdoch’s understanding 
of moral agency lies in her affirmation that “true vision occasions right conduct.”73 
Joining her secular understanding of sin, Murdoch develops a secular version of 
the Christian ethical stress on love, both love of God and love of neighbor. The energies 
of the ego compulsively pull attention back onto the self’s concerns and interests, and, 
thus, leave little energy for an extension of careful attention out into the world beyond the 
self. But through struggle and techniques wherein we develop a reorientation of attention 
and care beyond ourselves, we can grow in our capacities to love. For Murdoch, “The 
direction of attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away from self which reduces all to 
a false unity, towards the great surprising variety of the world, and the ability so to direct 
attention is love.”74 
Murdoch, as noted earlier, is at pains to debunk the notion that moral significance 
                                                 
70
Ibid., 54.  
 
71
 Ibid., 64. 
 
72
 Ibid. Realism is a moral achievement, because it requires defeating one’s ego. 
 
73
 Ibid. 
 
74
 Ibid., 65. Nussbaum examines Murdoch’s views on erotic love and her drawing on Plato’s 
understanding of the erotic as a vehicle (at its best) for helping us to strive toward beauty and the good. See 
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Love and Vision: Iris Murdoch on Eros and the Individual” in Maria Antonaccio 
and William Schweiker, eds., Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 29-53. 
 
37 
primarily resides in the occasions when a discrete problem confronts us with the need for 
decision and action. Her stress on vision highlights the moral importance of our sustained 
habits and practices of attention.  These can empower both virtue and true vision of 
others in the world of vice and selfishness. “[O]ur ability to act well ‘when the time 
comes’ depends partly, perhaps largely, upon the quality of our habitual objects of 
attention.”75 This is why Murdoch feels that habits of clear vision can be developed and 
secured by attention to God and neighbor (for those to whom religion still speaks), to the 
“Good” that transcends the self, and to the beauty of nature or great art or kind people. 
The stilling of the ego, as we stand before great art, helps train us in a habit of seeing 
beyond our own self-interest. Prayer to God, meditation on realities beyond the self, 
friendship —all of these can become important steps on a progressive path of moral 
development.  For Murdoch “[A]rt is an excellent analogy of morals, or indeed that it is 
in this respect a case of morals. We cease to be in order to attend to the existence of 
something else, a natural object, a person in need.”76 The training of attention to the real 
can occur in diverse ways in people’s lives and all these have direct bearing on our 
building up or diminishing our moral capacities. 
Murdoch draws deeply upon Plato to suggest how the “idea of realism” is linked 
to the “idea of transcendence.”77 She holds that the “Good” is connected to the idea of 
perfection.
78
 Murdoch believes that Plato’s Myth of the Cave offers a helpful insight into 
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the Good.
79
 She agrees with Plato that the Good is “the source of light which reveals to us 
all things as they really are.”80 She also believes that the reality is connected to a type of 
“mysticism” which she holds is a “non-dogmatic essentially unformulated faith in the 
reality of the Good. . .”81  
Mysticism in Murdoch: The Myth of the Cave 
In her essay “The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts,” the concluding 
essay of The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch returns to her appropriation of Plato’s Myth 
of the Cave to help illustrate her understanding of Good as a transcendent reality and a 
moral ideal. Here Murdoch argues that her ethics of vision is grounded in the light of the 
transcendent Good and yet is a deeply realistic ethic. The core obstacle in ethics, she 
submits, lies in the “refusal to attend.”82 As she puts it,  
Of course virtue is good habit and dutiful action. But the background condition of 
such habit and such action, in human beings, is a just mode of vision and good 
quality of consciousness, which is something that must be achieved. As a result, it 
is a task to come to see the world as it is.
83
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 Contending that the “image of Good, as a transcendent magnetic center, seems to 
be the least corruptible and more realistic picture to use in reflecting upon the moral life,” 
Murdoch turns her attention to explaining her understanding of Good in the Myth of the 
Cave. The myth is one of many images used by Plato to express his understanding of the 
moral life. Thus, Murdoch, in recasting Plato’s understanding of the moral life, draws 
from Plato’s cave myth as an instructive device to depict the moral life in a way that 
demonstrates the image of Good as a “transcendent magnetic center.” In so doing, she 
uses the myth to address the core question of her writings: “How do we make ourselves 
morally better?”84   
The image of the Cave is “not something coldly intellectual, [rather] it is 
something that involves the whole man.”85 For her, the myth also “attaches value to the 
most ‘concrete’ of everyday preoccupations and acts.”86 That is, she holds that the myth 
“concerns the continuous detail of human activity, wherein we discriminate between 
appearance and reality, good and bad, true and false, and check or strengthen our 
desires.”87 She also contends that the cave myth captures the whole of morality in its 
totality and thus can serve as a primary motivation and framework for recapitulating the 
moral life as well as human existence. This is because Murdoch believes that “morality is 
a sort of unesoteric mysticism, having its source in an austere and unconsoled love of the 
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Good.”88 In her words, the myth shows that the “good and just life is thus a process of 
clarification.”89 She holds that the good and just life is also “a movement toward selfless 
lucidity, guided by ideas of perfection which are objects of love.”90 Here, the supreme 
object of perfection is the Good. An understanding of its reality helps to lead the pilgrim 
to a greater faith, a progressive path of moral development. Put another way, according to 
Murdoch’s understanding of Plato’s parable, “the moral life is a spiritual pilgrimage 
inspired by the disturbing magnetism of truth, involving ipso facto a purification of 
energy and desire in the light of a vision of what is good.”91 That is, the parable, Murdoch 
contends, shows that one’s conception of reality begins as shadows cast upon the wall of 
a cave and that, as one’s cognitive awareness develops, one moves through several stages 
of consciousness that with “attention” allow one to see more clearly and truthfully.92  
For Murdoch, this is a normative process that involves the agent and the agent’s 
response to surrounding reality. According to her interpretation of the parable, the Cave 
represents a condition of reality in which the agent finds himself or herself. In the 
“Cave,” at first, because the shadow is all that the pilgrim sees, the pilgrim perceives 
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himself as a shadow cast upon the wall of the cave in the light of the fire.
 93
 Here, the fire 
represents the “old unregenerate energy of the psyche,” while the shadow represents the 
complete reality of the pilgrim.
94
 Then, through a progressive change in “quality of 
consciousness,” the pilgrim “turns around and sees the fire” that “threw the shadow,” 
and, then, with additional progress in “quality of consciousness,” the pilgrim eventually 
notices the light of the sun beyond the fire.
95
 The sun represents the transcendent Good, 
the supreme power that gives unity to form. Thus, the pilgrim focuses his or her attention 
upon the sun and journeys toward it.
96
 In the words of Murdoch, through a process of 
striving ascent, the pilgrim journeys through several levels of consciousness and is able 
not only to see himself differently but also, through the use of experience along the 
journey, to discover his or her way out of the cave, and, eventually, by raising his or her 
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head, to look up at the sun.
97
 However, what the pilgrim sees are the “converging edges” 
of the sun rather than its “magnetic center.” The magnetic center escapes the pilgrim’s 
view because, in the words of Murdoch, “it is not like looking at other things.”98 As a 
result, the pilgrim does not and cannot know and conceptualize what the sun is like in its 
center.
99
 There is a sense of trying to look, but what is seen is only false doubles.
100
 
Here, Murdoch holds that the Good is “indefinable,” “indescribable,” and a 
“unifier of forms.”101 She believes that the Good is also inseparable from knowledge and 
is the focal point of “attention” when one’s intention to achieve virtue coexists with a 
desire for clear vision.
102
 In this way, as I said earlier, Good is that reality that requires a 
pulling away from illusion and fantasy to train the attention beyond the self. In short, the 
sun is the source of light, which reveals to us all things as they really are, all “just 
                                                 
97
 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 97. Murdoch believes that it is impossible for the agent to 
look directly at the sun. The Good is not visible, but Plato pictures the good man as able to look at the sun. 
However, this agent represents one among many in a community of pilgrims, as depicted in the note above. 
All do not progress at the same rate. Only those who are enlightened are able to advance, which involves 
turning around, climbing up, and raising our heads. Implied is no demand to help others to see the light. 
Only those who are enlightened are called to be responsible agents. Such agency inspires an attitude that 
leads those who are enlightened to assist those who are unenlightened that all may see the light and become 
responsible. 
98
 Ibid. 
 
99
 Ibid. 
 
100
 Ibid., 97-98. For example, there may be a false sun. 
 
101
 Plato’s Form Theory deals with logic and moral questions. Plato’s Forms are models, 
archetypes, demigods. In the ethical role, the forms are moral ideas active in our lives, radiant icons, and 
images of virtue (Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’,” The Sovereignty of Good, 68). According to Murdoch, 
beauty is the most vivid sense of form. She argues that “we see and love beauty more readily than we love 
good.” Like Plato, she argues that beauty is the spiritual thing to which we are most attracted. Plato pictures 
the human soul as having been able to see the spiritual Forms with perfect clarity, a vision of which the 
incarnate soul retains a shadowy memory. The sun may be far away, but its reflection in beauty is near and 
so is the light (Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 14).  
102
 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 68. 
43 
vision.”103 “Just vision” represents an accurate and “loving” depiction of “reality or 
realities” without “prejudice.” A truthful depiction of reality is achieved because, as 
Murdoch contends, “an increased (loving) awareness of the Good brings with it an 
increasing awareness of the unity and interdependence of the moral world.”104 For 
example, the sun cast the shadow of the pilgrim upon the wall of the cave.
105
 The agent 
sees himself as a shadow. The shadow represents the “lowest level of awareness,” the 
fundamental “Form” of our moral condition.106 However, with experience and reflection, 
the pilgrim, by attending to the Good, strives through several levels of consciousness and 
is able to see the shadows more clearly in the light of the sun at each progressive level of 
the process and, inspired by truth, finally emerges from the cave to look at the sun.
107
 
“The moral pilgrim emerges from the cave and begins to see the real world and at last of 
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all, is able to look at the sun itself.”108 In short, the sun is seen at the end of a journey, 
which, according to Murdoch, involves “reorientation and an ascent.”109  
[The sun] is real. It is out there, but very distant. It gives light and energy and 
enables us to know the truth. In its light, we see the things of the world in their 
true relationships. Looking at the sun itself is supremely difficult and is unlike 
looking at things in its light; the sun is a different kind of thing from what it 
illuminates.
110
  
 
Here, according to Plato’s conception of human life, the self is a place of illusion. 
“Goodness is connected with the attempt to see” a purification of the old unregenerate 
energy of the psyche through what Antonaccio calls an “ethics of unselfing.”111 An ethics 
of unselfing is an ascetic process that allows the pilgrim to “see and to respond to the real 
world in the light of a virtuous consciousness.”112 What this means is that the pilgrim is 
able to perceive truthfully what is happening to make the appropriate response to reality 
in light of a selfless state of consciousness. It is here that Marije Altorf contends that the 
answer to living better is found in “understanding consciousness in relation to an external 
reality.”113 Here, the external reality is the Good, represented by the sun. In short, the 
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process represents an “endless struggle” and is the “attempt to pierce the veil of selfish 
consciousness and join the world as it really is.”114   
However, for Murdoch, a truthful depiction of reality is achieved only by those 
who can rightly differentiate between the “real good” and its “false double.”115 “The love 
which brings the right answer is an exercise of justice and realism and really looking.”116 
For Murdoch, the struggle involves keeping one’s focus secure upon the condition one is 
confronted with and on the “consolation” of Good to escape despair. “Consolation of 
Good” means that the moral agent must strive to love Good in the same way that 
Christians strive to love God. This expression conveys Murdoch’s efforts to retain certain 
religious values that she sees as essential for living the moral life. Here, God, as an object 
of attention, consoles, and Murdoch would like for Good to replace God as the consoling 
object of attention. The bottom line is that the moral agent must find comfort in Good. 
However, the parable of the Cave, as an instructive device, presents the 
“journeying soul as ascending through four stages of enlightenment, progressively 
discovering at each stage that what it was treating as realities were only shadows or 
images of something more real still.”117 At the end of this quest, the “soul reaches a non-
hypothetical first principle, which is the form or idea of the Good, which enables it then 
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to descend and retrace its path, but moving only through the forms or true conception of 
that which it previously understood only in part” (Republic, 510-11).118 In short, Plato’s 
conception of the complete life of an individual is a mix of “knowledge and illusion,” 
submerged in a “reality” that extends beyond it, apprehending or failing to apprehend, in 
countless ways, the dissimilarity “between true and false and good and evil.”119 Here, 
Murdoch takes a metaphysical stance without being able to give clarity to that stance. As 
Luisa Muraro contends,  
[Murdoch] describes “a metaphysical position but no metaphysical form.” … 
[H]er remarks have something in common with those of the mystics who speak of 
God and then add; what I’ve said is false. They undermined certainty in order to 
make a comparison between the inexhaustible wealth of the presence of their 
beloved, which they had understood through direct experience, and wanted to 
convey to others as their own devoted but incomplete knowing. . . . Her intent is 
to prevent philosophical thought, her own first and foremost, from taking that 
“authority” (her word) that is the province of reality as it presents itself to 
experience informed by love, whether in the moral life of good people or in the 
fruition of beautiful things.
120
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Murdoch holds that, in being conscious, we are valuing creatures, perpetually 
valuing and focusing our efforts on the world around us in ways that shape and are 
shaped according to how we unselfishly and truthfully comprehend such value. In this 
view, as Bridget Clarke states, “simply in virtue of having a consciousness, Murdoch 
believes one is constantly evaluating and directing one’s attention to reality in ways that 
shape and are shaped by one’s moral understanding.”121 Murdoch believes perception is a 
mode of moral evaluation. All is moral. Thus, because the way one perceives the world is 
inseparable from one’s state of consciousness, restoring consciousness, in light of the role 
experience plays in the moral life, is at the core of Murdoch’s philosophical writings. 
Next, I turn my attention to understanding these two important features in Murdoch’s 
philosophical writings. 
Experience and Consciousness in Murdoch 
Murdoch believes that understanding the concept of “experience,” especially in its 
relationship to God and Good, is the key to understanding the moral life. In this view, 
experience is so intricately related to consciousness that, in the words of Murdoch, 
“experience is consciousness.”122 Antonaccio notes, “Against the displacement of the 
notion of consciousness in favor . . . of language, Murdoch retrieves consciousness as the 
fundamental mode of human moral being.”123 For Murdoch, consciousness involves 
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one’s perception of reality as an evaluative process of knowing. She holds that this entails 
much more than a shadowy substance, something she equates with “merely a daydream” 
or an “impersonal thought.”124 Murdoch contends that consciousness “is deep and 
complex; it has density, thoughts and perceptions and feelings are combined in the swift 
movement of our mode of existence.”125 Pictured as consciousness, experience is “a 
stream punctuated by objectified memorable events,” the significant moments or 
occurrences in our lives.
126
 According to this view, our experience makes a difference in 
how we see the world. In fact, it deepens our awareness according to degrees of 
understanding.
127
  
As a result, our spirituality is commensurable to our experience, and our 
experience is intrinsic to our understanding of the moral life.
128
 In this view, there is no 
separation between knowledge and the good.
129
 Here,  
Goodness is connected . . . with a refined and honest perception of what is really 
the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one, 
which is the result not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a certain perfectly 
familiar kind of moral discipline.
130
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This is a discipline that includes both moral effort and a moral imagination (akin to that 
of an artist) under the authority of an absolute value, Good or God. Directing one’s 
attention to the reality of the Good brings clarity of vision, and it is the key to our 
becoming morally better. As a result, “knowledge informs the moral quality of the 
world.”131 Here, for example, virtue is found by the “careful scrupulous, benevolent, and 
just” person who, Murdoch holds, “sees” the world differently from the “callous” 
individual.
132
  
This stress on experience highlights a “progressively changing quality of 
consciousness.”133 The moral agent “begins to see different objects” and gains a 
“deeper,” “wider,” and “wiser understanding of the world.”134 In other words, for 
Murdoch, the agent produces a helpful “series of acts” and “mental states.”135 He or she 
can better “see people’s faces and leaves on trees” as they are.136 It does not happen 
immediately at the moment of choice. Rather, it happens gradually over time. Therefore, 
for Murdoch, “what happens in between such choices is indeed what is crucial” to the 
moral life.
137
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Like Plato, she believes that morality is circular and that ultimate reality resides in 
its center as the “idea of perfection.” This is another way to say that the conscience of the 
moral agent is oriented toward Good as his or her center of value. The agent’s orientation 
toward such a rubric is intrinsic and best expressed as a form or process of aesthetic 
evaluation inhabiting the mind of the agent. As a result, any form of cognition, because it 
contains order, involves a prior form of value through which moral acts are measured, an 
aesthetic value, built into the conscience of the agent. This sense of value that Murdoch 
identifies as Good gives unity to the self. Thus, Murdoch notes, Good is not merely a 
descriptive term; rather, Good is an aesthetic value, a type of value that resides in the arts. 
What this means for Murdoch, as Antonaccio states, is that “other disciplined acts of 
understanding could provide similar insights and perhaps good art above all.”138  
Good art helps us to “purify our imagination” of illusion.139 We submit ourselves 
unconditionally to its authority.
140
 We recognize its “hierarchy,” its “degrees of merit,” 
“heights,” “distances,” and so on.141 “Art shows us how difficult it is to be objective by 
showing us how differently the world looks to an objective vision.”142 According to 
Murdoch, moral agents do not create moral value; rather, like great artists, they recognize 
moral value through sustained attention and trained vision. Here, “freedom” is discovered 
as the “disciplined overcoming of self,” and humility, in the words of Murdoch, is 
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“selfless respect for reality.”143 For the moral agent and artist, a truthful depiction of 
reality “combines just modes of judgment” with an “increased perception of detail.”144 
With the recognition of such value, both agent and artist seek to orient their lives around 
it. However, for Murdoch, such recognition of value comes only through the process of 
“unselfing.” This is a core theme throughout her work.  
I will spend the rest of this chapter focusing upon deepening our understanding of 
Murdoch’s concept of vision through “unselfing.” After discussing unselfing as a process 
for achieving the moral life, I discuss how vision relates to an ethics of responsibility and 
show how an ethics of responsibility adds a missing dimension to Murdoch’s ethics of 
vision. I do this using Niebuhr’s ethics of responsibility. For example, I demonstrate that 
responsibility lies in the moral agent who not only sees but also “stays with his [or her] 
action, who accepts the consequences [of his or her] action in the form of reactions and 
[who] looks forward in a present deed to the continued interactions.”145 That is, I show 
that the moral agent is held “socially accountable” for his or her acts, which adds a social 
and political dimension to Murdoch’s work. This means that being responsible beyond 
“seeing” is to act in “solidarity with others” in an ongoing community where everyone is 
accountable.
146
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Ethics of Unselfing 
Murdoch believes that virtue involves a desire for the achievement of “truth” and 
“reality,” and that this comes through “unselfing,” a term she draws from Simone Weil.  
For Murdoch, exemplars of virtue are “unselfish mothers of large families,” “saints,” 
“heroes,” and “hero-saints,” individuals who, as Tony Milligan, rightly notes, “sacrifice 
themselves for the sake of the other.”147  
Unselfing is a term that Murdoch uses to emphasize the practice of pulling 
attention away from the self and directing it toward others. It is a practice that demands a 
sacrificial commitment on the part of the moral agent.
148
 To be virtuous, the moral agent 
must place others first. That is, the agent must think of others from the outset. In many 
cases, this involves suffering. Such a sacrificial commitment distinguishes Murdoch’s 
understanding of virtue from that of Aristotle. For Aristotle, virtue itself is rewarding. For 
Murdoch, there is no reward or telos (end). In fact, virtue is an achievement tied up in 
one’s perception of goodness. Murdoch’s classic example of “unselfing” is demonstrated 
in the illustration noted earlier of the mother-in-law, M, and her daughter-in-law, D. For 
example, M had a change in her attitude of mind with respect to her temperament toward 
D. The change of being or change of consciousness is brought about by the “deep process 
of unselfing” as M sought to attend to D lovingly and justly. In using this illustration, 
Murdoch demonstrates that she is cognizant of the fact that moral change demands a 
reorientation of mental energies, the purging of illusions, and the disrobing of “idolatrous 
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images” and their “false consolations” to perceive reality truthfully. As Antonaccio notes, 
Murdoch seems to be well aware that “moral transformation requires the expunging of 
self-seeking fantasies, the stripping away of idolatrous images, and their attendant false 
consolations, in order to gain a truthful perception of reality and others.”149 It is here that 
Antonaccio contends that Murdoch’s notion of “unselfing” is carefully aligned with her 
attempt to eliminate elements viewed as mythic from religion and to redirect “psychic 
energies.” 150 What Murdoch seems to be interested in is the energy generated in attention 
as a formula for generating such energy to be used in ascetic practices. Central to this 
process of moral development is what Antonaccio calls askesis. It involves a type of 
transformation that Murdoch sees in artistic practice, and it serves as a reoccurring theme 
in her understanding of virtue.
151
 Although, askesis (or ascesis) is “commonly associated 
with religious practices devoted to the renunciation or mortification of bodily desires for 
the sake of some spiritual aim,” Murdoch’s use of it is closely connected to its root 
meaning, “exercises.”152 As such, Murdoch uses the term to refer to an extensive 
assortment of ways that human beings shape their existence in relation to an “ideal 
good.” 153 However, Antonaccio rightly notes that Murdoch’s use of the term does mark 
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the “presence of a renunciatory element.”154 Being virtuous requires the purging of “self-
seeking fantasies.”155 Only through the removal of such fantasies can a truthful 
perception of reality and others be achieved.
156
 The removal of these fantasies requires a 
redirection of psychic energies, something that the ordinary person can most confidently 
achieve.
157
  
Therefore, it is not surprising to see why Murdoch holds that “modern psychology 
supports the ordinary person’s or ordinary believer’s instinctive sense of the importance 
of his states of mind and the availability of supplementary energy.”158 As a result, I 
believe that this explains her hope that modern psychology would prompt contemporary 
behaviorist philosophers to re-examine their discarded concepts of “experience and 
consciousness.”159 To do so would manifest a more accurate depiction of the human 
condition and point to unselfing as a process for making people’s lives better. Psychology 
helps with this by exposing to us the dynamics involved with redirecting an energy that is 
naturally selfish. However, she makes it clear that unselfing requires more than just 
opening our eyes to see clearly. In her view, seeing clearly requires work because we are 
in battle with the “fat relentless ego” that continually fabricates and falsifies what the 
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world is really like.
160
 It is this selfish nature in the human person that brings forth 
different qualities and often distortions of consciousness. As a result, “each of us pictures 
the world in a variety of ways that may differ in quality depending upon our vantage 
point.”161 We are not excluded from “fantasy” and “reveries” due to our attractions, 
needs, and desires. Many of these aspects of our nature are profoundly connected with 
our energies and our ability to choose and act. Fantasy and reveries blind us. To see 
clearly, we must work to be completely free of illusion.
162
  
In the words of Murdoch, “if quality of consciousness matters, then anything that 
turns consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be 
connected with virtue.”163 According to this view, virtue results from unselfing, which 
involves a process of letting go objects of love. “Unselfishness” is one’s attention turned 
outward away from one’s self toward others as an expression of love. Objectivity here is 
unlike scientific objectivity that aims at neutrality. Objectivity, for Murdoch, is the 
building up of selective detachments as one struggles to see what is before one. It 
involves directing one’s love through a gradual building up of affection that comes with 
“clear vision.” For Murdoch, realism has much to do with “seeing” as a careful study.   
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Murdoch’s Contribution: An Assessment 
In this work, I have made no attempt to conduct a complete or comprehensive 
study of the entire works of Murdoch. The most recent comprehensive reading of 
Murdoch’s work was done by Maria Antonaccio, as indicated below.164 However, this 
study shows that Murdoch’s writings are broad, complex, unsystematic, and sometimes 
vague; her writings also cover a wide range of materials including both philosophy and 
fiction. She does not footnote, but she demonstrates that she has a firm grasp of the 
materials as she moves from argument to argument with ease. The problem is that she 
also assumes that her readers have a grasp of the materials of those she refers to in her 
argument, including Descartes, Hume, Kant, Mill, and Marx.
165
 For example, she says 
little to nothing about Marx in her essays but assumes that the reader knows Marx’s 
agenda. In fact, the discussions in her three essays include discussions on ethics, art, 
literature, Platonic ethics, virtue theory, and the debate over the relation between 
philosophy and literature, the retrieval of moral realism in ethics, critiques of liberalism, 
and the relationship between ethics and religious discourse. In short, Murdoch boldly and 
brilliantly challenges the major minds of her time.  
Writing in an age that she described as scientific and anti-metaphysical in which 
the dogmas, images, and precepts of religion had lost much of their power, Murdoch 
demonstrates her concern regarding the inability of her contemporaries to see the great 
loss of an accurate picture of the human condition inasmuch as these moral philosophers 
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all supported a narrow conception of human moral agency, something she called the 
“current view.” Here, as Charles Taylor believes, Murdoch was “criticizing the 
narrowness of moral philosophy.”166 Thus, what she was writing against was a 
reductionistic account of the human individual.  
At the heart of her concern is a worry about the effect of this loss on our ability to 
theorize adequately about the reality of human beings. In short, she is concerned about 
how we picture the human person.
167
  She insists that morality must endeavor to be a 
form of metaphysical realism, and she is wary of appeals to consensus or community as 
an easily corruptible standard for moral claims.
168
  In so doing, she depicts the human 
person with “inward depths and experiences that cannot be reduced to a system of public 
or collective meanings.”169 
However, to understand Murdoch’s work, one must know that she uses a 
conceptual approach to understanding morality that is radically different from standard 
philosophical arguments.
170
 The conceptual approach is a form of metaphysical realism 
that calls for the imaginative construction of ideas, thoughts, and language built upon 
pictures. Murdoch uses this form of metaphysical realism as a way of understanding the 
moral life that can depict the moral agent with inward depths and experiences. In so 
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doing, Antonaccio notes, 
Murdoch provides conceptual schemes and explanatory pictures of human moral 
being in relation to the good. These pictures of the human have retained their 
explanatory force and evocative power over several decades and through cultural 
and philosophical shifts that might have rendered them obsolete. This testifies to 
the depth and insight of Iris Murdoch’s moral imagination.171 
 
The conceptual approach provides an accurate picture of the condition of 
humankind described by Murdoch as a “creature of pictures.” Ultimately, her writing is 
framed through this understanding as she seeks to provide a normative account of human 
agency against a background soaked in value. Plato’s love of the Good and Freud’s 
pessimistic view, although they did not fully agree, together provide an adequate 
framework for understanding such a condition. As Tracy states:  
Of course, neither Murdoch nor any other good interpreter of eros and the Good 
would claim that Plato and Freud share the same view of our situation. But Iris 
Murdoch does show their affinities by her careful interpretation of central factors 
in both Plato’s and Freud’s different but oddly related notions of the need for 
therapy in the soul before any objective truth or goodness can be claimed.
172
 
 
Murdoch excludes structural volence in her philosophical understanding of the 
individual self, so much so that she misses the role that structural violence plays in 
distorting society’s vision of whole classes of others. Social justice issues were not her 
concern. In fact, in Martha Nussbaum’s critique of Murdoch, she holds that “political and 
social determinants of a moral vision” seem to escape Murdoch’s “interest.”173  
Nussbaum goes on to say that “all too rarely does Murdoch suggest that goodness 
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requires reflection about social justice.”174 As a result, the lack of a more adequate 
political and social world diminishes the relevance of her ideas to complex social 
situations.
175
  
Niebuhr adds a distinctive element that Murdoch misses by filling this void. 
Niebuhr’s concern for the social self and social solidarity points us in the direction of 
social justice. Niebuhr’s “man the answerer” responds to actions upon him as a “part of a 
total action, something which means the total action or derives its meaning from the 
whole.”176 The moral agent’s responses are personal and social. The agent’s action 
“exists in responses . . . to others who as Thou’s are members of a group in whose 
interactions constancies are present in such a way that the self can interpret present action 
and anticipate future action upon it.”177 As a result, Niebuhr’s ethics of responsibility 
actually broadens our understanding of vision as it relates to responsible action. In this 
way, he directs our attention toward acting fittingly. With Niebuhr, “vision” occasions 
right action, but the focus is not on the individual; it is rather on the community of which 
the individual is a part.  
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Murdoch’s focus is almost completely upon the individual and her stress is on 
attention and vision. Niebuhr, however, focuses on the individual and society, and his 
stress is upon attention and how it requires response and action. He develops social 
attention to broad issues of justice, and Murdoch focuses on a moral psychology of the 
self. Murdoch says that, if one sees accurately, right action will follow, but she is vague 
on what the action may require. In this way, while her work helps to provide accuracy in 
our ability to see the significance of the texture that makes up human lives, Murdoch 
never really tells us what to do when certain conditions are identified. In the words of 
Nussbaum, “Murdoch tends to veer sharply away from those questions, and even to 
suggest that in the end they did not matter, that the only important thing was each 
person’s struggle for self-perfection.”178  
While I deeply appreciate much of Murdoch’s agenda, I must agree with 
Nussbaum’s highlighting of the significance of the issues and concerns that Murdoch 
tends to ignore. Murdoch is short on analysis of action and social justice. Niebuhr’s ethics 
of responsibility brings in a social awareness that enriches our understanding of vision 
and action in ways that help to move toward social justice. Thus, my engagement with 
Niebuhr is driven by his affirmation of the importance of vision, and he had a social 
agenda. This agenda involves the task to “analyze ‘ethos,’  to lay bare the roots and 
fundamental character of a community’s moral life” in order to “[understand] what ought 
to be done.”179 He explores how we see clearly, respond fittingly, and express our 
commitment to be accountable to others, ourselves, and God. Lifting up these important 
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themes helps to engage the work of Martin Luther King Jr. and Emilie Townes. 
Niebuhr’s focus upon fitting action has provided a way to discuss social justice issues and 
in a more concrete way to express the connection between clear “vision” and “right 
action.” 
H. Richard Niebuhr and the Ethics of Responsibility 
Like Murdoch, Niebuhr criticizes utilitarian and deontological models of agency 
as being reductionistic. He celebrates the many contributions made by the “Man the 
Maker” and “Man the Citizen” images at “enabling us to understand broad ranges of 
human existence” and at offering us helpful “guidance in making complex decisions,” but 
he points out the failure to move beyond “images” and “hypotheses” to fully capture 
“truthful copies of reality.”180 He correctly asserts that the old images of “Man the 
Maker” and “Man the Citizen” reduced human moral existence to a set of rules, laws, and 
goals. Niebuhr, focusing on the social self and social solidarity, sees the agent as homo 
dialogicus, a claim that implies the “notion that conceptions of human existence are 
deeply bound to cultural forces shaping how the world is structured and how goodness is 
understood.”181 The Maker and Citizen images fail to capture this aspect of reality. 
Niebuhr states that “Man as Maker subordinates the giving of laws to the work of 
constructions. The right is to be defined by reference to the good.”182 Moral action is 
connected to the “attainment of a desired or desirable end” sought through utilitarian 
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rules designed as “means to an ends.”183  Niebuhr claims that Man the Citizen seeks 
“equally to subordinate the good to the right.” When the Citizen image is used to depict 
the moral life, moral action is connected to the “right life.” The focus is on the now. 
There is “no future ideal” and the right life is the good life.184 When both deontological 
and utilitarian images are analyzed together to apprehend our existence, the images create 
a conflicting “double theory” involving an extension of practical questions. For example, 
the practical question “What shall I do?” or “What shall we do?” becomes the question 
“What is required and by whom is it required?”185 These questions present the moral life 
as an explanation and justification of laws and authority. 
 Moreover, the Maker and Citizen images fail to capture the “material of our own 
actions,” which is the part of our actions that defines who we are as individuals and 
groups.
186
  For example, we are responsive beings. We address each other and engage in 
dialogue in response to questions, to defend ourselves from both verbal and physical 
attacks, to make injunctions and to meet challenges and so on.
187
 These are common 
experiences that are not depicted in the “old images,” and for Niebuhr, they provide 
evidence that our actions have the characteristics of being responsible. That is, we 
constantly respond to forces that act upon us. Niebuhr vehemently claims that the image 
of “responsibility brings into view aspects of our self-defining conduct that are obscured 
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when Man the Maker and Man the Citizen are used.”188 Unlike the Man the Maker and 
Man the Citizen images, “responsibility” causes us to “feel fear, confidence, appetite, 
anger, and pity at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people, with the right motive, and in the right way.”189  
By connecting Murdoch’s ethics of vision with Niebuhr’s ethics of responsibility, 
the close relation between the two approaches becomes evident.
190
 For example, at a 
fundamental level, both approaches assert that human agents are not simply responsive 
beings. Human agents are influenced by values that transcend the physical world. Human 
agents respond to sacred values that are more spiritual than physical. Like Murdoch, 
Niebuhr’s view suggests that the transcendent “center of value” to which moral agency is 
ordered is not only the rubric by which all things are measured and ordered around but 
that the moral agency is also God. Niebuhr argues that God intimately involves Himself 
or Herself with humans by interacting with them spiritually. The Divine interacts with 
humanity as humans respond by consent to the authority of the Scriptures, the Church 
and the Christian community.  Divinity is revealed in the “Son” and is best expressed as 
“God with us.”191 On this note, Niebuhr states that “moral action is human action in 
response to the governing action of God.”192 Thus, Niebuhr contends that God acts upon 
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the agent, and the agent answers by responding to God with a “fitting” response, which is 
done with the help of not only a moral effort and a moral imagination but also with the 
help of God and others.
193
  
 According to Niebuhr, God is both ruler and sustainer.
194
 Divine grace influences 
the agent’s response when the agent fixes his or her attention on God.195 God, as ruler and 
sustainer, forms the heart of Niebuhr’s theory of ethics.  Divine grace drives the agent 
toward morality. The responsible self is driven to respond within the boundaries of the 
Christian community and to all God’s actions in history and in nature. The responsible 
agent must respond in solidarity with his or her community, while responding to God’s 
creative power as interpreted by both the agent and the community to which he or she 
belongs. Therefore, the agent’s expressed solidarity is anticipated, because the agent 
develops a pattern of responses as he or she becomes engaged in patterns of interaction 
within the community.
 196
 
The concept of vision is significant here because, as Niebuhr states, in order to 
respond appropriately, humans must not only perceive the world, but also pose the 
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question at the core of Niebuhr’s thought: “What is going on?” This question not only 
involves being able to give a detailed account of the things that make up one’s 
environment, but it also emphasizes the importance of self-knowledge, both internally 
and externally.
197
 Internal self-knowledge refers to the interiority of the person 
performing the action. “Who am I” and “what am I becoming”198 are questions 
concerning the agent’s entire being (ontologically and epistemologically). Thus, an ethics 
of being is concerned with the agent’s inner self. It implies that God’s actions are heart-
related, so one must respond from the heart if one is to respond appropriately.
199
 This 
involves a process in which patterns of action reveal identities; a person’s inner-self or 
character is exposed. There is an intrinsic relationship between conduct and character. 
Therefore, conduct is a reflection of character. As a result, the question of accuracy of 
vision becomes important in accurately interpreting what is going on in order to respond 
fittingly. A moral response identifies the character of the person, and a moral person’s 
response stems from character.  
The ethics of vision and responsibility are concerned with the interior and exterior 
of a person and focuses on accuracy of moral response. In other words, discipleship 
supports and specifies what religion discloses about the relational nature of the person, 
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and a person’s life is lived in absolute openness and self- giving to God and to other 
people, which is rarely achieved, according to Murdoch.
200
 For Niebuhr, one primary 
concern is “gaining clarity of vision.”201 In fact, he considers it the fundamental task and 
purpose of moral theology.  He states that theology is a “reflection on the action and 
nature of God,” while “ethics is the response of man to the action and nature of God.”202 
In other words, moral theology is concerned with teaching people to see and act 
responsibly within ongoing patterns of interactions. Niebuhr believes that seeing is 
essential in leading a moral life. As a result, accuracy of vision leads to a truthful 
depiction of reality, and clear vision results in right actions. If one sees clearly, one 
responds correctly. The problem is that sin (or ego) attempts to obstruct the moral path as 
a result of both internal and external forces.
203
 Divine grace provides empowerment and 
the drive to engage internal and external forces as individuals and as communities. 
Vision and Responsibility and the Problem of Racial Injustice 
In this chapter, I have focused on an “ethics of vision” as it is understood in the 
work of Iris Murdoch, who not only argues that moral good should be conceived through 
vision but actually recasts the work of Plato, specifically his understanding of Good, the 
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Cave, and perception. This study is based on her understanding of vision, which is 
supported by those scholars who have been influenced by her work.   
The ethics of vision asserts that morality is a form of metaphysical realism. In 
other words, morality consists of adequate conceptions and interpretations of situations 
that correspond to reality and offers a technique for analyzing the “inner life” in the sense 
of personal attitudes and visions that do not take the form of choice-structured 
arguments.
204
 It is a realist approach to moral problems, involving seeing reality clearly. 
It conveys a type of evaluative knowledge, or awareness, directed toward an object of 
interest and assisted by moral imagination and moral effort.
205
  
Therefore, the ethics of vision involves a way of seeing directed under the 
authority of the Good with the Good being an idea of perfection.
206
 This perfection is the 
“center of value,” and it not only represents the rubric by which all things are measured, 
but it also provides the source of energy that sustains all things. This approach bases 
virtue on perceiving and interpreting what one sees before acting.
207
 It is to perceive 
reality and understand reality truthfully. Emphasis is placed on ‘seeing’ as a moral 
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discipline. Morality is striving to discover the truths that exist without being recognized. 
Perceiving truth directs actions by eliminating choices.  
The ethics of vision is also linked to the Greek culture and is discussed in the 
Republic as well as Nicomachean ethics;
208
 however, its more recent use represents a 
shift in moral thinking from an act-centered approach that focuses on structures and 
functions to a more person-centered approach that focuses upon activities, as discussed 
previously in this chapter. The concept of experience is central to both works. In their 
work, Iris Murdoch and H. Richard Niebuhr view the world as a mystery in which truth is 
to be discovered. Experience plays a significant role not only in a perception of the world 
but also in encountering the world and being encountered by the world.
209
 Truths are 
intrinsically knowable through a moral imagination and deep discernment. One responds 
to the world and is shaped by the world as he or she participates in shaping the world, 
which is achieved by attending to “particulars.” Attending allows one to not only see 
clearly but to also mirror what one sees and to use one’s imagination to impact what is 
seen. This implies that the agent is deeply involved within his or her relationship with the 
world and that he or she must strive to correctly participate in it.  
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Therefore, “ethics of vision” is an approach that has been used in both Christian 
ethics and moral philosophy to stress the importance of seeing as a device for interpreting 
and valuing the things that impact our lives. A fitting response is accommodated by the 
agent’s interpretation and values the reality that the agent is confronted with. The reality 
that moves the agent out of isolation and places the agent in a relationship with others 
within a historical setting or context forms the background of the agent’s response.210 
Here, the moral agent uses all his or her faculties to gain insight about a situation in order 
to interpret and respond to the reality around him or her. 
Unlike Niebuhr, Murdoch emphasizes that vision is the totality for all moral 
striving. For her, vision itself is a moral achievement. To see clearly, humans must 
overcome self-deception. The self must overcome the ego in order to see clearly and to 
see things as they are. Thus, the ethics of vision imply that if one is to discover the hidden 
truths of the world, then one must exercise a life of selflessness. Therefore, it is through 
conquering ego and valuing the world that one is able to truly see the world and become 
virtuous.  Instead of asking the question “what is happening,” Murdoch believes that it is 
a given that one already apprehends more than one can handle from one’s surrounding. 
The problem for the agent is seeing clearly in order to move beyond fantasy.
211
 Thus, 
Murdoch’s question becomes a question of clarification. If the agent sees clearly, the 
right action inevitably follows when the agent acts out of obedience to what is seen. 
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Therefore, Murdoch asserts that morality is born out of “attention,” which is a loving and 
just gaze directed toward another using a moral imagination and moral effort. It is the 
quality of one’s ability to attend to others through deep loving and just discernment 
without prejudicial motives that determines the moral quality of one’s response.  
Therefore, “ethics of vision” consists of evaluation guided by aesthetic values and 
principles, which concern a grasp of particulars. It reveals the relationship between 
judgment and values and combines Christian ethics with moral philosophy. There is a 
combination because Christian ethics and moral philosophy share common values.  For 
example, Christian ethics and moral philosophy are concerned with morality and virtue 
and both perceive morality as a spiritual task. 212  
In using the technique of vision, the agent questions his or her ability to see 
clearly, which is a question concerning particulars. The other-directedness which 
involves the agent directing his or her attention toward others is an exercise of love or 
empathy, which is achieved through virtue and places the agent in proximity to the 
Good.
213
 It is a principle-based ethical approach that involves a relationship between 
love, justice, and freedom. Character is identified as the unified self. It is a consummation 
of perceptions and responses stamped upon the soul of the individual self, which gives 
the individual a sense of being or somebodiness. There is a close relationship between 
being and doing, and both are intimately related to vision.  Thus, character is the unified 
identification of self, a self that is inevitably, deeply involved in the mystery of the world. 
After being moved by a desire to know truth, the agent encounters reality and responds 
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by freely asking the question: “Am I seeing correctly?” The agent’s freedom is primarily 
in his or her ability to see rather than his or her ability to choose, and clarity of vision 
results from demonstrating justice and love toward others.
214
  To love others is to see 
others as mysteries and not as equations with finite conclusions (or outcomes). This 
involves seeing others as ends in themselves as opposed to a means to some personal gain 
motivated by selfishness.  A moral response will always result in an elimination of 
choices and a correct response. The notion that moral people see and are seen is correctly 
implied, which means that moral people respond lovely and justly; and, their efforts are 
experienced by others. Niebuhr affirms this assertion and moves us toward a more 
socially conscious vision. He asserts that being responsible demands not only that we see 
others but that we also respond as a community of solidarity. He envisions humans 
engaged in a dialogue in which the moral agent begins a journey of self-understanding. 
According to Niebuhr, the self is social.  
In contrast, Murdoch’s view is limited to the individual self. She fails to consider 
the moral dynamics associated with the social self, especially regarding issues of social 
justice. Niebuhr’s work is more comprehensive regarding the social self and social 
justice. Although he emphasizes vision and action, he argues that other dynamics are also 
essential. First, the moral agent is tied to a community or communities to whom he or she 
must be responsible. Second, the self is only a self as related to other individuals. Third, 
the moral agent must respond to cultural and moral forces that shape him or her. Fourth, 
the agent must transform internal and external forces that negatively affect the self. As a 
result, the world shapes the agent as the agent shapes the world in a community of 
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relationships. Thus, to respond correctly, the individual must both see in the moral sense 
and respond in light of that ability to interpret ongoing patterns of interactions. A moral 
response is a virtuous response that fits within the fabric of the ongoing relationship 
between the individual and the community. Vision is intrinsically connected with virtue 
and plays a major role in shaping the agent and therefore the world around him or her. 
Although “seeing” occasions the right action and freedom is the experience of accurate 
vision, responsibility is the core of moral life. In fact, responsibility demands not only 
clear vision but an accurate interpretation of a situation in solidarity with the group to 
which one is accountable in light of a transcendent Good or God. The freedom 
experienced is not only a freedom from fantasy and blinding self-centered aims and 
images, it is also a freedom experienced in harmony with other human beings and the 
Divine. 
Although becoming selfless eliminates fantasy on an individual level, it does little 
to transform unjust structures that violently return attention to the social self. 
Responsibility drives the moral agent to see clearly and to help others see clearly through 
acts of social justice. Social justice holds the agent and the community accountable to one 
another. It challenges concepts that induce blindness, such as racism, sexism, and 
classism. Racism, like sexism and classism, impairs judgment. It is a type of blindness 
that produces irresponsible action. By disguising truths, it prevents the moral agent from 
seeing what is really there to see. In fact, racial injustice significantly contributes to 
ongoing failures in seeing clearly and choosing correctly. Thus, racial injustice denies 
freedom to the moral agent and the individual whom he or she fails to see clearly. Racism 
is a distortion that imposes inaccurate portrayals of human beings and dehumanizes the 
73 
agent and those around him or her. It also creates and sustains covert structures of 
violence that perpetually blind the oppressed and the oppressor and creates superiority 
and inferiority complexes. Through the works of Niebuhr and Murdoch, the presence of 
these structures is exposed. For example, the ethics of vision and responsibility can help 
individuals see and understand unjust practices that are widespread and often appear 
normal because they are basic “givens” of social or national life and a part of reality. 
Murdoch and Niebuhr illustrate the importance of seeing and responding fittingly in the 
work of King and Townes, whereas the work of King and Townes demonstrates in a 
concrete way why the significance of Murdoch and Niebuhr’s understanding of vision is 
so important.  
Liberationist thinkers like King and Townes are responding to forces that are 
acting upon not only them but also their communities. King is responding to the issues of 
race and economic oppression from deep inside a community which has suffered from 
centuries of racial violence because of society’s failure to see the harm it has inflicted on 
itself. An ethics of vision and responsibility helps King better grasp a truthful depiction 
of the realities of his world. For instance, it helps him identify the specific needs and 
desires of those around him with an increasing awareness of what is going on and allows 
him to be sensitive to such realities. It allows King to name and describe the condition of 
his time, “social leprosy,” and to address such a condition as he became aware of the 
appetites, motives, fears, and pities of divided communities, summed up in inferiority and 
superiority complexes. Identifying and rightly responding to such time-sensitive 
conditions, which pull our attention, when distorted, away from our neighbors, allows us 
to escape the reach of utilitarian and deontological accounts of human agency. In chapter 
74 
two, an ethics of vision helps us account for these aspects of human agency. 
 Likewise in chapter three, Townes’s  time-sensitive approach to human agency is 
a response to the conditions of her times.
215
 She complements King’s time-sensitive 
approach while broadening its reach in addressing multidimensional levels of oppression 
experienced by those whose suffering reaches beyond racial and economic oppression. 
Declaring herself to be a Niebuhrian and using a reflection and action model to depict a 
truthful grasp of reality, she affirms the work of Murdoch and Niebuhr while 
simultaneously exposing structures of violence involving race, class, gender, 
homophobia, and age.
216
 An ethics of vision and responsibility helps her unmask what 
she calls “cultural productions” both visible and invisible that block our vision and brings 
about irresponsible action. An exploration of such forces provides concrete evidence of 
the significance of the theoretical work of Murdoch and Niebuhr. Townes addresses 
issues of health care, fantasy, and hegemony—aspects of human agency that escape 
utilitarian and deontological models of agency. In this way, the work of Murdoch and 
Niebuhr will be very helpful in highlighting distinct aspects of the work of King and 
Townes.  
In this chapter, I have discussed the origin of “the ethics of vision” as it is related 
to Christian ethics and moral philosophy to make a connection between Murdoch’s work 
and Niebuhr’s work, which will be further developed in later chapters. I focus on this 
because I am curious about the ethics of vision as it relates to Christian ethics, and I plan 
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to highlight the significance of Murdoch’s work in understanding human existence and 
exploring its significance for shedding light on the insights and agendas developed by 
King and Townes.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ETHICS OF VISION AND MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 
In this chapter, I correlate Murdoch’s understanding of the centrality of vision and 
H. Richard Niebuhr’s stress on attention and responsibility with the life, leadership, and 
writings of the great civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. I believe King offers a 
historic example that highlights the distinctive role that vision plays in the moral lives of 
individuals and whole societies. I argue that the ethics of vision and responsibility 
presents a paradigm or frame of understanding about how ethics function that offers a 
distinctive vantage point for appreciating the logic, function, and theological and ethical 
sophistication of King’s leadership, speeches, sermons, and writings.  
While I appreciate Murdoch’s creative achievements in her articulation of a 
critique of the main streams of modern ethical theory and her emphasis on the role of 
vision in the moral life, I also agree with Martha Nussbaum’s critique noted earlier that 
Murdoch focuses too tightly on the individual and seems uninterested in understanding 
how societal shaping of individuals constructs and sustains patterns of societal-wide 
exclusion, bias, and injustice. Whereas Murdoch reaches to Freud to articulate an account 
of egoism as the primary obstacle in the moral life, King, raised in the American Black 
church tradition and schooled in Christian theology and ethics, has the broader concern to 
link egoism with analyses of social oppression, economic injustice, a history of deep 
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racial oppression, and Gandhi’s critique of colonialism. Murdoch is weak on any interest 
in or discussion of how communities and societies shape individuals.  
In short, Murdoch, in reaching to Freud, reaches to psychology and develops a 
focus on moral agency as rooted in an overcoming of individual egoism. King, like 
Niebuhr, is rooted in the Christian scriptural and theological accounts that stress how the 
individual participates within a broader community and how such communities often can 
be biased and corrupted by group identification and a denigration of other social 
groupings. In short, where Murdoch reaches to philosophy and psychology to concentrate 
on a generic account of the individual person, King appropriates the Hebrew Bible’s 
prophetic tradition of social critique as well as the New Testament’s emphasis on Jesus’s 
ethic of love. He reaches to the sweep of biblical accounts of Israel’s Exodus out of 
Egypt to understand the power of slavery and social oppression and to the New 
Testament accounts of Jesus to reflect on his ethic of love. Nussbaum is right that where 
Murdoch is focused on the individual self-overcoming egoism and extending care as love 
outward to others, she pays almost no attention to broader sociological understandings of 
the need to promote social justice and just social policies. 
King is arguably best understood as a moralist of vision. It is true that he would 
have American society live according to its duties and obligations to respect the common 
humanity and personhood of all as the deontological heritage of ethics maintains, and he 
calls Americans to live out a better range of society-wide consequences flowing from 
civil rights and a commitment to more equitable social policies as the utilitarian ethical 
tradition emphasizes. I believe, however, that in terms of ethical theory, naming King as a 
deontologist or a utilitarian simply misses too much of what is distinctive of and most 
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creative and central to King’s life mission and his choice of practices aimed at promoting 
social change. King is most helpfully understood, I believe, through the lenses of the 
ethics of vision and responsibility. King’s life and works centered on helping American 
society come to see (in the moral sense of seeing) that all of reality hinges upon moral 
foundations, in which moral laws of the universe, like physical laws, must be abided by.
1
 
King believed that American society could come to see the vicious injustice of racism 
and segregation and that a true “beloved community” could be realized.2 Likewise, I 
believe that King’s nonviolent agenda in the civil rights movement and its profound real-
world impact offer concrete illustrations of the pragmatic societal significance of the 
rather generalistic and philosophically theoretical accounts of the dynamics of vision and 
responsibility offered by Murdoch and Niebuhr.  
Murdoch and Niebuhr, I believe, give us a most helpful new lens on the work and 
writings of King that let us appreciate the true sophistication of his Christian ethical 
understanding and agenda. In turn, King’s life and writings illustrate a number of the 
concrete practices designed for focusing society’s attention and mobilizing its sense of 
responsibility. Where Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s reflections on the ethics of vision and 
                                                 
1
 Carson, Clayborne, “Martin Luther King Jr. and the African American Social Gospel,” in African 
American Religious Thought: An Anthology, ed. Cornel West and Eddie C. Glaude Jr. (Louisville and 
London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 710. This is to have clarity of vision, to see things as the 
way they are. This is, in Murdoch’s words, “just vision.” 
2
 Here, the “beloved community,” a sign and symbol of the reign of God’s kingdom, is a 
conceptual motif that King adopts from Walter Rauschenbusch as rightly suggested by Luther Ivory. Ivory 
contends that King “implemented two important concepts from Rauschenbusch that enabled him to arrive 
at significant conceptual clarity,” Rauschenbusch’s “notion of the ‘beloved community’ subsumed under 
his broader conceptual motif of the kingdom of God, humanity organized according to the will of God” 
(99–100). These concepts helped King to “envision and articulate an eschatological goal with historical 
concreteness and specificity” (100). For a valuable discussion, see Luther Ivory, Toward a Theology of 
Radical Involvement (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1997). Also, implied here is King’s unwavering 
belief in America and that right action will follow correct vision. 
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responsibility are on a broadly generalistic level of ethical theory, King’s life and 
writings display in concrete detail what we might call the “praxis of vision and 
responsibility.”3 Thus, a correlation of the ethics of vision and responsibility, as 
understood by Murdoch and Niebuhr on the one hand, and King’s mission and agenda on 
the other, enriches our understanding of each. 
In short, I argue that the ethics of vision and responsibility offers a perspective 
that grasps the distinctive moral sophistication and power of King’s life, his nonviolent 
campaigns for social justice, his insight into the importance of demonstrations and 
marches to attract and focus moral attention, and his words so carefully chosen to help 
dominant White society “see” the full humanity of African Americans. First, his agenda 
of civil rights required powerful social change to push new national legislation to protect 
the voting rights of African Americans. To achieve this, King and his colleagues helped 
mobilize the hopes, discipline, and courage of Black Americans to take concrete actions 
toward civil rights.  
This movement required a moral educational outreach via words and deeds to 
broad ranges of White American society to attend to something that for too long had 
easily been ignored—namely, the reality of the vast suffering inflicted upon Black 
American citizens by America’s racist policies of segregation. King and others staged 
powerful and dramatic demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches that pulled the attention of 
Middle America and helped it begin to “see.”  
                                                 
3
 Luther Ivory, Toward a Theology of Radical Involvement: The Theological Legacy of Martin 
Luther King Jr., (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1997). It is a conception of God as “love in action,” 
which Ivory calls  the linchpin of King’s theological framework. In the words of Ivory, it is the axis upon 
which King’s theological program turns. Here, attention and responsibility are central to King’s concern. 
Implied is an ethics of responsibility (46–65). 
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Second, King’s and his fellow civil rights leaders’ advocacy of nonviolent 
resistance to segregation played a pivotal role in this movement’s pedagogy of vision. 
From his study of Gandhi and the Indian Independence movement, King knew that any 
violent resistance to oppression by the oppressed typically triggers violence in response. 
If a resistance movement opts for violent resistance, this will typically and quickly 
mobilize a sense of justification of the use of violence by the established authorities—the 
oppressive system. In the cases of India under British colonial rule and of Black 
Americans in segregated America, the ruling governmental authorities held a near 
monopoly on the means of mass violence.  
Also, a liberation movement that resorts to violent resistance too easily allows the 
dominant society to depict the oppressed as mere wild and dangerous troublemakers. It is 
much more difficult for mainstream society to come to see the justice of the cause of the 
oppressed if mainstream society is being confronted with rocks or bullets. A nonviolent 
approach to social reform, however, works well by its disciplined avoidance of occasions 
that would encourage the British or the American White society to feel massively 
threatened. With a disciplined avoidance of any hyped sense of dangerous threat, 
nonviolent resistance campaigns allow for a calmer process of educational attention to 
begin and develop. These sorts of campaigns helped American society begin to be forced 
to concentrate attention on the scale of the suffering of Black Americans caused by 
America’s racist laws. It helped America focus its attention on the shocking ethical gap 
between our expressed constitutional ideals of equality and freedom and the harsh 
ugliness of our discriminatory practices. The civil rights marches, demonstrations, and 
speeches put on clear display the full humanity and basic dignity and courage of Black 
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Americans. In these ways, King’s actions and words make concrete and vivid, in an 
important way, how significant and practically relevant Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s rather 
general descriptions are of the moral life. The civil rights movement centered on a 
process of moral pedagogy in which events and words were carefully chosen to prompt a 
process of attention and new seeing.  
For several decades now, King’s writings and achievements have been widely 
admired across American society and, indeed, around the world. His life and teachings 
are examined in elementary, middle, and high schools across our country and in college, 
university, and seminary classrooms. He is admired primarily as a great religious leader 
and activist of historical importance, but not so much as a theological innovator or 
theological ethicist.
4
 In academic theological circles, King is acclaimed for his social 
justice work, but he is not generally regarded as a significant moral theologian or 
Christian ethicist. This is because he never developed a formal analysis of religious 
ethical theory, nor did he typically write in a formal academic way, displaying clear 
mastery of the classic literature of the field and citing sources via footnotes.
5
 King neither 
developed a comprehensive theory of Christian ethics, nor did he elaborate a sustained 
formal ethical account of the moral principles needed for engaging a range of moral 
problems. This is not at all surprising for one so busy with heavy responsibilities that 
were thrust upon him at such a young age. 
                                                 
4
 I would say that this is specifically because many theologians have not considered the 
theological efforts of King, as suggested by James Cone, who, along with King, was identified as one of the 
major theologians of the twentieth century, “Black or White,” by Peter Paris, a leading Christian ethicist. 
For valuable discussion, see Peter Paris, Black Leaders in Conflict: Joseph H. Jackson, Martin Luther King 
Jr., Malcolm X, Adam Clayton Powell Jr. (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 1978). 
5
 See Ira Chernus, American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2004), 161.  
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In this chapter, I draw on many sources, but especially on The Papers of Martin 
Luther King Jr. (hereafter The King Papers) and James M. Washington’s A Testament of 
Hope.
6
 These works, especially The King Papers, demonstrate that a personalist 
understanding of agency is central to King’s moral perception.7 This is important because 
a personalist understanding of moral agency represents the starting point for King’s ethics 
of vision. I explore these claims and examine how King’s moral agenda can be most 
helpfully interpreted along the lines of the ethics of vision and responsibility examined in 
Chapter One.  
Major Interpreters of King 
In this section, I articulate the diverse views of major interpreters of Martin 
Luther King Jr., including Peter Paris, James Cone, Robert Franklin, Luther Ivory, and 
Samuel L. Roberts. In doing so, I identify the interpretation of “ethics of vision and 
responsibility” as it is reflected in some of these different understandings of King. Their 
interpretations of King demonstrate that King’s life as a moralist involved what Niebuhr 
calls “fitting actions.” For example, although King was not a perfect man, Paris and 
Franklin identified King as an “exemplar of virtue ethics”—types of moral excellence 
such as beneficence, forbearance, practical wisdom, improvisation, long suffering, 
                                                 
6
 Clayborne Carson, Ralph E. Luker, and Penny A. Russell, eds., The Papers of Martin Luther 
King Jr., vol. 1, Called to Serve, January 1929–June 1951 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1992) (hereafter The King Papers). The Martin Luther King Jr. Papers Project documents 
the family’s longstanding ties to Ebenezer Baptist Church and the social gospel ministries of his father and 
grandfather, and suggests that the current trend in scholarship may understate the extent to which King’s 
African American religious roots were intertwined with the European American influences of his collegiate 
years. It provides a new understanding of King’s graduate school experiences and demonstrates reliable 
expressions by King of his evolving weltanschauung. It makes clear that King’s academic experience did 
not separate him from his historical heritage—transracial leadership—deeply influenced by his childhood 
immersion into religious life. (Ibid., 32) Also see Washington, James M., ed., A Testament of Hope: The 
Essential Writings of Martin Luther King Jr. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986). 
7
 See Carson et al., The King Papers, 1: 51–57. 
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forgiveness, and justice, that are essential to an ethics of vision and responsibility.
8
 In 
fact, each of these particular virtues represents King’s ability to hit a mean between two 
extremes after focusing his attention toward something greater than himself—God. These 
interpreters stress that it is this type of life, resulting from King’s understanding of God 
and his demonstration of an ethic of love modeled after Christ.  
It is in this light that Paris, like Cone and Franklin, sees King not only as a 
moralist but also as one whose theology exemplifies the Black Christian tradition par 
excellence because of his commitment to the vision of the Black Church to establish an 
interracial society.
9
 For Cone, establishing an interracial society was at the heart of 
King’s agenda, and it is in this light that Cone sees King as an integrationist following in 
the tradition of Fredrick Douglas. His efforts emphasized that the Christian vision is one 
of justice and love, which asserts that people should live lovingly and justly.  
Niebuhr highlighted concepts that are central to this vision, such as redemption, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation. Paris, Cone, Franklin, and Ivory have found these 
concepts to be of great importance to King, the Black Church, and the Black 
community.
10
  
For Paris, Cone, and Franklin, God forms the heart of King’s theology, which—
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 For a valuable study see, Peter Paris, The Spirituality of African People (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press: 2004), 129–159, and Virtues and Values: The African and African-American Experience 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004). 
9 Peter Paris, “Comparing the Public Theologies of James H. Cone and Martin Luther King Jr.,” in 
Dwight N. Hopkins, ed., Black Faith and Public Talk: Critical Essays on James H. Cone’s Black Theology 
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Black Religious Leaders (Louisville, KY. Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992). 
10 
Ivory, Toward a Theology of Radical Involvement, 133–147. Paris, The Spirituality of African 
People, 151-152. Robert Michael Franklin, Liberation Visions: Human Fulfillment and Social Justice in 
African American Thought (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 123, 134. James H. Cone, Martin and 
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like the theology of Niebuhr—presents God as a creator, governor, and redeemer.11  
Moreover, because God’s governorship is central to both Niebuhr and King, Niebuhr’s 
work helps to illumine King’s efforts by demonstrating that King’s deeds were driven by 
God’s “actions upon” him. In this manner, King’s selfless deeds are responses to God’s 
actions upon him. For example, in the work of these interpreters, King was driven to 
respond lovingly and justly to others as though he was responding to God—Niebuhr’s 
Thou—who is a member of an interacting community.12 All other important themes, or 
concepts, pervading King’s work—“nonviolence, love, justice, human dignity, freedom, 
and morality—are either explicitly or implicitly related to his understanding of God.”13 
Thus, these interpreters of King demonstrate that his core vision of life and society is 
rooted in his affirmation that God is the ground and essence of all reality. For example, 
Paris quotes King as saying, 
God has been profoundly real to me in recent years. In the midst of outer dangers 
I have felt an inner calmness. In the midst of lonely days and dreary nights I have 
heard an inner voice saying, “Lo, I will be with you”... So in the truest sense of 
the word, God is a living God. In him, there is feeling and will, responsive to the 
deepest yearnings of the human heart; this God both evokes and answers prayer.14 
 
Thus, for Paris, such a declaration not only demonstrates that King directed his attention 
toward God, but also that King had the ability to see the interrelatedness of humanity and, 
consequently, consistently expressed a “message of hope and redemption.” In fact, such 
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H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1963), 7. 
12 
Ibid., 56–79. 
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 Paris, “Comparing the Public Theologies of James H. Cone and Martin Luther King Jr.,” in 
Dwight N. Hopkins, ed., Black Faith and Public Talk: Critical Essays on James H. Cone’s Black Theology 
and Black Power, 218–231. 
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 Paris, Black Religious Leaders, 100. Also see Martin Luther King Jr., Strength to Love (New 
York: Harper Row, 1963), 94. 
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hope and redemption form the background for the way King viewed the world and for the 
deeds he inspired others to demonstrate in the world.  
Cone rightly contends that “King felt that it was imperative that theology be 
integrally related to the concrete issues of social injustice in general and to the pursuit of 
racial justice in particular.”15 He contends that “King viewed theology as prophetic 
because of the ministry of Jesus.”16 I believe Cone’s assessment is correct and would 
only point out that the approach of ethics of vision and responsibility reminds us that a 
central function of prophetic critique is to help draw attention to injustice and oppression 
that have remained ignored for too long. 
On this note, Franklin asserts that King’s importance to us is not only in the fact 
that he believed that all human life is sacred and interdependent, but also in that “his civic 
and moral achievements and virtues” are within the grasp of common people.17 “This 
fundamental moral commitment” in King’s theology aligns with Niebuhr’s view that 
human agents are called to be administrators of society’s justice. Central to his view is 
the belief that the agent must “resist and transform social institutions and practices that 
violate the sacred and relational aspects of human beings.”18 Such a violation is a refusal 
to love and places humans in conflict with one another. Moral agents have a 
responsibility to love not only their neighbors but also their enemies.
19
 Ivory rightly 
                                                 
15 
Cone, Martin and Malcolm X and America: Dream or Nightmare, 7–8. 
16 
Ibid.
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 Franklin, Liberation Visions: Human Fulfillment and Social Justice in African American 
Thought, 103.  
18
 Ibid., 8. 
19
 Ivory argues that King’s “activism was based upon an ethics of community, and this ethics was 
informed by structured theological formulation on how love radically involves itself in the affairs of human 
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demonstrates that “King was oriented, motivated, and guided by an eschatological vision 
of a future human community characterized by inclusivity, justice, love, and peace.”20 
For Franklin, it is this understanding of King’s efforts that is not fully captured in Black 
theology. From my study of Murdoch and Niebuhr, I add that a careful training of 
attention outward, beyond the self, is a key step in empowering integration. 
Franklin asserts that “King balances integration of economic goods and political 
goods, for gaining access to others, and the goods of personal development to make 
possible a beloved community.”21 He did this to realize his vision of a kingdom that 
would “secure equal justice for all.”22 I contend that King’s genius lies in how his 
leadership centrally consists of helping Whites see the harshness of racism and African 
Americans see hope in the actual possibilities of nonviolent social change. 
Like Franklin, I believe that King’s moral efforts can broaden the appeal of moral 
philosophy by correcting and expanding the perspective of such theorizing in a culturally 
pluralistic nation. Academic philosophers can strengthen the efforts of Black moralists by 
helping to systematize Black folk wisdom and render it accessible to a wider public.
23
 
                                                                                                                                                 
history.” Ivory, Toward a Theology of Radical Involvement, 15. 
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 Franklin, Liberation Visions: Human Fulfillment and Social Justice in African American 
Thought, 9. Social psychologist Allison Davis observed that “knowledge of this society was ground into 
King by his daily experiences in Atlanta. But between his nineteenth and twenty-fifth birthdays, he was 
educated in a different climate, in university classes on religion and philosophy at Crozer, at Harvard 
University, and at Boston University.” Allison Davis, Leadership, Love, and Aggression: Psychological 
Factors in the Making of Four Black Leaders (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), 191. 
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 Ibid., 9. 
23 Ibid., 110. Franklin argues that “the most elaborate and systematic statement of King’s vision of 
human fulfillment is found in his 1958 address to the United Church of Christ. Here, we find a sketch of 
King’s thoughts about the formation of moral character. In the language of academic ethics, the vision is an 
aretaic ethic, an approach to thinking about the moral life and person that focuses on the specific virtues, 
habits, intentions, and behaviors that good people ought to manifest.” 
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Indeed, Murdoch’s insight is a helpful resource for understanding both King’s deeds and 
words, and much of Black folk wisdom relies centrally on an ethics of vision. My use of 
the ethics of vision helps to explain how King’s eschatological vision of the future and 
the beloved community shaped his actions and was the driving force behind his deeds. 
Finally, the connection between King’s agenda and the interpretation of the ethics 
of vision is made more explicit in Samuel Roberts’s interpretation of King. Roberts 
demonstrates that responsible action leads King to a “new piety that bridges the gap 
between thinking and faithful existence, which leads inexorably to an enlivened praxis (a 
true praxis), the interplay between critical reflection and informed action.”24  
Here, the term piety has to do with “discerning the contours of a life in which 
Christian thought and living come together to form a harmonious whole. Piety is a way of 
living in the world with the sure and certain knowledge that God is present.”25 He holds 
that African Americans must form a “piety” that truly represents the interchange between 
“thought and mediation,” thinking and divine restfulness, serious discourse and the 
mutual reassurance of comrades, male and female, who share a common fellowship.
26
 
Roberts holds that a way must be found to meld the hard work of thinking through issues 
of faith and feeling the vibrancy and intensity of faith. On this note, according to Roberts,
 
The modest demands of the civil rights movement [were] merely about being 
treated like other Americans and the nature of the movement determined the 
strategies used to [achieve those rights]. The movement’s essential strategies were 
to appeal to the universal legal values embedded in the sacred documents of the 
American Republic…. The movement was anchored in the “great wells of 
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 Samuel L. Roberts, African American Christian Ethics (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 2001), 
293. 
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 Ibid., 292. 
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democracy which were dug deep by the Founding Fathers in the formulation of 
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence,” [of which each was 
designed to secure a vision for the American populace.] Hoping to change white 
Americans through moral suasion, the specific tactics used by the movement were 
nonviolent resistance, peaceful protests and the right use of the media, particularly 
print and television. The objective was to change the hearts of white Americans. 
[The theology of the movement] affirmed a God that made no distinction between 
persons, or races, and championed the “brotherhood of man” as the ideal relation 
between human beings. God’s ultimate will was to bring about justice, perhaps 
slowly, but inexorably to bring it about.
27
 
 
Roberts rightly contends that King maintained that nonviolent direct action is the 
one ethical and “practical sound way” available for the liberation of an oppressed people, 
and that nonviolence is the “key” to long-term and thoughtful change—for peace, 
goodwill, and justice.
28
 In this manner, Roberts holds that the movement had no other 
option but to petition the “goodness of human hearts within the context of inter-
racialism” to meet its demands.29 It is to this end that King’s work, in the words of 
Roberts, became a mission of ending Black suffering under segregation according to his 
perception of God’s will in history and to God’s vision. This is where an ethics of vision 
becomes essential for shedding new light upon King’s efforts. It helps to demonstrate 
why “seeing” is so important to King’s work as well as the tools used to bring about such 
a method. Seeing and responding accurately or fittingly to what is seen is the core of 
King’s work. This chapter develops this claim.  
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Major Influences on King 
King was raised in a family that had multigenerational connections to the Black 
church. His father, grandfather, and great-grandfather were Protestant preachers.
30
 In 
1846, King’s great-grandfather was an exhorter, “an old slavery time preacher,” who 
“entered the Baptist church during the period of religious and moral fervor that swept the 
nation in the decades before the Civil War.”31 Adam Daniel (A.D.) Williams, King’s 
maternal grandfather, followed in the footsteps of his father and was eventually ordained 
and received his license to preach. He remained Baptist and accepted several invitations 
to preach before becoming the pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, in 
1894. On October 29, 1899, he married Jennie Celeste Parks, and together the two served 
Ebenezer for 40 years.32 During this time, Martin Luther King Sr., who married A.D. 
Williams’s daughter, was the pastor of several churches before he joined Williams and 
eventually continued Williams’s legacy as the pastor of Ebenezer.33  
King was born in Atlanta in 1929. He was the second of three children.34 In his 
family’s home, King, his brother, and his sister lived a stable life with two very 
protective, loving, and busy parents who were heavily involved in church affairs.35 His 
mother was a Sunday school teacher and choir director; his father was the highest-paid 
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pastor in the community and had enormous influence as a successful community leader 
and organizer.
36
 While the Great Depression brought deep economic hardship across the 
land, King’s family was spared its harshest effects due to the continuing income from his 
parents’ leadership positions in the church. Though times were tough, the work of King’s 
parents provided the family with solid middle-class security. The children’s maternal 
grandparents also lived in the King home and had an enormous influence upon King’s 
early religious and moral development. He had an exceptionally close relationship with 
his grandmother, and upon her death he began to think deeply about immortality and life 
after death. 
King’s grandparents created a legacy for his parents to follow through their 40-
year commitment as pastor and first lady of Ebenezer Baptist Church and through their 
unwavering leadership in the Black community at the local, state, and national levels. The 
family’s three generations of leadership of the historic Ebenezer moved them from an 
early struggle with poverty into relative economic security and solid middle-class 
stability and leadership of important civic and religious circles. 
The theological movement known as the Social Gospel Movement was a 
powerful shaper of King’s grandfather and father. A number of important Protestant 
pastors and theologians began to call for Christian efforts to be engaged directly in the 
Gospel’s vision of social justice and an activist attempt to help build the kingdom of God 
through a program of humanitarian reform. The movement’s major spokesperson was 
Walter Rauschenbusch, who helped found the Federal Council of Churches (now the 
National Council of Churches) in 1908. His books Christianizing the Social Order (1912) 
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and A Theology for the Social Gospel (1917) were the most influential articulations of 
this emerging movement of Christian social reform.37  
As one of its pioneering advocates, Williams built a large congregation through 
“forceful preaching that addressed the everyday concerns of poor and working-class 
residents.”38 Through “charismatic leadership” extending “beyond purely spiritual 
concerns,” Williams became actively involved in the community and served in local, 
state, and national capacities. In doing so, throughout his pastorate of Ebenezer, he 
played a leading role in Baptist affairs at the state and national levels. For example, he 
was also one of the organizers of the National Baptist Convention, the largest Black 
Baptist organization in the United States.39 As a pioneering advocate of the social gospel, 
Williams “took the lead in responding to W. E. B. DuBois’s call for civil rights activism 
by joining five hundred other Georgians in 1906 to form the Georgia Equal Rights 
League.”40 In 1917, Williams helped to organize the Atlanta branch of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Soon after, he became president of 
the local branch and mobilized “newly enfranchised African American women” in a drive 
to register Black voters.41 He also led a fruitful initiative to force White administrators 
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into “improving educational facilities for Black children.”42 His efforts brought about the 
founding of Booker T. Washington High School, a Black high school that Martin Luther 
King Jr. would later attend.43 
Martin Luther King Sr. continued the legacy of Williams and the “tradition of 
social gospel activism.” King Sr. was a self-made man who had lived a hard life but 
pulled himself up by the bootstraps and obtained an education at Morehouse University 
in Atlanta. He eventually became one Atlanta’s leading preachers and a strong pioneering 
advocate of the social gospel.44 In sum, King Sr. “identified himself as a social gospel 
preacher who believed that his ministry should be focused on the everyday needs of his 
congregation.” King Sr. “had been exposed to the liberal theological ideas of C. D. 
Huber, who headed [the Morehouse] theology program.” King Sr. also expanded the 
scope of Williams’s politically engaged ministry.  
In 1935, he organized meetings to encourage blacks to register to vote, and 
despite resistance from more cautious clergymen and lay leaders, [King Sr.], 
organized a march to City Hall. A year later, he became chairman of the 
Committee on the Equalization of Teachers’ Salaries, which was formed to 
protest against discriminatory policies that paid higher salaries to white teachers 
than to equally qualified blacks. In spite of receiving threatening hate letters, he 
played a leading role in the sustained struggle for pay equity. King’s firm 
insistence that the Christian church should participate in civil rights activities set 
him apart from political conservatives, [both] scriptural and fundamentalists.
45
  
 
In light of such activism, the success of King’s grandfather and father—along 
with their wives’ equally successful roles as first ladies of Ebenezer Baptist Church, 
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Sunday school teachers, and choir directors—created a home-church environment that 
created the backdrop for King’s moral and religious development and an environment for 
his success as a civil rights activist. According to The King Papers, because his family 
had such close ties to the Ebenezer Baptist Church, participation in the church simply 
was a central part of King’s life. Consequently, the religious heritage he absorbed during 
his youth was derived from daily contact with family and church life rather than from 
formalized (or book-learned) theological reflections, something that he subsequently 
realized during his college years. 
Growing up in the church provided a substitute for orthodox theological 
convictions; born a Baptist, he never felt the need to affirm all the tenets of the 
denomination. In his “Autobiography of Religious Development,” he explained: 
“Conversion for me was never an abrupt something…. Religion has just been 
something that I grew up in.46  
 
In fact, he never had an emphatic religious experience and joined the church only 
because he wanted to keep up with his sister. In short, King writes, “Conversion for me 
has been the gradual in-taking of the noble ideals set forth by family and my 
environment, and I must admit that this in-taking has been largely unconscious.”47 In 
other words, his moral and religious development was not wrapped up in his choices; it 
was based on his growing ability to attend to the particulars of his environment, both 
consciously and unconsciously. In this manner, his moral development seems to be in 
parallel with much of what Iris Murdoch has suggested regarding the importance of the 
quiet and gradual buildup of structures of value in people. This means that when it comes 
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to action, they feel that they must act not so much out of some discrete moral decision in 
response to some identified problem, but rather feel compelled to act out of the 
commitment to the persons that they have become. The key work in ethics, as Murdoch 
reminds us, is not so much the drama of free decision but rather the quiet buildup of 
patterns of sensitivity and vision.  
King’s Encounters with Racism 
Like many African Americans, King had to deal with the unfortunate reality of 
race at a young age. This had a profound impact on his moral development. King began 
to establish a moral outlook at age five when he questioned his mother regarding why a 
large number of people were standing in bread lines during the Great Depression, which, 
he claims, affected his negative attitude toward capitalism.  
At age six, King had a more lasting experience. This occurred when a White 
playmate he had known for three years entered Atlanta’s segregated school system. His 
friend’s father told his son that he could no longer play with King. King recalled, “I never 
will forget what a great shock this was to me.”48 He remembered discussing the matter 
with his parents and realizing “the existence of a race problem” for the first time. 49 At 
that time, “King’s parents told him the ‘tragedies’ of racism and recounted ‘some of the 
insults they themselves had confronted on account of it.’”50 In response, King said, “I was 
greatly shocked, and from that moment on I was determined to hate every white person,” 
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even though his parents told him that he should not hate White people.
51
 They also told 
him that it was his duty as a Christian to love Whites. Of course, like many African 
Americans who encountered similar situations, King was not satisfied. He said, “The 
question arose in my mind,” as it did in the minds of many Black Christians, “how could 
I love a race of people who hated me and who had been responsible for breaking me up 
with one of my best childhood friends.”52 King would eventually address this experience 
during his college years. It also played a major role in his conception of God, the nature 
of God, and the nature of humankind. It would help him to see the potentiality of 
humankind for good and evil and to experience humankind’s limitations. However, this 
was not King’s only experience regarding this moral dilemma. There were more 
experiences that were just as profound, although they would not be negative, such as his 
summer visits to the North, specifically Washington, DC, and Connecticut.  
Writing to his father, he commented on things he “never [anticipated] to see.” 
Upon traveling north from Washington, D.C., he observed “no discrimination at 
all.” Whites were “very nice. We go to any place we want to and sit anywhere we 
want to.” A letter to his mother referred to his attendance at a church service in 
Simsbury: “Negroes and whites go [to] the same church.” After a weekend trip 
into Hartford, he told his mother about the lack of discrimination in public places. 
Having eaten at one of Hartford’s “finest” restaurants, he commented, “I never 
[thought] that a person of my race could eat anywhere.” These experiences in the 
North increased King’s already strong resentment of racial segregation.53  
 
Exposure to such experiences had a major impact on King’s moral development. It also 
presented him with a paradox regarding the different attitudes toward race in the North 
versus the South. 
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Although I emphasize only one of many experiences that shaped King’s attitude 
toward race and his understanding of the moral life, it represents the kinds of experiences 
that many Black and White children had to endure—that is, the experience of losing a 
childhood friend because of racial segregation.  
Ebenezer provided a sanctuary for King to escape such experiences. For him, the 
church was like a second home. He spent much time there and made most of his 
childhood friends from among the congregation. He became intensely involved in church 
life, and the church gave him a sense of belonging. He attended Sunday school and 
participated in many of the church’s social gospel ministries, which were involved in 
providing clothes, food, day care, and medicine for those in need. As a result, he was 
strongly affected by a ministry that conveyed a conception of a God who provided for 
every need, a conception of God that his father emphatically preached about throughout 
his ministry and encouraged King to do the same. According to his father, King 
“absorbed attitudes . . . and skills . . . that would prepare him for a preaching career.”54 
He loved to sing and often accompanied his mother in song. He had a talent for singing 
and preaching and by early adolescence had gained an intimate knowledge of the details 
of church life, including congregational governance, ward meetings, church finances, and 
social events. He was also aware of the legacies of his grandfather and father, as both 
men were powerful role models for King, and he would subsequently strive to live up to 
their examples.  
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In fact, “during King’s childhood and teenage years, he became increasingly 
aware of his father’s vocal opposition to segregation.”55 As a result, King Sr.’s activism 
shaped his son’s understanding of the ministry and presaged King’s own career. Along 
with other “progressive” Black Baptist preachers, the elder King emphasized the need for 
an educated, politically active ministry. “The elder King not only engaged in individual 
acts of dissent, such as riding the ‘White only’ City Hall elevator to reach the voter 
registrar’s office, but also was a leader of organizations such as the Atlanta Civic and 
Political League and the NAACP.”56 
As a result of his father’s influence, by the time King entered graduate school, he 
had already developed a moral outlook on the world that would eventually move him into 
national acclaim. Such a moral outlook was not derived from abstract theories or his 
ability to make decisions based upon standard methods of ethical theories of his time. His 
moral outlook was acquired unintentionally as he attended to the social and ecclesial 
challenges around him and responded to them. In many cases, his moral outlook 
developed “unconsciously” as his life and religion became one, which led him to write in 
a paper regarding his religious development that there was no separation between his life 
and his religious development, a phrase that indicates the fact that King’s moral 
development involved his entire life’s experiences.57  
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Additionally, King’s college years and educational experiences put him in contact 
with a new range of close family friends who were also socially and politically engaged 
religious leaders, such as Reverend William Holmes Borders, who built Wheat Street 
Baptist Church, the largest Black church in Atlanta. Borders “possessed the academic 
credentials that King’s own father lacked.”58 Like King Sr., Borders fought through 
poverty to graduate from Morehouse College, but he went on to obtain a divinity degree 
from Garrett Theological Seminary and a master’s degree from Northwestern University. 
He then returned to Atlanta, taught religion at Morehouse, and became an “outspoken 
preacher of Wheat Street Baptist Church.”59 King and other friends studied his sermons. 
King was also influenced by Benjamin Elijah Mays, a family friend and the 
president of Morehouse University. He was the kind of committed, intelligently refined 
religious leader that King wished to imitate.60 Succeeding John Hope, Mays was the first 
Morehouse president with a PhD. As president of Morehouse, Mays enthusiastically used 
his efforts to push a social gospel agenda and called for students to use their skills on 
behalf of the Black community. In doing so, “Mays often used his talks to the student 
body as occasions to express his commitment to social gospel values.”61 He also 
“challenged Morehouse students to struggle against segregation rather than accommodate 
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themselves to it.”62 Shortly before King became a 15-year-old student of Morehouse, 
Mays, along with an increasing number of Black Americans, became a disciple of 
Mahatma Gandhi upon returning home from a trip to India. Like Mays, King would also 
become a disciple of Gandhi, the famous Indian liberation leader, who believed in 
nonviolence. “[King] later described Mays as ‘one of the greater influences in his life.’”63 
When King attended Crozer Seminary he came to be influenced by his professor 
George D. Kelsey “who reassured him that behind the legends and myths of the Book 
(the Bible) were many profound truths which one could not escape.”64 Kelsey also 
“published an article arguing that the problem of race is indeed America’s greatest moral 
dilemma” of the time.65 This essay had a powerful impact on King’s growing vision and 
indeed gave him a set of themes that he would later play out more deeply in his book, 
Stride toward Freedom (1958).
66
 Kelsey and Mays, as well as others, provided King with 
role models of academically trained ministers, and their example inspired him to continue 
his theological studies. Through sustained vision and careful habit, King came to say, “I 
can see in their lives an idea of what I wanted a minster to be.”67 Both were ministers, 
and both were religious, learned men aware of all the trends of modern thinking.  
King was also directed to liberal schools for his training, such as Morehouse 
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College in Atlanta, and eventually Crozer Theological Seminary in Pennsylvania and 
Boston University, where he earned his PhD. At these schools, King was further 
influenced by social gospel advocates and personalist theologians who helped deepen his 
inherited beliefs.
68
 For instance, after being introduced to personalism by George Davis, a 
former professor at Crozer who placed emphasis on combining “social gospel teachings 
with a critical understanding of modern theology,” King became an admirer of Edgar 
Brightman, a personalist scholar and professor at Boston University who mentored 
King’s until his untimely death.69 According to King, the emphasis personalism placed 
“on the reality of personal religious experience validated King’s own belief that ‘every 
man from the ordinary simple hearted believer to the philosophical intellectual giant, may 
find God through religious experience.’”70 It also validated the religious experience of his 
tradition by suggesting that his earlier cynicism might not have undercut his religious 
heritage.
71
 Brightman’s personalist view confirmed for “King that he had experienced” 
the powerful presence of God in his own life, even without the benefit of an ecstatic 
“religious experience.”72  
As the centrality of the person became the focus of King’s theology, he grew 
increasingly convinced that “experience as well as intellectual reflection” could be the 
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foundation of one’s “religious belief.”73 Personalism became the tool for King’s 
understanding of the moral life and his lens for constructive criticism of the work of 
others. King used it to guide him through his civil rights career. Not only would he later 
write about this, but he also was sure that God was in his presence and on his side.  
For King, God is a personal spirit. To support this claim, King used eclecticism, a 
writing strategy commonly practiced among Black Baptist clergy. King drew from the 
best of liberal and neo-orthodox theological views and synthesized his own theological 
perspective.
74
 In this way, he used his academic experiences not to supplant the religion 
of his youth but to deepen it. In so doing, with the help of Brightman and other 
personalists, King criticized Luther, Calvin, Barth, Bultmann, Wieman, and Reinhold 
Niebuhr (the brother of H. Richard Niebuhr) and drew from the best of their works to 
synthesize the religion of his heritage.  
In sum, he criticized neo-orthodox theology for its overemphasis on the 
sovereignty of God at the expense of losing sight of God’s divine love. He also rejected 
its view of God as a strict judge who has little concern and respect for humankind, but he 
praised its emphasis on sin. On the other hand, King criticized liberal theology for its lack 
of an adequate anthropology, stating, “Any theology which does not have an adequate 
anthropology is not worth the name.”75 On the other hand, he praised liberal theology for 
its efforts in addressing issues concerning racial equality and economic justice. 
Moreover, King rejects both neo-orthodox and liberal theology’s positions on the nature 
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of humankind and the problem of good and evil, while accepting their views of a personal 
God. This was due to his experience with “a vicious race problem,” through which he 
was able to see the worst of humankind, but with “the gradual improvements of this same 
race problem,” in his words, he was able to see the best of humankind.76 Thus, King 
concluded that humankind was neither good nor evil, but had the propensity to be both. 
In this way, race and eclecticism played essential roles in helping King to construct a 
fitting response between extreme philosophical and theological views. 
Personalism and Its Influence on King’s Thinking 
Personalism emphasizes the uniqueness, significance, and inviolability of 
personality.
77
 It is a school of thought that became popular in the first half of the 
twentieth century, although it was developed during the  
… nineteenth century as a reaction to perceived depersonalizing elements in 
Enlightenment rationalism, pantheism, and Hegelian absolute idealism. The 
centrality of the person is the primary locus of the investigation for philosophical, 
theological, [and ideological studies.] The person is the ultimate epistemological, 
ontological, and axiological principle of all reality.
78
  
 
Two of the theologians who influenced King’s understanding of the moral life were 
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, a leading personalist scholar, and L. Harold DeWolf, 
Brightman’s protégé. Both were professors at Boston University. Boston exposed King to 
the writings of Brightman and DeWolf. Brightman was a disciple of Borden Parker 
Bowne, the first prominent American supporter of personalism and a colleague of 
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Boston’s faculty until his death in 1910. Brightman taught at Nebraska Wesleyan 
University from 1912 to 1915 and at Wesleyan University from 1915 to 1919. He 
returned to Boston University as professor of philosophy in 1919 and “held an endowed 
chair at Boston named for his mentor” from 1925 until his death.79 His works include 
Introduction to Philosophy (1925), The Problem of God (1930), The Finding of God 
(1931), Moral Law (1933), A Philosophy of Religion (1940), and Nature and Values 
(1945). “[He] is noted for his theistic finitism, and particularly his view that God’s power 
to combat evil is limited.”80 According to this view, God is not “fixed.” The Divine is 
still “growing and expanding,” which implies God is not only finite, but that the Divine 
lacks the knowledge of some things.  For Brightman, God is still working out problems in 
both the spiritual and the physical realms.
81
 This is something Brightman taught in his 
philosophy of religion course, assigning his own work, A Philosophy of Religion, as the 
required text. Such instruction had a major influence on King’s growing theological and 
ethical visions.  
“Under Brightman’s guidance, King continued the development of his theological 
outlook by critically evaluating the ideas of leading theologians from personalist 
perspectives:”82 
Personalism’s insistence that only personality—finite and infinite—is ultimately 
real strengthened me in two convictions: it gave me a metaphysical and 
philosophical grounding for the idea of a personal God, and it gave me a 
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metaphysical basis for the dignity and worth of all human personality.
83
 
 
Brightman’s emphasis on the dignity and centrality of the personal “dovetailed” 
closely with the traditions that King had “absorbed” from his upbringing in Black Church 
circles. Under Brightman’s influence, King wrestled with the diversity of models of God. 
Finally, King came to rigorously examine and reject a number of ways of understanding 
God, and this exercise helped King to clarify his own religious beliefs and articulate them 
forcefully. Through his academic training, King developed a reinforced personalist 
conception of God; this conception of God was passed onto him by his ancestors and 
preached from his father’s pulpit in Ebenezer Baptist Church. It is a conception of a God 
who not only sees and acts responsibly but also creates a society of people who see and 
act responsibly. In so doing, God acts according to God’s ability to love, which not only 
limits God’s divine power but also empowers a society of people to act out of their ability 
to love. Love becomes a tool for seeing and acting responsibly out of one’s freedom. 
In 1953, DeWolf became King’s mentor, following Brightman’s death. King took 
six courses with DeWolf. Under DeWolf’s guidance, he clarified his personalist views 
and found the opportunity to express his theological ideas. This is evident in King’s 
Boston essays, which trace the course of his theological development and reveal how he 
constructed an identity by carefully selecting insight from perspectives similar to his 
own.
84
  
However, the theological perspective to which King was exposed throughout his 
life emphasized touching every phase of the community life. For example, drawing from 
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the Bible, King asserted its concern for the broken-hearted, the poor, the unemployed, the 
captive, the blind, and the bruised. In other words, the theological perspective 
aggressively addressed the concerns of the oppressed in its midst and unceasingly 
struggled on their behalf for freedom, justice, and equality, which, for King, was the 
essence of discipleship.
85
 The Black churches have a vision that directs their thought and 
action, specifically a vision of a nonracist society. King would adopt such a vision of a 
kingdom. The independent Black churches struggled steadily on behalf of the oppressed 
for freedom, justice, and equality in an effort to realize a vision of a better world, a world 
where social, political, and religious concerns are intimately related to one another.
86
 For 
King, this would become his “beloved community,” which he would strive to realize 
throughout his life. I contend that this framework of thinking shaped King’s thoughts and 
actions. It also formed the thoughts and actions of many in the Black community. The 
independent Black churches formed the heart of the Black community, and this seems to 
be borne out in King’s life experiences. King’s efforts were not in isolation, but were 
communal in nature and involved an individual and communal vision. In other words, his 
efforts were grounded and inspired by a vision that involved seeing, interpreting, and 
envisioning a better world. 
The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Ethics of Jesus and Gandhi 
King first achieved national and international prominence in 1955, when, at age 
26, he became president of the Montgomery Improvement Association in its effort to 
achieve desegregation of the bus system in Montgomery, Alabama. The high drama of 
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this opening chapter of the civil rights movement drew the world’s attention to 
Montgomery and the efforts of its Black citizens to push for social justice and an end to 
racial segregation. The pace of King’s life was remarkable. On September 1, 1954, he 
became pastor of Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery. In June 1955, he earned 
his doctorate in systematic theology from Boston University. That November, he and his 
wife, Coretta Scott King, celebrated the birth of their first child, Yolanda Denise King.  
Across the South, many Blacks were increasingly ready to take risks to end 
segregation and unjust exclusionary laws and practices. On December 1, 1955, Rosa 
Parks refused to give up her seat and move to the back of a local bus in Montgomery and 
was arrested. This match lit a fire. The next day, Montgomery’s Black religious and civic 
leaders met and called for a one-day bus boycott to be held on December 5. That first day 
was so successful in achieving widespread Black participation that attendees at an 
afternoon meeting agreed to form a new organization, the Montgomery Improvement 
Association, to carry on the bus boycott, in part, by employing Black taxi companies to 
help ferry people to and from their jobs. King was chosen to be its president. He now 
found himself thrust into a position of being a key leader and spokesperson of the first 
large-scale and sustained organized effort to push for the civil rights of Black people 
across America. For 381 days, the African American community of Montgomery 
boycotted the local bus system in this highly dramatic opening act of the civil rights 
movement. They initiated a boycott of the city bus system to put political and economic 
pressure toward promoting a change in the practice of requiring Blacks to sit at the back 
of the bus.
87 
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From its beginning, King and others rushed to educate Montgomery about the 
practices of nonviolent civil disobedience and the importance of nonviolence in the 
campaign for social reform. Under King’s leadership, the practices and disciplines of a 
nonviolent campaign for social justice, civil rights, and public policy change were 
discussed and given high prominence through a sustained series of workshops devoted to 
how nonviolent protests work and how nonviolent protest efforts must engage with great 
discipline to commit to nonviolent practices, even when their marches or boycotts trigger 
violence aimed back at those marching and protesting. As King later wrote,  
At the beginning of the protest, the people called on me to serve as their 
spokesperson. In accepting this responsibility my mind, consciously or 
unconsciously, [I] was driven back to the Sermon on the Mount and the Gandhian 
method of nonviolent resistance. This principle became the guiding light of the 
movement. Christ furnished the spirit and motivation while Gandhi furnished the 
method.
88
  
 
Along with the sources listed above, a number of other important sources 
influenced King’s ethic of vision grounded in the core Christian ethic of love. First, for 
four years, King served as an associate pastor at his father’s church, the historic and 
prestigious Ebenezer Baptist Church of Atlanta—one of the major Black churches in the 
country. For three summers, King, Jr., had been its sole preacher. These experiences 
honed his preaching and rhetorical skill.
89
 Second, as discussed above, King was pulled 
toward Social Gospel values by his father and his reading of Walter Rauschenbusch’s 
Christianity and the Social Crisis at Crozer Theological Seminary in Chester, 
                                                                                                                                                 
see Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63 (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1988), 143–205.  
88
 Martin Luther King Jr., “Pilgrimage to Nonviolence,” in A Testament of Hope, 38.  
89
 King, “An Autobiography of Religious Development,” in Carson et al., eds., Papers of Martin 
Luther King Jr., 1: 359–63.  
108 
Pennsylvania.
90 
The Social Gospel Movement stressed that the mission of Jesus was 
committed to building the kingdom of God on Earth through Jesus’s ethic of love, which 
directly entailed a commitment to expanding justice in earthly societies.  
Third, King’s education at Crozer helped to deepen his theological beliefs by 
exposing him to the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, especially Moral Man and Immoral 
Society.
91
 This was first published in 1932; King read it in 1950. From Niebuhr, King 
came to appreciate the power of sin, the importance of what Niebuhr called “Christian 
realism,” and the need to avoid utopianism but to push hard for ever better achievements 
of social justice in societal life. In fact, Niebuhr’s emphasis on the profound moral gap 
between the ideal and the real helped reinforce in King a powerful awareness of the need 
to always push for ever-better social justice policies.
92
 
Thus, while King continued to appreciate the Social Gospel and Christian 
liberalism as important remedies for some of the emotionalism and constraints of 
fundamentalism, his encounter with the Christian realism of Niebuhr, with its emphasis 
on the sustained power of human sin, helped him see that too often liberal theology, like 
the Social Gospel, depicted an overly optimistic understanding of human reason and too 
much confidence in social progress founded in education and inevitable advancement. 
King became strongly influenced by Niebuhr’s emphasis on the continuing dimensions of 
human sinfulness and the continuing need to recognize that the push to social justice 
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requires an exertion of power and that the defense of justice in society requires checks 
and balances of real power.
93
  
For Niebuhr, expressions of “love” are not enough; in the social sphere, justice is 
the closest approximation we can come to of the Christian love ethic. In his book Moral 
Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr, while voicing a strong criticism of some forms of 
religious pacifism, gives a strong endorsement of nonviolent campaigns in certain 
circumstances. As he puts it: “Nonviolence is a particularly strategic instrument for an 
oppressed group which is hopelessly in the minority and has no possibility of developing 
sufficient power to set against its oppressors. The emancipation of the Negro race in 
America probably waits upon the adequate development of this kind of social and 
political strategy.”94 It is clear that King read deeply in Niebuhr’s Moral Man and 
Immoral Society, and it is equally clear that he delivered what Niebuhr envisioned. 
 
Fourth, King was first introduced to the vision, tactics, and insights of Mahatma 
Gandhi, when he attended Crozer Theological Seminary.
95
 There, King studied the 
writings and examples of Gandhi and his leadership of the Quit India movement, which 
decades earlier struggled to free India from British colonial oppression. In light of the 
Quit India movement, the Montgomery bus boycott was guided from the start by the 
insistence of King and others that it remains a nonviolent effort like Gandhi’s in India. As 
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King put it, “While the Montgomery boycott was going on, India’s Gandhi was the 
guiding light of our technique of nonviolent social change. We spoke of him often.”96  
King and the other leaders of the civil rights movement were close students of 
Gandhi’s agenda and tactics, employing dramatic performances of boycotts, marches, and 
civil disobedience aimed at reminding Black Americans that they are “somebodies” and 
not second class and not deserving of segregationist policies of exclusion. Also, like 
Gandhi’s agenda, a core agenda issue for King’s leadership of the bus boycott and other, 
later civil rights marches and efforts lay in the construction of highly dramatic actions 
that would help pull the attention of the nation and indeed many in the world to the 
suffering caused by racist segregation of Black Americans. As King wrote in “Pilgrimage 
to Nonviolence”:  
Then I was introduced to the life and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. As I read his 
works, I became deeply fascinated by his campaigns of nonviolent resistance. The 
whole Gandhian concept of satyagraha (satya is truth which equals love and 
graha is force; satyagraha means truth-force or love-force) was profoundly 
significant to me. As I delved deeper into the philosophy of Gandhi, my 
skepticism concerning the power of love gradually diminished, and I came to see 
for the first time that the Christian doctrine of love, operating through the 
Gandhian method of nonviolence, is one of the most potent weapons available to 
an oppressed people in their struggle for freedom.
97
  
 
King described how, while he was deeply moved intellectually at Crozer 
Theological Seminary when he was introduced to Gandhi’s writings and achievements, it 
took the experience of the Montgomery bus boycott to solidify his understanding of the 
dynamics and power of nonviolence.
98
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In sum, King’s increasing participation in the church became a central part of his 
life, and the religious heritage he absorbed during his youth was derived from daily 
contact with family and church life rather than from formalized (or book-learned) 
theological reflections. In this manner, King’s home-church environment created the 
backdrop for his moral and religious development and his subsequent success as a civil 
rights activist. The Black church provided the background for his fundamental 
convictions, and his moral development was a “gradual intaking of the noble ideals” set 
forth by his family and environment.
99
 For example, King was influenced by Christian 
efforts that directly engaged in the Gospel’s vision of social justice and activist efforts to 
help build the kingdom of God through humanitarian efforts. These efforts were 
expressions of love that addressed the actual needs of people. Rauschenbusch and the 
Social Gospel Movement helped King to see that the mission of Jesus was committed to 
building the kingdom of God on Earth through Jesus’s ethic of love, which directly 
entailed a commitment to expanding justice in earthly societies. In this light, Gandhi and 
the Quit India movement became the guiding light behind King’s efforts toward 
nonviolent social change, efforts that lay in the construction of highly dramatic actions 
that would help pull the attention of the nation and indeed many in the world to focus on 
the suffering caused by racist segregation of African Americans.  
Gandhi, Truth-Force, and Campaigns for Right Seeing 
If, as Murdoch puts it, the capacity to extend attention and vision beyond the cares 
of the self toward the cares of others—their needs and vulnerabilities—is a fundamental 
moral achievement, then it is a doubly difficult achievement to promote this in a 
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sustained fashion in times of oppression or conflict. Gandhi’s struggle in India’s 
independence movement required that he and the movement engage in a double 
unmasking effort, a double educational outreach aimed at getting people to see. While the 
extension of British colonial rule over India was justified by the British people’s 
sustained affirmation of the empire’s noble civilizing mission and program of economic 
and social development for simpler people (i.e., more “backward” dark-skinned people), 
this sustained ideology justified the stark oppression and violence to Indians as an act of 
civilizing altruism. This ideology of oppression came to mold the minds of both 
oppressors and the oppressed. If over the decades the British became comfortable in the 
generosity and basic goodness of their project in India, their “jewel in the crown,” Indian 
boys and girls grew up believing in the inevitability of British superiority and 
advancement and in Indian weakness and dependency. They came to assume that the 
British had all the power and the weapons and that they had none. At bottom, the 
ideology of domination attempts to educate the oppressed in the inevitability of their 
condition because of the victims’ basic inferiority.  
Gandhi titled his autobiography The Story of My Experiments with Truth. The title 
is an apt description because much of his nonviolent campaigns against the British was 
rooted in his experiments mobilizing the hopes and growing confidence of Indians that 
they too had dignity and full humanity. Simultaneously, he experimented with marches, 
demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes, all designed to dramatically turn the attention of 
the British public and the world to the stark realities of British imperial rule. Civil 
disobedience campaigns are certainly sustained efforts at building pressure to force 
societal change. From an ethics-of-vision perspective, they can also be understood as 
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educational efforts to help the worldwide community, but especially the British, to come 
to see the ugly structural violence and oppression on which their imperial rule over India 
was really built.  
For instance, Gandhi’s decision in 1930 to lead a group on a twenty-four-day “salt 
march” of some 240 miles to the Indian Ocean, where they let seawater evaporate in the 
sun to get salt, was the kind of educational effort that an ethic of vision highlights. This 
gesture, with the accompanying massive media buildup, focused India’s and the world’s 
attention to the British tax on salt and announced to all that the civil disobedience 
campaign had begun in earnest. In carrying out this gesture, Gandhi timed his arrival at 
the sea to coincide with the anniversary of the British massacre of hundreds of Indians at 
Amritsar, thereby layering the event with multiple strata of emotional, religious, and 
political symbolism and associations. As a result, Indians and others around the world 
understood the Salt March as a religious “pilgrimage,” as civil disobedience, as an 
educational lesson on British taxation policies, and as a demonstration of Indian 
organization and dignity. It was a carefully planned dramatic performance whose design 
and execution drew the attention of Indians, the British, and people around the world to 
the British colonial regime and the fact of rising Indian efforts at home rule.  
The world’s attention was further galvanized by Britain’s subsequent arrest of 
Gandhi and the Indians’ demonstration at the British-controlled Dharasana Salt Works. A 
Gandhi-trained group tried to nonviolently take over the salt works but was stopped by 
Indian troops under British officers who beat unarmed men over the heads with wooden 
staves. The high drama and bloodshed of this planned civil disobedience performance 
riveted the world’s attention to how British imperial rule rested—despite all the 
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celebration of a civilizing mission—on a foundation of imperial violence.100 Where 
before, a salt works seemed like a benign economic benefit, the Gandhian demonstration 
forced public disclosure of the violence that sustains the colonial system. It made the 
quiet and hidden covert structural violence manifest for all to see.
101
  
The ideology of colonialism seeks to justify imperial hegemony via a stratagem of 
covering over the realities of stark violence and oppression with a canopy of moral 
justification, denial of reality, and systemic practices of misnaming and deception. 
Gandhi’s efforts at creating performative acts of dramatic civil disobedience attracted the 
world’s attention. Having gained its attention, he and his satyagraha movement—truth-
force or soul-force—could begin a dual-sided educational program. This program 
centered on showing Indians that they have equal dignity, agency, and rights as the 
British and other Westerners, and that, although they may not have the guns and rifles 
that the British have, they do, if organized, have profound force and power.  
Likewise, Gandhi and the Quit India movement, also centrally tried to help the 
British people see that their so-called “civilizing mission” in India is, at bottom, a pack of 
lies sold to them by their political leaders and elites. A central goal of the campaign was 
to help the British finally see the scale of the suffering that they caused. It is a testament 
to Gandhi’s greatness that he long preached the importance of maintaining the discipline 
of criticizing British imperial policy and still refrained from demonizing the British 
people or its leaders. During his time studying law in London, Gandhi had grown to 
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know the British and to admire much about their system of law and their society in 
general. For Gandhi, the British were not fundamentally evil people, but rather were good 
people who did not yet see the suffering they were causing. He had every confidence that 
after they came to see, the path to Indian independence would be secured. In short, 
liberationist campaigns like Gandhi’s seem centered on important ways in the ethics of 
vision.  
The Psychology of Aggression and the Ethics of Vision 
If, as it has been said, “in war the first casualty is the truth,” the same is true in 
most situations of human conflict.
102
 Conflict and violence tend to provoke emotional 
reactions that in turn produce a strong emotional bifurcation between the opponents. If 
Murdoch is correct about how basic egoism is a powerful engine of moral blindness and 
insensitivity to others, then it is also surely correct that conditions of social conflict 
between groups, tribes, or nations add powerful emotions of fear and paranoia that 
promote heightened tendencies for falsely seeing our opponents as utter adversaries and 
demonic threats. The sense of threat mobilizes powerful emotions of fear, anger, and 
hatred and an overgeneralization that the opponent is a “monster” and solely “other,” not 
human like us, an enemy having no human compassion.
103
 Such a depiction is a distortion 
of reality that reaches beyond individual egoism to group egoism.  
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Violent resistance to oppression allows the forces of oppression to depict the 
resistors as the sources of violence and societal-wide disruption. This justifies in the 
dominant media and societal conversations a framing of the movement for social justice 
as a destructive and threatening force deserving of violent crackdown and oppression. 
This violent mode of confrontation for social justice simply plays into what has been 
rightly called the “spiral of violence” whereby oppression and injustice trigger a revolt, 
which in turn provides justification for “repression.” As Robert McAfee Brown puts it, 
“Confronted with revolt, those who hold power put down the revolt by whatever 
repressive means are necessary to ensure that their power is not threatened.”104 Lonergan 
further supports this claim. Group bias, whenever it is threatened, uses whatever means 
possible in any “manner” possible to achieve its end.105 It seeks to defeat all efforts of 
common interest. 
Much of the power of nonviolent resistance campaigns derives from their 
disciplined attempt not to project hatred against their opponents. Nonviolent resistance 
movements, like those of Gandhi and King, know that attack, violence, the threat of 
violence, and disrespect will entrench a defensive posture and fear in the majority 
population that has been lax in focusing on the issue of social justice for all. 
A key theme in Murdoch’s ethics of vision is relevant here. Recall her reference 
to Sigmund Freud’s notion of the self as inevitably and daily pulled into self-interested 
concerns that tend to block our ability to extend attention to, and interest in, the realm 
beyond ourselves—namely, other people or other parts of our world. She is eloquent on 
                                                 
104
 Brown, Religion and Violence: A Primer for White Americans, 10–11. 
105
 See Lonergan, The Lonergan Reader, ed. M. Morelli and E. Morelli, 128–135. 
117 
how this powerful dynamic of self-concern absorbs so much energy that little is left for 
an extension of care or attention outward.
106
 This is a helpful observation for 
understanding what often happens in conflict situations. Self-concern is the driving 
energy of broader senses of participation in community. Self-concern gives rise to a sense 
of identification with broadening circles of loyalty and commitment beyond the self, 
namely, to family, a web of friends, local neighborhood, state, nation—in short, to “our 
people.”107  
One of Murdoch’s most distinctive emphases lies in her affirmation that the center 
of morality lies in the quiet processes of attention and vision that build up structures of 
value and commitment. As she argues, “But if we consider what the work of attention is 
like, how continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value 
round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the 
business of choosing is already over.”108 As she notes, however, often “psychic energy 
flows … into building up convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world, complete 
with systematic vocabulary. … Attention is the effort to counteract such states of 
illusion.”109 In her own way, Murdoch, like Gandhi, believes in “truth-force;” what 
Gandhi calls satyagraha. Where Murdoch is pulled into her reflections on the moral 
person, Sam Keen and other psychologists of aggression stress the large-scale blindness 
of groups, peoples, and nations when engaged in violent clashes and how such blinding 
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occurs through the reification of us-versus-them thinking. If Murdoch is correct that a key 
obstacle to clear vision and love of our neighbors living in the world lies in our obsessive 
ego drives, then Keen and others, who study social conflict and violent conflict between 
peoples, are similarly right that the ego drives get broadened via our identification with 
larger groups—namely, with “our people” as opposed to “those people.” This social scale 
of group egoism can be seen in the blindness of the British to the suffering caused by 
their imperial rule over India and by White American society’s blindness to the realities 
of life for Black citizens living under American segregationist laws.  
King’s efforts at developing an educational process for social reform center on 
coming up with dramatic events that concentrate people’s attention in new ways and in 
creating a climate of nonviolent resistance that remains relatively unthreatening enough 
so that the intended audiences of these events can remain calm and relatively comfortable 
while coming into new insight. In this sense, we can think of King and the civil rights 
movement as presenting pedagogy for the appreciation of the reality of injustice that, like 
a mode of social therapy, helps people come to see under nonthreatening circumstances. 
Moral development and the growth of attention, insight, and compassion do not flourish 
in the heat of violent threats when communities are clashing and understandably spiraling 
into a polarizing stance of distrust, resentment, and paranoia. Nonviolent approaches to 
social reform seek to reduce this mobilizing of conflict and paranoia by their disciplined 
effort at communicating to the other side that the conflict is not between good people and 
evil monsters, but rather between basically good people on one side and basically good 
people on the other. Nonviolent campaigns seek to heighten attention and promote 
mutual respect and, in this way, create a relatively safe social space for a relaxing of 
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tension and an increased opportunity to attend to the claims of the oppressed and to 
see.
110
 
Across his career, King frequently described the importance of keeping to the 
discipline of vocalizing a strong critique of the evil of the system of segregation, but 
never engaging in any personal attack on individual human beings caught up in these 
dramatic times. As King put it, “[T]he attack is directed against forces of evil rather than 
against persons who are caught in those forces. It is evil we are seeking to defeat, not the 
persons victimized by evil. Those of us who struggle against racial injustice must come to 
see that the basic tension is not between the races.”111 Elsewhere he noted, “In your 
struggle with justice, let your oppressor know that you are not attempting to defeat or 
humiliate him, or even to pay him back for injustices that he has heaped upon you. Let 
him know that the festering sore of segregation debilitates the White man as well as the 
Negro. With this attitude you will be able to keep your struggle on high Christian 
standards.”112 In his essay “The Power of Nonviolence,” he repeats, “[O]ur aim is not to 
defeat the White community, not to humiliate the White community, but to win the 
friendship of all of the persons who had perpetuated this system in the past. … A boycott 
is never an end in itself. It is merely a means to awaken a sense of shame within the 
oppressor but the end is reconciliation, the end is redemption. … Then we had to make it 
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clear also that the nonviolent resistor seeks to attack the evil system rather than 
individuals who happen to be caught up in the system.”113  
Nonviolent resistance techniques have the ability to clearly and publically define 
the aims of the campaign and the motives of the agents of the campaign in nonthreatening 
ways. Because nonviolent resistance is redemptive, it seeks to transform the heart of the 
oppressor and the oppressed in a community of relationships in an effort to bring forth a 
new community based on an ethic of love that transforms “self-interest” into “common 
interest.” As a fitting response, nonviolent resistance helps defuse the ratcheting up of the 
egoistic self-defense mechanisms that Freud and others have noted. By avoiding a stance 
of violent attack, it does not prompt the British or White America to escalate into 
overwhelming emotions of fear, anxiety, and paranoia that would energize a reification of 
a strict “us”—we are good versus “them”—and a “they” who are disruptive, threatening, 
and violent. Such thinking is fantastic. It distorts reality and disadvantages one group 
over another. If, as Murdoch puts it, “True vision occasions right conduct,” King is 
correct to stress that “true vision” is nurtured by the trust and the comfort afforded by 
nonviolence as the hallmark of reaching out to the other side. Nonviolence encourages 
people of goodwill, whom Lonergan calls progressives, to aim to both correct existing 
distortions and find means to prevent their recurrence.114 Where violent resistance to 
oppression poses a direct threat and, thus, sadly triggers justifications of fear and the 
retribution of repressive violence, nonviolent resistance campaigns seek to trigger a 
relaxation of tensions, a clear communication to and affirmation of the full humanity of 
                                                 
113
 King, “The Power of Nonviolence,” in A Testament of Hope, 12. 
114 
See Lonergan, The Lonergan Reader, ed. M. Morelli and E. Morelli, 132–135. 
121 
one’s opponents. It creates, in short, a kind of educational therapeutic context that helps 
prompt insight and possibility for growth of moral vision. 
As Gandhi’s campaigns illustrated, nonviolent resistance has the capability of 
focusing attention on the dignity and courage of the resisters by the drama of the 
stagecraft of the great Salt March and other marches, boycotts, and demonstrations. It can 
do this without triggering the mobilization of the opponent’s defensive energies that 
would serve as a powerful obstacle to any growth in clear attention and moral vision. If 
one feels one is being attacked, such development in insight and vision is almost certain 
to be cut off. A sense of immediate attack triggers powerful emotional postures of 
defense. The conflict and perceived threat immediately polarize the two parties, and the 
one threatened finds it difficult not to see “them”—those people, as attacking “us.” As 
Lonergan rightly suggests in his study on group bias, the dominant groups in their 
reactionary efforts seek to “block any correction of the effects of group bias, and they 
employ for this purpose whatever power they possess in whatever way they deem 
appropriate and effective.”115 If one does not feel so directly attacked, then “just vision,” 
as Murdoch puts it, is quite possible. The nonviolent approaches employed by Gandhi 
and King adopt a path that seeks to highlight that oppressed and oppressors are not two 
enemies, but rather at bottom are actually one community. They stress the importance of 
never attacking or demeaning those who benefit and sustain the levers of oppression, and 
argue that the whole system—be it British colonial rule or American segregationist laws 
and customs—creates victims on both sides.  
                                                 
115
 Ibid., 135.  
122 
A key part of the “truth-force” or satyahagraha approach of the nonviolent path is 
a sustained affirmation of the common humanity and dignity and, indeed, the shared fate 
of both sides. Against the polarized understanding that flows from oppression and the 
paths of violent resistance that reifies a sharpened emotional understanding of the radical 
differences between “us” versus “them,” the nonviolent approach affirms that there 
finally is only “us”—one community. This is what King called the “beloved 
community”—a growth in the understanding of both sides of a conflict situation that 
ultimately they are all “brothers and sisters.”116  
King’s Ethic of Vision: Parallels with Murdoch 
Murdoch and King illumine the works of the other in important ways as we 
explore massive parallels between Murdoch’s diagnosis of egoism as the chief obstacle in 
the moral life and King’s emphasis on the corrupting powers of self-interest, moral 
blindness, and ideological justifications for racist oppression and economic and societal 
injustice. Similarly, there are similar and sustained parallels between Murdoch’s notion 
that love is the antidote to egoism and King’s sustained call for the building up of the 
“strength to love.” Egoism is a force that constricts our attention and concern to self and 
our narrowly defined group. Love, for Murdoch, is the extension of attention and moral 
concern outward beyond self-interest.
117
 King, as a Christian preacher and leader, draws 
on the core emphases of historic Christian ethical reflection to preach and write 
powerfully on the dynamics of sin and the need for love to help reform American society 
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by the promotion of civil rights for all. 
Some of King’s most famous and often-repeated sermons are collected in his 
book Strength to Love, published in 1963. They display King’s understanding of how 
excessive self-interest pushes moral blindness and a lack of concern for the suffering of 
others. His sermons are rich with imagery of “seeing” and “not-seeing.” In his sermon “A 
Tough Mind and a Tender Heart,” King, echoing Reinhold Niebuhr’s emphasis, calls us 
to be both “idealistic” and “realistic.” As he puts it, “Our minds are constantly being 
invaded by legions of half-truths, prejudices, and false facts. One of the great needs of 
humankind is to be lifted above the morass of false propaganda.”118 In his description of 
the “hardhearted person,” he centers his description in their failure to really see people: 
“The hardhearted person … passes unfortunate men every day, but he never really sees 
them. … The hardhearted individual never sees people as people. … He depersonalizes 
them.” King describes the “rich fool,” noting that “he was condemned” because “he was 
not tender-hearted. Life for him was a mirror in which he saw only himself, and not a 
window through which he saw other selves.”119  
In his sermon “On Being a Good Neighbor,” King reflects on the Good Samaritan 
story. While others failed to see the needs of the neighbor wounded on the road to 
Jericho, King notes, “When he (the Samaritan) saw the wounded man, he was moved to 
compassion….” King reflects how such failures to see needy neighbors get reinforced by 
how egoism extends and mobilizes identification with certain groups or nations. This 
psychological and sociological dynamic of identification with broader groups and 
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communities builds walls between in-groups and out-groups. For King, the power of the 
Good Samaritan story in great part lies in how the Samaritans were somewhat estranged 
from the Jews, and yet it is an individual who breaks through this in-group versus out-
group frame, who reaches across in true moral care and responsibility to a needy 
individual.  
As King puts it, “The Samaritan had the capacity for a universal altruism. He had 
a piercing insight into that which is beyond the eternal accidents of race, religion and 
nationality. One of the great tragedies of man’s long trek along the highway of history 
has been the limiting of neighborly concern to tribe, race, class, or nation.”120 The visual 
metaphor for moral sensitivity dominates this sermon. As King notes, “The real tragedy 
of such narrow provincialism is that we see people as entities or merely as things. Too 
seldom do we see people in their true humanness. A spiritual myopia limits our vision to 
external accidents. … But the Good Samaritan will always remind us to remove the 
cataracts of provincialism from our spiritual eyes and see men as men.”121  
In his sermon “Love in Action,” King reflects on Luke 23:34, where Jesus on the 
cross states, “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.” King’s dominant 
theme is “blindness,” a failure to see, and thus a failure in ability for a compassionate and 
human response. “Jesus’ prayer on the cross” is “an expression of Jesus’ awareness of 
man’s intellectual and spiritual blindness. ‘They know not what they do,’ said Jesus. 
Blindness was their trouble; enlightenment was their need.” “The men who cried, 
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‘Crucify him,’ were not bad men, but rather blind men.”122 This teaching applies, King 
believes, directly to America. “Slavery in America was perpetuated not merely by human 
badness but also by human blindness.”123 “The tragic blindness is also found in racial 
segregation, the not-too-distant cousin of slavery.”124 King moves beyond a concentration 
on individual egoism and personal blindness, however, to analyze how the history of 
slavery and racial injustice is rooted in a societal-wide blindness of dominant White 
America to the basic humanity and suffering of Black people.  
In his powerful “Letter from Birmingham City Jail,” King distinguishes between 
“negative” and “positive” peace. Like Augustine before him, King notes that societies 
can on the surface appear quiet and orderly, but that peaceful appearance can be rooted in 
injustice and oppression. This surface-level peace masks and hides an underlying system 
of ongoing violence, what many today refer to as “structural violence.”125 He is upset that 
too many “white moderates” seem “more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice” and prefer 
“negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence 
of justice.”126  
For King, the appropriateness of nonviolent direct action campaigns lies in how 
they break through dominant society’s complacent sense that the status quo is good. It is 
not surprising that those who benefit from the status quo arrangements of societal order 
come to think that order is part of the natural order of things and thus something to be 
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taken for granted. Those who engage in boycotts, sit-ins, marches, and demonstrations 
are thus understandably, from the perspective of the privileged, labeled as “disturbers of 
the peace,” but King argues that the only peace they are disturbing is the “negative 
peace” that hides its face in injustice and thus deep violence. King argues that those 
engaging in nonviolent direct action are “not the creators of tension,” but rather are 
agents attempting to focus the nation’s and the world’s eyes on the structural violence 
that has gone on unnoticed and unexamined for too long. King’s core ethic, it seems, is 
an ethic of vision. 
As King puts it, “We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already 
alive. We bring it out in the open where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can 
never be cured as long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its pus-flowing 
ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must likewise be exposed with 
all of the tension its exposing creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of 
national opinion before it can be cured.”127 The drama of nonviolent direct action 
campaigns grabs the media’s and people’s attention and makes possible a moral 
educational process whereby White moderates’ eyes can be opened in shame to the 
injustices of America’s racist inequity.  
Using Murdoch’s terms, I argue that King’s dominant efforts to create dramatic 
nonviolent “direct actions” are attempts to capture the attention of the nation to 
something it has generally been too happy to ignore. The Montgomery bus boycott, the 
march on Washington, and the “I Have a Dream” speech with thousands gathered at the 
Lincoln Memorial are all dramatic and theatrical events constructed and planned to help 
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draw the attention of the nation and the world. Once the world is focused on the drama of 
the events, then spokespersons like King and other civil rights leaders can use the 
occasion as a massive teaching moment. The drama of the events grabs attention, and the 
sermons, writings, conferences, and speeches help develop the moral education and 
“seeing.”  
King’s “Letter from the Birmingham City Jail” is an eloquent example of his 
attempt to open the eyes of White America to the lived experience of Black America. 
Following is the full quote of the most remarkable sentence in one of America’s most 
iconic works of literature. King states: 
I guess it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of 
segregation to say, “Wait.” But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch 
your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at 
whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick, and 
brutalize and even kill your black brothers and sisters with impunity; 
when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers 
smothering in the airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent 
society; when you finally find your tongue twisted and your speech 
stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daughter why 
she can’t go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised 
on television, and see tears welling up in her little eyes when she is told 
that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see the depressing 
clouds of inferiority begin to form in her little mental sky, and see her 
begin to distort her little personality by unconsciously developing a 
bitterness toward white people; when you have to concoct an answer 
for a five-year-old son asking in agonizing pathos: “Daddy, why do 
white people treat colored people so mean?”; when you take a cross-
country drive and find it necessary to sleep night after night in the 
uncomfortable corners of your automobile because no motel will accept 
you; when you are humiliated by day in and day out by nagging signs 
reading “white” and “colored”; when your first name becomes “nigger” 
and your middle name becomes “boy” (however old you are) and your 
last name becomes “John,” and when your wife and mother are never 
given the respected title “Mrs.”; when you are harried by day and 
haunted by night by the fact that you are a Negro, living constantly on 
tiptoe stance never quite knowing what to expect next, and plagued 
with inner fears and outer resentments; when you are forever fighting a 
128 
degenerating sense of “nobodiness”; then you will understand why we 
find it difficult to wait.
128  
 
In this powerful sentence, King attempts to reach out to moderate White America 
in terms that they could appreciate. He simply shares with them a number of the concrete 
life experiences imposed on America’s Black population by the system of segregation. 
He speaks about the impact on families and how daughters and sons are affected and how 
mothers and fathers are affected. He speaks about the suffering imposed on Black bodies 
forced to sleep in their cars during road trips, and on the Black minds and souls who 
develop in distorted and fearful ways from simply growing up in racist America. This 
brilliant sentence, which King constructed while in jail, is designed carefully to touch the 
hearts of White America and to help us see what it feels like to be Black in our 
segregationist system. His rhetorical choices express sadness and suffering and highlight 
to White America what it feels like to be a Black parent and how Black children grow up 
in a deeply unfairly constricted universe.  
In terms of ethical theory, this is not deontology or utilitarianism but clearly a 
profound attempt to marshal rhetoric and narration to focus White America’s attention 
and vision and begin to grasp the simple, basic, real humanity of Black people—people 
with kids, and cars and needs to sleep, and sadness when daughters are hurt. By 
enumerating experiences in Black life that White America can relate to, King offers a 
powerful bridge for cross-racial understanding and a moral growth in awareness.  
In a central theme of his letter, King expresses his deep disappointment at the 
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“appalling silence of the good people.”129 He notes that America will have to repent for 
the hatred of entrenched White racists, but feels more deeply let down by “the White 
moderate” like the White religious leaders asking him to slow his pressing for rapid 
social change.130 He embraces the charge that he is an “extremist” but argues that so were 
Amos, Paul, Martin Luther, John Bunyan, Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, and even 
Jesus Christ—Jesus being an extremist for “love, truth, and goodness.”131 As he puts it, 
the “South, the nation and the world are in dire need of creative extremists. I had hoped 
that the White moderate would see this. Maybe I expected too much.”132 Few Whites can 
appreciate the scale of the suffering rained down on Black Americans, and “still fewer 
have the vision to see that injustice must be rooted out by strong, persistent and 
determined action.”133 At his core, I submit, King is an ethicist of vision and 
responsibility. 
Responsibility in King’s Thinking 
The ethics of vision and responsibility in Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking open 
our eyes to see that living morally requires the effort of interdependence, which points to 
the necessity of responsibility. In other words, King’s efforts demonstrate for us that 
building God’s kingdom requires both an individual and a collective effort on behalf of 
the whole community. Here, King, like Niebuhr, recognizes that morality is social.
134
 As 
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Paris suggests, one could not be moral in isolation.
135
 Thus, while there are parallels 
between King and Murdoch, there are also substantial parallels between Niebuhr’s 
emphasis on responsibility and King’s thoughts on human nature and destiny as they 
relate to injustice and exploitation, self-respect and justice, goodwill and brotherhood, 
and nonviolent resistance. Niebuhr’s stress on the importance of seeing affirms 
Murdoch’s stress on vision. However, because King reaches beyond Murdoch in that he 
focuses on both the individual self and the social self, Niebuhr helps to offer further 
structure to King’s thoughts and actions. Niebuhr affirms King’s stress on vision and 
action. For King, “it is midnight in our world. The darkness is so deep that we can hardly 
see which way to turn … This midnight in man’s external collective life is paralleled by 
midnight in his internal individual life. It is midnight … psychologically [and] … 
morally.”136 Like Niebuhr, King balances his concerns for both seeing and acting. For 
him to respond to such conditions, moral agency requires responsible action. America 
must repent because it has written a “bad check.” Responsibility and solidarity are at the 
very core of King’s ethics. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that he has a concern for 
both the individual self and the social self. Midnight is upon both. Blacks and Whites 
must respond to the world outside of themselves under midnight conditions. In short, they 
are called to be custodians with caretaking functions that point to an inescapable moral 
obligation to make real God’s kingdom upon Earth. Here, God acts, and Blacks and 
Whites respond to God’s actions upon them. Thus, drawing from biblical revelation, 
philosophical anthropological personalism, and the social sciences, King establishes a 
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critical correlation between divine sovereignty and responsibility. In this way, the 
responsibility ethics of Niebuhr become helpful because he sees humans as responding 
directly to the actions of God. Here, Niebuhr’s man the answerer becomes the image that 
best illustrates King’s understanding of humanity when related to the function of 
humanity in the universe. Here, life consists of dynamic positive interactive forces: 
sacred and profane, divine and human, personal and social, life and death, justice and 
interests, integration and disintegration, and reconciliation and fragmentation.  
The individual is both personal and communal. One exists because the other 
exists. We are who we are because of our relationships with our family, our community, 
our nation, the world around us, and the dynamic of responsiveness that forms the very 
heart of Niebuhr’s ethics of responsibility. For instance, King concretely demonstrates 
the Homo dialogicus nature of humanity in that he calls us to respond not only to one 
another as human beings but also to God. King’s theology is shaped by his understanding 
of God as the cosmic companion of the universe who surrounds us with justice and 
embraces us with grace. At the heart of King’s work is an I-thou relationship. For him, as 
for Niebuhr, we are employed as co-creators with God. We respond to others as though 
we are responding to God. “We are engaged in a dialogue.”137 In fact, King embraces a 
vision of the divine narrative and builds upon it. It is his way of bringing about God’s 
justice and God’s call of justice to be a lived out reality in the lives of people upon the 
earth not only for the Black community but also for the world. As a Christian, King 
centers his theological concerns on the lived practices or involvement of theology in 
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human affairs (orthopraxy).
138
 For King, at issue is the relevance of religion for one to 
live morally and to improve morally under midnight conditions. Therefore, King seeks to 
“ascertain the liberative potential of theology for reshaping the conduct of human beings 
in the daily affairs of living.”139 In this sense, King “defies rigid, traditional, Western 
characterizations” of theology.140 In short, “his theology represents a significant departure 
from the ‘norm’ of classical theological formation of doctrine (orthodoxy).”141 Yet, King 
had solid grounding in the conceptual framework of classical Western theology while 
reshaping this tradition accordingly.  
For King, we answer others in our reactions. We respond not only to one another 
but also to something beyond ourselves. In this way, the ethics of vision and 
responsibility better captures King’s understanding of human existence than utilitarian 
and deontological ethical models, because it more adequately highlights the 
responsiveness that lies at the core of moral agency.
142 
For example, he demonstrates that 
personal suffering serves to shape our thinking. Recognizing that one could be self-
centered in one’s denial and self-righteous in one’s self-sacrifice, he reluctantly refers to 
his personal sacrifices but moves on to say in his article on Suffering and Faith:  
But I feel somewhat justified in mentioning them in this article because of the 
influence they have had in shaping my thinking. … I have been arrested five 
times and put in Alabama jails. My home has been bombed twice. A day seldom 
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passes that my family and I are not the recipients of threats of death. I have been 
the victim of a near fatal stabbing. So in a real sense I have been battered by the 
storms of persecution. I must admit that at times I have felt that I could no longer 
bear such a heavy burden, and have been tempted to retreat to a more quiet and 
serene life. … As my sufferings mounted I soon realized that there were two ways 
that I could respond to my situation: either to react with bitterness or seek to 
transform the suffering into a creative force. … Recognizing the necessity for 
suffering I have tried to make of it a virtue. If only to save myself from bitterness, 
I have attempted to see my personal ordeals as an opportunity to transform myself 
and heal the people involved in the tragic situation which now obtains. I have 
lived these last few years with the conviction that unearned suffering is 
redemptive.
143
 
 
Nonviolence soaked in love infuses King’s actions. This is due to the fact that 
central to King’s thinking is that we are purposive beings responding to a creator, 
sustainer, and redeemer who governs the universe and is a conserver of human beings. 
Personality is central. Here, a study of personalism provides King with a philosophical 
grounding for saying that the problem is that the universe necessitates the operations of 
certain fixed, immutable, unbreakable laws. In this school of thought, God, who sustains 
and governs the universe, sets these wheels in motion. To achieve God’s plan, God sets a 
multiplicity of laws in motion to ensure the perpetuation of what King refers to as the 
moral foundation of the universe. Clear vision involves incisive thinking, realistic 
appraisal, and decisive judgments. Vision is sharp and penetrating, breaking through 
legends and myths and sifting the true from the false. Clear vision is astute and 
discerning. Clear vision eliminates choices and leads to responsible action. Choices that 
promote injustice are in disharmony with God’s will. Here, unjust laws and practices are 
in rebellion against God. Every person is made in the image of God and must be 
accountable to God’s deep concern for human dignity. As a result, moral agency must 
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begin with the recognition of every human person in relation to God. Clearly implied is 
the notion that both Niebuhr and King have a concern for the Christian community. As a 
result, the texture of human life for King is essential in his work. The concrete needs of 
people inform King’s theology and the centrality of the person is at its heart.  
God is concerned with human society, both individually and collectively. 
Relationality, interdependency, sensibility, solidarity, selflessness, and goodness are 
essential to human agency. Interaction, response, community, struggle, and seeing are 
themes that are central to Niebuhr. With this image of human agency, it is no surprise the 
question of vision is central. Responsible action requires that one first see “what is 
happening.” As Murdoch suggests, an individual could only respond within the world he 
or she sees. The question of vision and responsibility is the central question for King. 
Such vision captures the material of one’s actions, thoughts, feelings, intentions, 
attitudes, purposes, and so on.
144
 King’s response is timely. He seeks to respond in the 
right place, at the right time, with the right means, directed toward the right audience, be 
it Black or White. He wants Whites to see their Black brothers and sisters, and Blacks to 
see that nonviolence is the only way to build a truly peaceful community. It is this 
concept that underlies King’s commitment to nonviolence. Nonviolence is the fitting 
action. For King, nonviolence combines the characteristics of tough-mindedness and 
tenderheartedness, and it avoids the complacent do-nothingness of the soft-minded and 
the violence and bitterness of the hardhearted. He aims to oppose the unjust system and, 
at the same time, to love the perpetrators of the system. God is both tough-minded and 
tenderhearted, with the qualities of both sternness and gentleness. God expresses tough-
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mindedness in justice and wrath, and expresses tenderheartedness in love and grace. God 
surrounds us with justice and embraces us with grace. God is the provider of justice who 
punished Israel for its wayward deeds and is the forgiving father whose heart was filled 
with unutterable joy when the prodigal son returned home. At issue is the necessity for 
love and justice, which are two major themes in the work of Murdoch, who declares that 
the moral life must involve a relationship between love, justice, and freedom. King 
concretely demonstrates the relationship between love, justice, and freedom in his work.  
For King, “love provides the conceptual clue for ascertaining the nature and 
purpose of God and derivatively, the meaning and end of life.”145 For King, love is the 
basis for freedom, responsibility, and genuine community. For him, love is the fuel that 
empowers the moral agents for social change. Reaching to Gandhi’s understanding of 
true force, as interpreted in light of his heritage, love becomes for King the heart of the 
nonviolent movement for social change. For King, love is also foundational to Christian 
discipleship and the basis for divine and human co-responsibility in working toward 
God’s kingdom of justice in human history. In short, love is the principle catalyst, and 
nonviolence is the tool King uses to make God’s notion of justice a reality. For him, 
God’s justice and command of justice lead to a beloved kingdom.  
Love motivates King and others to make choices for justice, and it encourages 
them against compromising with injustice, motivated by their ability to see according to 
the vision of God. In this way, for King, nonviolence, as an expression of love and as an 
educational tool, helps people to see justly and respond fittingly. As a result, people of 
goodwill engage in radical acts of divine self-giving through their faith and commitment 
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to God’s vision of a better world. Love demonstrates itself in a caring God, whose 
interests rest upon deliverance and justice for the oppressed, a central theme in the work 
of King. Here, love becomes a force for “unselfing” as expressed in the work of 
Murdoch.
146
 Like Murdoch, King believes that virtue involves a desire for the 
achievement of truth and reality, and he believes that such could only come about 
through outward attention. King’s desire for truth parallels Murdoch’s understanding of 
“unselfing.” However, King takes suffering to a different level and seeks to use it as a 
powerful and creative force for social change. He is interested in unmerited suffering, 
which becomes the transformative tool for “unselfing.” Although he does not use the 
term “unselfing,” it is implied throughout his work as he strives to encourage Whites to 
see the suffering that segregation inflicted upon Black Americans. Thus, King encourages 
nonviolent participants to be unselfish and institute an educational program to transform 
human agents for change. These agents of goodwill become heroes as they sacrifice 
themselves for the sake of others through selfless deeds. It is through such suffering that 
some are transformed, while it is due to shame and educational programs that others are 
transformed, as they direct their attention to God and to the poor. 
King encouraged his participants to pull attention away from themselves and 
direct energy toward others. He encouraged them to put others first. This sacrificial 
commitment confirms King’s understanding of virtuous living, as it does for Murdoch. 
However, King’s agent is rewarded, or the agent stands the chance of being rewarded, if 
not in this life, then in the afterlife. This is because unselfishness leads to heavenly 
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rewards. There is a telos. One hopes to see God. 
King’s understanding of “unselfing” is not only demonstrated as it relates to the 
individual. It is also demonstrated as it relates to the social self. King’s example is the 
Samaritan’s expression of neighborly love. Love does not only energize the agent; it also 
opens the agent’s heart and heightens the agent’s sense of the world around him or her. 
The results are not only transformative but also redemptive. In other words, freedom 
provides the ability to see and interpret the world, and love enables the redemption of the 
human community. Here, the relationship between freedom, justice, and love is made real 
in the agent’s ability to express selflessness. God and love remain in harmony as the 
moral agent carries out God’s will for justice. The object of attention, God, demands right 
action from the agent. Niebuhr’s notion of accountability is implied. Like Murdoch, King 
is cognizant that moral change demands a reorientation of psychic energies, the purging 
of illusions, and the disrobing of “idolatrous images” and their “false consolations” in 
order to depict a truthful reality.
147
 King is also aware that addressing group bias is more 
demanding because of its soft-minded nature. A group with a soft-minded nature 
prejudges and acts out of fear before any consideration of facts. It functions through 
distortions. For Murdoch: 
Moral transformation requires the expunging of self-seeking fantasy, [when it 
comes to group bias it also requires the recognition of the structures of violence 
that reinforce such fantasies.] The stripping away of idolatrous images, and their 
attendant false consolations, in order to gain a truthful perception of reality and 
others, [requires a deeper level of commitment that not only transforms the agent, 
but transforms others encountered by the agent. Unselfing must reach beyond the 
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personal into the social.
148
 
 
Nonviolence is an expression of open love and is the tool for transformation. 
Here, King’s ethics of vision and responsibility express love as the greatest good. God 
becomes the focus of attention as in the work of Niebuhr. Love, as expressed in the 
Christian gospel, becomes an expression of God and the very essence of God working to 
establish just relationships in the created order. In this way, for King, love also works as 
an educational tool to open people’s eyes and to help people overcome hate-producing 
fears, confront forces of darkness, defeat evil, convert enemies into friends, and create a 
just community.
149
 In this respect, divine grace fuels moral agency. It empowers the 
moral agent and drives the agent toward the object of his or her affection. Such is the case 
for Murdoch’s pilgrim in her depiction of Plato’s Cave. A force that is beyond the agent 
energizes the pilgrim. It is identified as a spiritual force that works analogous to the 
agent’s experience. As the pilgrim advances from one level of consciousness to the next, 
the force is at work bringing forth change in the agent and the agent’s environment. It is 
to say that the divine is active in the world, helping people to see. In this excerpt, the 
work of King sharpens Murdoch’s view because King sees God as an active participant in 
the world whose efforts are concrete. King believes that God is a creative force of power 
and love, always at work in the universe to restore harmony to the disconnected 
fragments of history. The belief that God is at work gives King a steadfast hope in God’s 
ability to prevail against injustice. Like Gandhi, King expresses an unwavering 
confidence in the ability of love to transform the hearts and minds of people to bring 
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about moral change.
150
 For both, involvement in the world collapses the past, present, and 
future, which is to say that we respond in the present in hope for a better tomorrow as a 
result of the past. Our history has much to do with our present actions and desires for 
justice. Acting in love points us toward justice and hope. In this way, justice is made real 
through human efforts.  
If Blacks and Whites gain a truthful picture of the horrors of segregation, the 
dehumanizing impact that it has on human dignity, and the fact that all people are 
brothers and sisters called to live in a community of love through reconciliatory and 
transformative ways, divine grace will lead them to become responsible agents of change. 
In this way, King’s concern for the social self begins with self-reflection: who is the 
agent in relation to others, and what does this say about the agent? Understanding the 
social self as it relates to others empowers the agent to function in a community. Thus, 
understanding oneself in relation to others is at the very heart of King’s theological 
agenda. In addition, the only way to bring about such a reality is through “unselfing,” 
directing one’s attention to God. It is to become “convinced of the reality of God.”151 
“Unselfing” involves loving another for their sake. It involves understanding the 
redeeming goodwill of all humankind. “It is to experience the love of God in the human 
heart,” to express disinterested love. 152 It is to seek the good of one’s neighbor. It is 
entirely neighborly to have concern for others, which exposes the neighbor in every 
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human it meets. It makes no distinction between friend and enemy.
153
 In this sense, King 
speaks of a God who values persons. Love becomes visible in a reform movement that, 
through a process of working in tension with people of goodwill, helps to open the eyes 
of White Americans to the needs of Black Americans. In this way, God’s command for 
justice is expressed in what Ivory calls “radical love.”154 Here, love and justice work as 
one underlined by a moral imagination of the divine. Love, like nonviolence, becomes 
courageously confrontational and radically disruptive in the pursuit of peace and in its 
demand for justice. Here, love becomes demonstrative. Love is made visible, as justice is 
visible. For instance, nonviolence and reform efforts become love in action, whether it is 
expressed in the movement by Blacks, or by Whites out of goodwill. Their efforts 
become a fitting response to God’s actions in the world. People become God’s hands and 
feet. As God participates in human history and throughout the universe, implied are the 
notions of solidarity, accountability, interpretation, and response. These themes are 
central to Niebuhr’s ethics of responsibility and implied in King’s “I Have a Dream” 
speech.  
“I Have a Dream” 
King and the civil rights movement led a march on Washington that emblazoned 
powerful words and images onto the American consciousness. The key to the ethics of 
vision is attracting attention to a powerful teaching moment so that the general vision of 
the dominant society can be sharpened and expanded through an educational process. 
What could be more visually riveting than to have King, the leader of the civil rights 
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movement, bring a huge crowd of Blacks and Whites together to hear a major speech at 
the Lincoln Memorial, the shrine to the president who enacted the Emancipation 
Proclamation? On August 28, 1963, scaffolding and a podium were set at the feet of the 
grand statue of Abraham Lincoln in America’s closest approximation of the Parthenon in 
Athens. This building and its steps look eastward across the Reflecting Pool toward the 
Washington Monument and the Capital. 
With the eyes and ears of the nation turned toward him, King gave a speech that 
arguably stands as the only rival to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address as the most famous and 
moving speech in all of American history. In it, King shared with his audience and the 
nation a broad vision of American ideals and how the nation has deep greatness and 
goodness but has fallen deeply short. He briefly explained the structural violence of 
segregationist laws and the general aim and methods of nonviolent campaigns for social 
justice. One of King’s major themes was his attempt to get America to see the huge gap 
between its originally expressed values of universal human rights and dignity and its 
starkly unjust concrete laws and general practices. He uses a banking metaphor of Blacks 
being offered a “promissory note” by America’s most fundamental affirmations that “all 
men”—really, “all persons”—are equal. But this has not been actualized. As he puts it, 
“So we’ve come here today to dramatize a shameful condition. In a sense we’ve come to 
our nation’s capital to cash a check.” King draws attention to the gap between the current 
segregationist rallies (America’s realities) and the envisioned future of the “beloved 
community” (America’s ideals) that King portrays in his great “dream.”  
On April 3, 1968, King gave his last sermon, “I See the Promised Land.” The next 
day he was shot and killed for telling the truth and trying to help White America to see 
142 
clearly and act justly. Remarkably, this sermon concludes with King in a rather resigned 
expression, stating that he doesn’t know what is going to happen now, but that it doesn’t 
matter, because he has 
… been to the mountaintop. And I don’t mind. Like anybody, I would like to live 
a long life. Longevity has its place. But I’m not concerned about that now. I just 
want to do God’s will. And He’s allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I’ve 
looked over. And I’ve seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you, but I 
want you to know tonight, that we as a people will get to the Promised Land. And 
I’m happy, tonight. I’m not worried about anything. I’m not fearing any man. 
Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.
155
  
 
Even in his death, King drew attention to the gap between America’s ideals and 
its realities and to the structural violence of normal everyday American laws and 
practices that sustain segregation.
156
 To the end, his campaign and sermon and speeches 
are rooted in and display the power of the ethics of vision and its immediate call for a 
loving and just response. The night before King’s murder, his sermon dealt centrally with 
“seeing” the Promised Land, and his last public sentence uttered, “Mine eyes have seen 
the glory of the coming of the Lord.”157 The attracting of attention, the training of vision, 
and the promotion of a moral responsibility were central to King’s agenda. 
Conclusion 
Through nonviolence, King provided an alternative that forced people to confront 
issues without destroying life or property. Through workshops, nonviolent marshals were 
trained to assist in nonviolent protest. For King, nonviolent demonstrations brought 
Blacks and Whites together to solve problems. As a result, “In Montgomery, Alabama, 
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when we had a bus boycott, the crime rate in the Negro community went down 65 
percent for a whole year.”158 People found ways to slough off their self-hatred, and they 
had a channel to express their longings in a war to be fought nonviolently.  
King holds that such a movement was needed to bring about togetherness among 
Blacks and Whites. In the light of an ethics of vision and responsibility, he writes, 
We have come to the point where there is no longer a choice now between 
nonviolence and riots. It must be militant, massive nonviolence, or riots. The 
discontent is so deep, the anger so ingrained, the despair, the restlessness so wide, 
that something has to be brought into being to serve as a channel through which 
these deep emotional feelings, these deep angry feelings, can be funneled.
159
  
 
Nonviolent direct action provided a way for Black Americans to channel their 
deeply angry feelings constructively, creatively, and peacefully. King writes, “I see this 
campaign as a way to transmute the inchoate rage of the ghetto into a constructive and 
creative channel” for the best interest of the nation.160 King was wholly devoted to 
nonviolence. Thus, he argues, 
I am committed to nonviolence absolutely. … I plan to stand for nonviolence 
because I have found it to be a philosophy of life that regulates not only my 
dealing in the struggle of racial justice but also my dealing with people, with my 
own self.
161
  
 
The advantage of nonviolence, for King, is that it prevents guerrilla warfare. 
Nonviolence draws attention away from the self and directs it toward others. It empowers 
the moral agent to express neighborly love while providing a space for both personal and 
social transformation. In a more concrete way, it empowers the poor through peaceful 
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means to place problems of injustice at the seat of government of the wealthiest nation in 
the history of humanity. It encourages that government to acknowledge its debt to the 
poor while holding the governing administration accountable to “living up to its promise 
to insure life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to its citizens.”162 In a concrete way, the 
success of nonviolence is measured in the creation and implementation of social policies 
and programs geared to remove structures of violence and to empowering the oppressed. 
For instance, for King, it is measured by the gaining of “an economic bill of rights, for 
the disadvantaged, requiring about ten to twelve billion dollars,” and the creation of a 
specific number of jobs to abolish unemployment. It was also measured in the creation of 
programs to supplement the income of those in poverty.
163
  
In addition, the success of nonviolent direct action is measured in the creation of 
affordable healthcare programs and policies. For instance, King sought to bring Medicare 
within the reach of both Black and White poor, who were aware of its great advances but 
were unable to afford them.
164
 He seeks to pull attention away from the rich and to direct 
it toward the hundreds of thousands of sharecroppers who have no work or food. He 
points out that 
… children are actually starving, while large landowners place their land in a soil 
bank and receive millions of dollars not to plant food or cotton. No provisions are 
made for the life or survival of the hundreds of thousands of sharecroppers who 
… [are] driven off land, and are forced into tents, [while] the rich are given 
sophisticated welfare handouts, as parity, subsidies, and incentives to industry.
165
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Thus, in King’s words, 
We have, through massive nonviolent action, an opportunity to avoid a national 
disaster and create a new spirit of class and racial harmony. We can write another 
luminous moral chapter in American history. All of us are on trial in this troubled 
hour, but time still permits us to meet the future with a clear conscience.
166
 
 
For King, the path of nonviolence made the idea of segregation the enemy. Thus, 
King fought against the idea of segregation as opposed to fighting the segregationist. The 
segregationist was a victim of an idea brought about by generations of abuse of freedom. 
For King, it is an understanding of the moral life grounded in his ancestors’ 
understanding of God and their own religious experience.
167
 King’s ancestors understood 
God to be their parent and themselves to be God’s children, and as such that they must 
conduct themselves as one ever-increasing family. In other words, all humanity was 
connected in a global web in which every member played a part. Each had value as a 
person, and no single person’s value as a human being was to exceed that of another’s. 
Each person was to be treated with dignity and respect. To do so was the beginning of 
being moral and thus of being a human person. It also implied the necessity of freedom, 
duty, responsibility, commitment, solidarity, and community, characteristics that were 
rights, duties, and privileges endowed by the creator. Basic freedom was an inherent part 
of the universe endowed to each individual to be devoted and faithful to the God of the 
universe, who was the most essential aspect of the moral life. To be in harmony with God 
required complete devotion.  
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In short, King’s picture of nonviolence turns out to be a way to love and to 
improve morally. It was his way to make a better world. However, his approach to 
nonviolent resistance was based upon a prescription of the moral life that resulted from 
the navigation of two essential themes that, more than anything, shaped his understanding 
of God and God’s will: (1) the problem of race, and (2) the solution of agape love.  
These two themes are pivotal to King’s moral theology—that is, in his life and 
work—and serve as threads throughout his life. In other words, race and agape love 
permeate his understanding and awareness of the moral life—from the moment he 
appears to recognize the differences between right and wrong, as he became aware of the 
race problem at age six and the way it was handled by his parents, to the moment of his 
death—as well as the civil rights work that led to his death. Thus, it is clear that these two 
themes directed his life and were based on his understanding of God and the moral life.  
This is demonstrated by the way he synthesizes his understanding of God by 
drawing from the best of liberal and neo-orthodox theologies and presents his conception 
of God and the nature of humankind. What distinguishes his view from that of others is 
his understanding of race and his understanding of love. These concepts were introduced 
to him in his youth as he became aware of segregation and the race problem. King argues 
that humankind is neither sinful nor evil but has the potential to be both. The example he 
gives to support this view is the problem of race. Through race, he saw the worst of 
humanity, but he also saw the best of human nature, which showed him the propensity of 
humankind to do well. This understanding of the nature of humanity set him apart from 
both the liberal and the neo-orthodox positions and made his conception of God unique, 
although it represented a view of God that he inherited from his ancestors, a view closely 
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related to African American thought and experience. What makes it unique is that it is a 
time-sensitive view of God derived from sustained attention and careful vision as a 
response to a truthful depiction of reality interpreted from a number of forces that provide 
the material content of King’s actions. 
The second aspect that makes King’s position unique is his perception of God as a 
preserver of value, interested in preserving his greatest value: humanity. King’s concept 
presents a view of God that deals with the issue of good and evil and is also grounded in 
the concept of love as it relates to power. Several essential themes stand out as a 
consequence: the themes of freedom and order, love and justice, aspects of the moral life 
that resulted in both moral and physical evil, and the importance of individuality and 
relationality. These concepts, King says, are essential in the structure of a universe that 
demands unity. It is from reflecting more on these themes than on others in relation to the 
goodness of God that he derives his understanding of God and the moral life. It was as a 
result of such an analysis that King concludes that God is the conserver of the universe. 
Central to this is the idea of the divine as a personal spirit who creates a community of 
persons, employs them as co-creators, preserves them, and works in their best interests, 
while simultaneously protecting them because of their propensity to fall victim to their 
own sins and the world, a propensity caused by the fact that sin blinds humankind and 
supports irresponsible action, an abuse of humankind’s freedom. In short, in King’s view, 
segregation is sin. It prevents both blacks and whites from seeing things as they are. 
An ethics of vision was essential to King’s understanding of the moral life. His 
core agenda was to share his vision of a beloved community as the final goal of all 
human endeavors. Moreover, for King, seeing is important because of its relevance to the 
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moral life and what it means to be truly human.
168
 Seeing has ontological, sociological, 
theological, and epistemological implications. By ontological, we mean that seeing has to 
do with one’s “sense of self” or one’s “I am–ness,” the picture one has of one’s “self as a 
being made in the image of God” as an extension of God’s personality (a person, 
somebody). Here, for King, as it was for Murdoch, identity is prior to culture; therefore, it 
is immoral for institutions and their safeguarders to abuse the powerless on the grounds 
that they are nobodies. No human being is a nobody. “Sociologically our seeing means 
that humans are social beings intrinsically intertwined in a network that links all human 
creatures together, a network that is essential for survival.”169 This means institutions as 
well as human relationships. This global, human, and relational web is central to King’s 
thought.
170
 It is in this network that we express our God-given somebodiness, a 
somebodiness that is interrelated to all other somebodinesses in ways that affect the value 
of each individual. In this network, each individual receives his or her personhood, or 
somebodiness, directly from God, an innate prepotency that shapes and defines human 
identity formation and that, if frustrated by culture, results in pathology, caused by 
discouragement, the major social cultural trigger of racial violence. Vision shows that the 
two are interdependent and mutually inclusive. My “nobodiness” discourages and 
degrades your somebodiness. You cannot rightly claim to be somebody when you cause 
or tolerate my “nobodiness.” In other words, the self is embedded ontologically and 
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socially and is derived from God’s personality.171 Right-seeing is also theologically 
important. King understands segregation to be a major culprit in the destruction of human 
identity formed in God’s image and described it as “leprosy,” a debilitating condition that 
has many implications for the moral life.
172
 For him, leprosy is a metaphor for that which 
destroys human identity, an identity that is simultaneously etched in God’s own. God 
bestows identity as part of His own image and confers value on it by reason of divine 
creation alone, as King conveys in his writings and speeches. 
The conviction that every person is an heir to a legacy of dignity and worth is 
deeply rooted in King’s religious heritage. Our Judeo-Christian tradition refers to the 
inherent dignity of human beings through the use of a biblical term: “the image of God.” 
Every human being has etched in his or her personality the indelible stamp of the Creator. 
The worth of the individual does not lie in the measure of his intellect, racial origin, or 
social position. Human worth lies in our relatedness to God. In short, according to King, 
an individual has value because he has value to God.
173
 God imparts value to the 
individual, a concept that is central to King’s beliefs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ETHICS OF VISION AND EMILIE M. TOWNES 
In this chapter, I argue that the work of Emilie M. Townes is best understood in 
light of Murdoch’s ethics of vision and Niebuhr’s reflections on the centrality of attention 
and responsibility.
1
 While I appreciate the efforts of Martin Luther King, Jr., in enriching 
the concept of vision in the last chapter, Townes adds another necessary dimension 
because, unlike King, she includes the experiences of Black women. Townes is the first 
African American dean at Vanderbilt Theological Seminary, Memphis, Tennessee. 
Including such experiences gives a thicker understanding of Black liberation thought as it 
relates to the role vision plays in womanists’ thinking. However, she does this in light of 
King’s later years as an uncompromising prophet who stood against the Vietnam War, 
who organized a poor people’s campaign, and who called for a restructuring of the Black 
community.
2
 Townes explores a dilapidated health and healthcare system, the negative 
impact of cultural productions upon human agency, and the commodification of Black 
identity. She joins King as she calls us to return to God, to confront unjust systems of 
violence, and to embrace a vision of justice and hope. She displays a vigilant moral 
agency designed to warn the powers that she will not tolerate any form of injustice or 
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2
 Disappointed with progress, King was more vigilant in his later years.  
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unjust social policies.
3
  Her goal is to help people see and to question the worth of our 
cultural values through a praxis of vision.
4
  
I explore Townes’s moral outlook in order to provide a more thorough account of 
human moral agency. I do this by correlating Murdoch’s understanding of the centrality 
of vision and Niebuhr’s compatible stress on attention and responsibility in the moral life 
with Townes’s writings. Townes, like King, offers a wonderful demonstration of human 
agency that highlights the distinctive role that vision and responsibility play in the moral 
life of both individuals and whole societies. In fact, like many other womanists, Townes 
holds vision and responsibility as two core characteristics of her work. I argue that the 
ethics of vision and responsibility presents a paradigm or frame of understanding about 
how ethics function. It also offers a distinctive set of insights regarding the logic, 
function, and theological and ethical sophistication of Townes’s writings.  
Murdoch and Niebuhr, I believe, offer a perspective on the writings of Townes 
that lets us appreciate the true sophistication of her Christian ethical understanding and 
agenda as a womanist. In turn, like King, Townes’s life and writings illustrate a number 
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of the concrete practices designed for focusing society’s attention and mobilizing its 
sense of responsibility, beginning with Black women. Where Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s 
reflections on the ethics of vision and responsibility are on a broad, general level of 
ethical theory, Townes’s life and writings display in concrete detail what we might call a 
more socially engaged “praxis of vision and responsibility.”5 Thus, a correlation of the 
ethics of vision and responsibility, as understood by Murdoch and Niebuhr on the one 
hand and Townes’s mission and agenda on the other, enriches our understanding of each. 
Unlike Murdoch’s work, Townes’s work is not grounded in an individualistic 
view of the world; rather, it is grounded in how individuals should live in community. In 
fact, Townes’s work as she describes “grows out of individual and communal reflection 
on African American faith and life.”6 She is concerned with how destructive forces are 
both imposed and self-imposed upon Black people throughout America, the Caribbean 
Islands, and Brazil.  
Because Townes’s work is intra-communal, a focus upon personal and group 
interests is central throughout her work. While Murdoch, in looking to Freud, reaches to 
psychology and develops a focus on moral agency as rooted in an overcoming of 
individual egoism, Townes, like King and Niebuhr, is rooted in the Christian scriptural 
and theological accounts that stress how the individual participates within a broader 
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community and how such communities can often be biased and corrupted by group-
identification and a denigration of other social groupings.  
Instead of focusing our attention upon only racial and economic concerns, 
Townes, nearly 46 years after King, broadens our moral vision to include increasing 
systems of injustice that pull our attention away from others to the self by focusing upon 
multidimensional aspects of structural violence. As a womanist, she no longer sees racial 
segregation as the chief obstacle to the moral life (like King does, as seen in the last 
chapter); rather, Townes sees racism as only one of many blinding forces that distort our 
vision, dehumanize us, and rob us of our self-worth and self-dignity.
7
 In one of her most 
recent works, Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil, she identifies these 
blinding forces as cultural productions (systematic structures of evil) caused by a 
“fantastic hegemonic imagination,”8 which is a violent structural force that uses memory 
and imagination to impersonate history. The fantastic hegemonic imagination 
impersonates history when it uses site memory to replace living memory. For Townes, 
these violent blinding forces are created, maintained, and sustained by hegemony, one of 
the major issues in postmodern thought.
9
 She notes, “Hegemony is the set of ideas that 
dominant groups employ in a society to secure the consent of subordinates to abide by 
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their rule.”10 For example, it is “coercion gained by using the church, family, media, 
political parties, schools,” and so on. She holds that hegemony “breeds a kind of false 
consciousness . . . that creates societal values and moralities such that there is one 
coherent and accurate viewpoint on the world.”11 She contends that such awareness exists 
in “Christianity, Islam, Judaism, conservatism, liberalism, and so forth and can be seen as 
hegemonic in particular societies.”12 In fact, for Townes, hegemony, not segregation, is 
the greatest enemy to both the individual and society because, she argues, hegemony 
gives birth to “isms” and hegemony is in all of us. Hegemony, like egoism, has a life of 
its own. She contends that hegemony gives birth to racism, genderism, classism, ageism, 
and homophobia. Townes holds that there is no way to escape hegemony.  
Throughout Townes’s work, she offers a number of ways to overcome hegemony. 
For example, one way to disrupt hegemony is to construct counter-hegemonic forces that 
generate new values, beliefs, and morality. These forces direct “our energies to advocate 
an interstructured consideration of class, gender, and race . . . using the strategy of 
counter-memory” to reconstitute history so “that we begin to see” and appreciate 
diversity as individuals living in whole communities.
13
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In another way, Townes concentrates our vision and focuses our attention upon 
the experiences of Black women, beginning with her own personal experiences and 
relating those experiences to the whole of the Black community. She holds that theology 
and ethics must be done contextually and contends that any authentic Christian ethical 
reflection must take the agent’s experience seriously. Drawing from the work of novelist 
and social activist Toni Morrison, she argues for a “dancing mind,” a place where two 
equally open minds are provided a space to meet and greet each other in the classroom or 
in the churches to tease through issues of life in peaceful ways.
14
 This teasing through 
issues is a process of mediation, a term she borrows from womanist Marcia Riggs, to 
denote a way to live in community with others who share differences.
15
 Mediation 
becomes a working metaphor for her along with counter-memory and counter-hegemony, 
all of which require a sustained habit of concentration and careful vision. Townes’s use 
of Riggs’s concept of mediation is a wonderful remedy for quieting egoism.16 However, 
Townes moves beyond Murdoch’s discussion of individual’s ego to address hegemony. 
She also addresses a debate on health and healthcare in the United States, and the interior 
world of evil. 
In summary, where Murdoch reaches to philosophy and psychology to 
concentrate on a generic account of the individual person, Townes uses her creative, 
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poetic, and prophetic imagination to embrace literature.
17
 Like Murdoch, she uses an 
interdisciplinary approach that allows her to reach to philosophy and psychology while, 
like King and Niebuhr, appropriating the Hebrew Bible’s prophetic tradition of social 
critique and the New Testament’s emphasis on Jesus’s ethic of love, as well as his 
concern for the oppressed.
18
 Townes draws from Joel, Amos, Obadiah, and Job while 
reaching to the sweep of biblical accounts of ancient Egypt to understand not only the 
power of slavery and social oppression but also to reinterpret “spaces in our lives,” and 
the issues emerging from them, in light of the experience of Black women. She does this 
after a rereading of the sacred text in light of the Black Women’s Club Movement, a 
social reform movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
19
 
Additionally, Townes directs her attention to broader womanist sociological 
understandings of the need to promote social justice and just social policies. King strives 
to promote social justice and just social policies, but fails to move us toward and beyond 
issues of gender discrimination, as well as many other forms of oppression as identified 
by Townes and other womanist scholars and theologians.
20
 Thus, on issues in which King 
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was silent, Townes, with other womanists, builds upon his contributions with a holy 
boldness that encourages all people not to be ashamed of their diversity. However, she 
moves away from King’s earlier contention that unmerited suffering is redemptive and 
declares that suffering is “outrageous,” claiming that it does not ennoble, enrich, or 
empower Black people.
21
  
Townes is distinct from other scholars and theologians. Like many theorists who 
are committed to social justice issues, she puts her whole life into her work.
22
    For 
example, she consistently reminds us that she is a Black lesbian scholar-preacher who 
refuses to live by the stereotypes of a lesbian Black preacher; furthermore, she refuses to 
separate her private life from the classroom, scholarship, and church.
23
 In this way, she 
models the lifestyle of one who suffers from multiple layers of oppression. Although, 
while like King, she is an African-American Baptist minister, she is rejected by the 
majority of the members of her denomination because she is female and because she is a 
lesbian who refuses to hide her sexuality. Further, she is an advocate of same-sex 
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marriage, and she is interracially married to a female partner.
24
 In this way, while King 
understandably pulls our attention primarily toward racial concerns, Townes provides a 
much thicker pragmatic approach to understanding the moral life that involves an 
exploration of a broader array of dimensions of structural violence. As a womanist, she 
embodies, embraces, names, analyzes, and critiques issues of class, race, sex, and 
homophobia in imaginative ways. 
She provides a window into what it is to suffer from and to fight multidimensional 
levels of oppression. While King’s goal is to move us beyond racial concerns in his 
efforts to bring about a beloved community, Townes’s goal is to simultaneously move us 
beyond issues of race, class, and sex in her effort to bring forth a new world, another 
phrase she uses for King’s beloved community. Her primary concern is for Black women, 
who have suffered tremendously as a result of race and patriarchy. Through their stories, 
she seeks to help the Black community and the world. Thus, Townes expands King’s call 
of “We the people” (which lacked the explicit concerns of Black women) to embrace a 
declaration of “We the people” to include, in Townes’s words, “all of us,” all of 
humanity, regardless of race, sex, or class.
25
 This was a development of nascent ideas 
rather than an improvement of King’s ideas. However, this is not to say that women’s 
issues were not important to him. 
Additionally, while bringing attention to the mass suffering that Black women 
experience as a result of multilevel dimensions of oppression, Townes expands upon 
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King’s efforts by employing a womanist methodology that allows her to use an integrated 
and interstructural analysis as educational methods to get people to see. For example, 
Townes weaves literary analysis, social history, and cultural studies with ethical and 
theological theory to emphasize and illustrate the interior life of evil. Thus, while King is 
a systematic theologian who integrates ethics into his theology, Townes writes from the 
point of view of an ethicist, whose audience is primarily the academy and church, 
specifically the Black Church. In this way, method and theory are naturally parts of her 
work. Because she is a womanist, she has many tools from which she can draw, from 
poetry to history and from speculative thoughts to reason. For example, she incorporates 
history with the study of memory to explain the complex social relationship in American 
society that reflects evil as a cultural production, while at the same time using poetry and 
novels to address contemporary issues.
26
  
Here, Townes’s application of God’s vision of justice embraces these concerns. 
Instead of maintaining a hierarchal structure that ranks one mode of oppression above 
another, Townes, as a womanist, seeks to use each mode of oppression as a window to 
understand the world in its many dimensions.  She seeks to recognize the dignity of every 
human being, beginning with the recognition of Black women. In this way, like the works 
of other womanists, Townes’s work is therapeutic to Black women and is designed to 
recognize that Black women suffer multilevel types of oppression and that, through her 
efforts to be made whole, she can help make the community whole.  In this way, Black 
women become the community’s savior through the help of divine grace. Through seeing 
and recognizing their condition and responding to God’s call, they can bring salvation to 
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the world. They do this in an effort to dismantle unjust structures of evil and assist in 
creating a “new heaven and a new earth,” according to what Townes calls God’s vision of 
justice—which is Townes’s search for paradise.27 
In this way, I believe that Townes, like King, is a moralist of vision and is most 
helpfully understood through the lens of the ethics of vision and responsibility. First, her 
work is fueled by the concept of vision and framed by a concept of responsibility. 
Second, like Murdoch, Niebuhr, and King in the previous chapters, she demonstrates that 
the texture of human life has much to do with how one lives morally and improves 
morally. Third, her work demonstrates that through clarity of vision and an ethic of 
responsibility, undergirded by womanist social witness, a new heaven and a new earth 
can be realized akin to King’s Beloved Community. Likewise, I believe that Townes’s 
womanist agenda and her efforts to bring forth such a community and its profound real-
world impact provides a more concrete understanding of the central importance of moral 
vision  and responsibility than the moral philosophical theoretical accounts offered by 
Murdoch and H. Richard Niebuhr in some of their major works.  
In short, I argue that the ethics of vision and responsibility offers a perspective 
that grasps the distinctive moral sophistication and power of Townes’s life, her efforts for 
social justice, her insight into the importance of understanding the nature of particularity 
in the context of people’s lives and its influence, and her poetic and prophetic words so 
carefully chosen to help people “see” the full humanity of African Americans. To achieve 
her goals, Townes and her colleagues helped mobilize the hopes, discipline, and courage 
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of Black women to take concrete actions in exposing stories too horrible to discuss. This 
movement required a contextual and moral educational outreach to Black women to 
attend to something that they themselves had to endure for too long—namely, the reality 
of their vast, multi-layered suffering and the absence of their voices. Townes and others 
share their stories to pull the attention of people and help them begin to “see” the 
humanity of all people.  
Additionally, the advocacy of Townes and her fellow womanists played a pivotal 
role in a pedagogy of vision. From her study of the Black Women’s Club Movement, 
Townes knew that any advocacy on behalf of women must be mediated. Here, mediation 
means working together with people in spite of differences. Through a process of 
mediation, differences could be recognized and appreciated.
28
 As a result, the club 
women’s aggressive agency centered on a process of moral pedagogy in which events 
and words were carefully chosen to prompt a process of attention and new seeing that 
leveled the playing field. As Townes demonstrates, their actions and words make 
concrete and vivid, in an important way, how significant and practically relevant 
Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s rather general descriptions of the moral life are. 
Brief Sketch of Townes 
For several decades now, the writings and achievements of Townes have been 
widely admired in college, university, and seminary classrooms. She is admired as a 
womanist scholar and activist of queer rights, and as a theological innovator and ethicist. 
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In academic theological circles, Townes is acclaimed for her social justice work and is 
regarded as a significant moral theologian and Christian ethicist because she develops a 
formal analysis of religious ethical theory and she typically writes in a formal academic 
way, displaying clear mastery of the classic literature of the field.
29
 She develops a 
comprehensive theory of Christian ethics, and she elaborates a sustained formal ethical 
account of the moral principles needed for engaging a wide range of moral problems. An 
understanding of her theories must begin with an overview of her life. 
Townes was born in 1955 in Durham, North Carolina, to a middle class Protestant 
family. She attended Asbury Temple United Methodist Church where she received her 
earliest formation. Her mother and father were both professors and administrators at 
North Carolina Central University. Townes also had a younger sister, Tricia, who became 
a lawyer and after years of success set out to follow her heart as an artist. Townes, on the 
other hand, would later follow in the footsteps of her parents and become an professor 
and administrator. Townes grew up in Durham and Southern Pines, North Carolina, 
where “her mother and mentor in many ways . . . taught [her] the value of truth telling, 
listening more than you talk, and the importance of learning how to truly look at and see 
what is going on around you,” something that she carries over into her work.30 In fact, in 
her early years, Townes’s mother would sit her down in front of the television to see 
Jesse Helms in action before Helms became a United States Congressman. At the time, 
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Helms was a radio and television personality. Helms was also a “race-baiter; he was no 
friend of racial justice.”31 Townes’s mother would 
have [her] listen to the things Helms would say including his constant berating of 
Black people. One day [Townes] asked [her] mother who Helms was talking 
about with that word ‘niggra’ because [she] didn’t know who ‘the niggras’ were. 
[Her mother] told [her] that he was talking about us. . . . It was then that [she] 
knew that [she] couldn’t believe everything on TV, [Townes concluded].32 
 
Even though Townes often declares that she grew up in a typical middle class 
dysfunctional family, she grew up primarily in a loving environment with two protective 
parents who, with other relatives, encouraged her to carefully explore life and to be the 
best that she could be. She also received similar encouragement from teachers and church 
leaders. She was an avid reader who always yearned for more. She became acquainted 
with a wide variety of literature, including poetry, Greek mythology, stories, and so on. 
In fact, with the support of her parents, she decided to read every book in her elementary 
school library before the start of the fifth grade, a decision that would impact the rest of 
her life.
33
 Nearing the completion of reading the books, she arrived to the S volume of the 
encyclopedia. After reading what she deemed to be a false and dehumanizing depiction of 
Blacks, she brought it, with pages marked, to the attention of a number of authority 
figures, including the librarian, her teacher, and her parents.  The matter was taken care 
of immediately. The book was replaced. What did she find that took the wind out of her 
in that article? She remembers: 
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Cartoonage and offensive caricatures of Black folk eating watermelons, 
stereotypes of smiling Black folks working in the fields with tattered clothes, a 
montage cavalcaded of sambas, mammies and pickaninnies – with all of the 
righteous indignations that a nine or ten year old can muster, I went to the 
librarian and the teacher-with my fingers marking the pages in the encyclopedia. 
They could tell that something was wrong. All I can do was open the page and say 
this is not right. They too were stunned and assured me that they would deal with 
this. When I got home that night, I told my parents what I had found at school and 
we were relieved that their more recent volume did not have those caricatures in 
it.
34
 
 
Townes’s actions, already at a young age, demonstrated that she had developed a 
moral outlook on the world. As she notes, by that time she was already able to understand 
sit-ins and marches, picketing, and President Kennedy’s assassination.35 Her world was 
expanding according to her growing ability to attend to the particulars of her 
environment. In this manner, her moral development seems to parallel much of what Iris 
Murdoch has suggested regarding the importance of the quiet and gradual buildup of 
structures of value in people. With her moral development, she was being raised by two 
proud Black parents who took seriously their responsibility for instilling in her and the 
students they taught at North Carolina Central University the determination to carry 
themselves with dignity, as did most adults in her community and church. In short, many 
authority figures in her life took great pride in passing their wisdom on to her. Even today 
she remembers hearing their voices, at home, at church, at the barbershop, and at the 
beauty salon. Such experiences continue to echo in Townes’s work—in her teaching, 
lecturing, and scholarship, in her vision for the church and theological education, and in 
her deep commitment to integrate spirituality, social justice, and social witness, 
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something that began with her earlier formation at Asbury Temple United Methodist 
Church.
36
  
Townes continued to reach for more and went on to earn her bachelor’s degree 
from the University of Chicago and her master’s degree from its Divinity school. She 
then entered into its Doctor of Ministry and during this time accepted a call into ordained 
ministry. In 1980, she was ordained a Baptist minister in the American Baptist 
denomination. In 1982, she graduated with a Doctor of Ministry degree. During this time, 
she taught at the Chicago Theological Seminary and the McCormick Theological 
Seminary in Chicago. From 1983 to1987, Townes taught ethics and society at Garrett 
Evangelical Theological Seminary and became involved in field education. She also 
became involved with administration in the Office of Ministry Programs.
37
  
From 1986 to 1989, Townes served as interim pastoral leader of Christ the 
Redeemer Metropolitan Community Church while completing her doctoral studies in the 
joint Garrett Evangelical Seminary/Northwestern University program. There, in 1989, she 
earned her Ph.D. Her doctoral dissertation was based on the work of Ida B. Wells-
Barnett, the turn-of-the-century activist in anti-lynching campaigns and co-founder of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). From 1989 to 
1999, Townes taught at Saint Paul School of Theology, Kansas City, MO, where she was 
named full Professor of Christian Social Ethics in 1998. In 1999, she became the Carolyn 
Williams Beaird Professor of Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary. Townes 
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has also served as the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of African-American Religion and 
Theology at Yale Divinity School, with a joint appointment in the African-American 
Studies Department of Yale University, the Religious Studies Department, and the 
Women, Gender, and Sexuality Program. She was also Associate Dean for Academic 
Affairs at Yale.
38
  
Currently, Townes is the Dean of Vanderbilt University Divinity School. Townes 
is primarily known for her lectures, essays, and books, including Womanist Justice, 
Womanist Hope; In a Blaze of Glory: Womanist Spirituality as Social Witness; Breaking 
the Fine Rain of Death: African-American Health Issues and a Womanist Ethic of Care; 
and Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil.
39
 Fueling these works is 
Townes’s search for paradise, a vision of a new heaven and a new earth, driven by God’s 
justice and God’s call for justice for the Black community—a vision, she argues, that 
“explores the tremendous complexities and multiplicities of the nature of realities, truths, 
lies and damned lies in which African-American critical religion finds its home, offers 
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strategies of resistance, and seeks to embody a liberating transformatory praxis.”40 It is 
what she emphatically calls an “apocalyptic eschatological vision,” a vision undergirded 
by a “social witness,” which brings together past, present, and future.41 It reaches to the 
wisdom of the past to act in the present in anticipation of building a better future. This 
vision frames her understanding of theo-ethical reflection. I draw from these works to 
illustrate Townes’s understanding of the moral life and to explore the role vision plays in 
Black thought and experiences. 
Womanism and Its Influences on Townes’s Thinking 
According to Peter Paris, during the latter part of the Civil Rights movement, 
several women theologians “allied themselves with colleagues around the country to 
demonstrate in their own voice their desire to affirm the major principles of both black 
theology and feminist theology”42 Among these were Jacquelyn Grant, Katie G. Cannon, 
and Delores Williams, to name a few. These women were fully aware of the fact that 
liberation theology, Black theology, and feminist theology presented inherent limitations 
that, intentionally and unintentionally, oppressed Black women, beginning with the fact 
that Black women were absent from the discussions.
43
 
Their aim was to create social and religious forms and structures free of sexual 
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injustice and domination. Womanist theology, like other liberation theologies, got its start 
as the thinking of an oppressed group who, through seeing, hard experience, writing, and 
studying (and also not hearing their concerns being discussed) became painfully aware of 
the absence of their voices.
44
 These women sought to offer a corrective to the deficiencies 
of Black and feminist theologies and, thus, adopted the term womanist, first used and 
definitively explained by the novelist and social activist Alice Walker.
45
 Grant notes, “A 
womanist is “a strong Black woman who has sometimes been mislabeled as a 
domineering castrating matriarch. A womanist is one who has developed survival 
strategies in spite of the oppression of her race and sex in order to save her family and her 
people.”46  
The term womanist movement provides new ground and a new framework for 
understanding and doing theology and ethical reflection. It also empowers Black women 
and women of color to join the moral debate. Womanist theology, as a term for doing 
theology and ethical reflection, provides new grounds and a new theological framework 
for a new methodology that involves a multidimensional approach to oppression as 
opposed to a monolithic one, which provides a simplistic or one dimensional response to 
complex or multidimensional problems.
47
 That is, instead of creating a methodology that 
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focuses on race or sex, womanist as a methodology provides an interstructural approach 
to the moral life that simultaneously focuses on multiple dimensions of oppression in its 
analysis, such as race, sex, and class. In short, womanist is a term derived from the sense 
of the word as it is used in Black communities:  
Womanist from womanish. (Opp. of “girlish,” i.e., frivolous, irresponsible, not 
serious.) A Black feminist or feminist of color. From the Black folks expression 
of mothers to female children, “You acting womanish,” i.e., like a woman. 
Usually referring to outrageous, audacious, courageous or willful behavior. 
Wanting to know more and in greater depth than is considered “good” for one. 
Interested in grown-up doings. Acting grown up. Being grown up. 
Interchangeable with another black folk expression: “You trying to be grown.” 
Responsible. In charge. Serious.
48
   
 
This is to say that a womanist is a woman who is called by God to care about and be 
responsible for others. In order to do this, she begins with her own experience. She poses 
questions to dismantle structures of violence. Her being responsible has much to do with 
being in charge, taking ownership or matters into her own hands; the term conveys 
working within a pattern of interactions from a grown-up perspective. For Townes, as for 
other womanists or Black feminists, there are four central aspects to womanism that sets 
the womanist agenda. This is an abbreviation of that agenda: 
The four part definition begins with the origins of the term, [1] the black folk 
expression womanish or more accurately the expression, You’ re acting 
womanish.” [2] Womanist is communal. The womanist cares about her people— 
contemporary and historical . . . [which imply a challenge on] the nature of how 
Black folk are with one another. We are sexual beings who are to be loved, 
sexually or not. We are oppressed people who have had saviors in our midst… 
We cannot divorce ourselves from one another without killing ourselves and 
signing the death warrant for our future generations. We must, the womanist 
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must, recognize her location and responsibility in a community. [3] The 
individual is grounded in love. Love of self, love of community, love of the 
worlds of Black women, love of the Spirit. These are all held together for the 
womanist—regardless. Spirit, community, and person are held together in a 
wondrous, if not faithful, circle pointing toward wholeness and hope. 
[4]”Womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender.” This signals the move so 
many Black feminists have made away from feminist preoccupation with gender 
inequalities without adequate attention and analytical and reflective insight into 
the interstructured nature of race, gender, and class oppression.
49
 
 
Following in the tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr., Townes writes that the 
“womanist project is to take a fuller measure of the nature of injustice and inequalities of 
human existence from the perspective of Black women.”50 In this way, for Townes, the 
experience of Black women becomes essential in conducting ethical reflection. It not 
only forms the grounds of such thought, but creates the entry point and provides the 
framework for analysis, self-reflections, and exploration. It is to use one’s writings as a 
praxis of vision to address such issues as self-doubt, self-contempt, self-hatred, and self-
flagellation. As M. Shawn Copeland writes, 
Thus, the crucial contribution that womanist analysis makes to canon 
(re)formation is the heretofore neglected subject of the experience of black 
women. [This means] that womanists take the survival and flourishing of 
oppressed, excluded, and despised humanity . . . as criteria for evaluation in 
reading texts. As Katie Cannon explains, “Canon formation is a new way of 
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establishing new and larger contexts of experience within which African 
American women can attend to the disparity between sources of oppression and 
sources of liberation.”51 
 
 Here, vision and responsibility become important for informing what Townes 
calls womanist social witness, a term used to capture and describe the motivation and 
drive of the thoughts and actions of Black feminists. Undergirding this social witness is 
the role experience plays in how we respond to the world. Here, experience, specifically 
the experience of Black women, helps us to “see” in the moral sense of see. The 
experiences of Black women become the concrete means for understanding the world and 
thus provide a concrete illustration of the significance of the rather general and 
philosophically theoretical accounts of the dynamics of vision and responsibility offered 
by Murdoch and H. Richard Niebuhr in some of their major works.
52
 The experience of 
Black women is used as an educational tool, as well as a framework for a concept of 
morality based upon sustained attention and careful vision. Womanism provides a way of 
doing ethical reflection that captures the integrity of the lives of Black women unlike 
dominant models of ethics. Katie G. Cannon captures this failure of dominant systems of 
ethics as she writes: 
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. . . the dominant ethical systems implied that the doing of Christian ethics in the 
Black community was either immoral or amoral. The cherished ethical ideas 
predicated upon the existence of freedom and a wide range of choices proved null 
and void in situations of oppression. The real lived texture of Black life requires 
moral agency that may run contrary to the ethical boundaries of main line 
Protestantism. Blacks may use action guides which have never been considered 
within the scope of traditional codes of faithful living. Racism, gender 
discrimination, and economic exploitation, as inherited, age-long complexes, 
require the Black community to create and cultivate values and virtues in their 
own terms so that they can prevail against the odds with moral integrity.
53
 
  
The point that Cannon makes is that the traditional moral virtues, like truth-telling, may 
be fatal for Blacks because of the results that could follow from truth-telling in some 
situations (“Where is that escaped slave?”). The point is that dominant systems of ethics 
are based in the experiences of dominant groups. 
Womanist Jacquelyn Grant declares that womanists are Black women leaders and 
activists like Sojourner Truth, Jarena Lee, Amanda Berry Smith, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, 
Marry Church Terrell, Mary McLeod Bethune, and Fannie Lou Hamer.
54
 For Jacquelyn 
Grant, as for Emilie Townes, these women used their own experiences through sustained 
attention and trained vision to interpret the world around them and to participate in it. 
Many of these women, receiving a call from God, embarked upon a ministry shaped by 
their notion of God’s vision. For example, in his essay “And Your Daughters Shall 
Prophesy: Public Speeches of Maria Stewart, 1832-1833,” Anthony Pinn notes that Maria 
Stewart embarked upon a ministry which she believed was ordained and sanctioned by 
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God. As part of this experience, and in keeping with the traditions of the Black Jeremiad, 
Maria Stewart lectured in Boston, spreading her religious and political message.
55
 Pinn 
notes that Jarena Lee, Amanda Berry Smith, and other well-known Black women dared 
to exercise public ministry, even as they faced the verbal and physical attacks of both 
Black and White men. These women were not deterred. They “felt ‘called’ by God.”56 As 
Townes states,  
Black and white women developed a spirituality that took them outside of their 
daily prayer and reflection time and into the world. Their public work was deeply 
wedded to their inner and intense reflection. The goal was salvation on earth. 
Because of their unique role in shaping the moral fiber of society through the 
family, women took up the challenge of salvation. Religion proved a way to order 
one’s life and priorities. It also enabled women to rely on an authority beyond.57 
 
In this way, these women directed their attention toward God and were led by their notion 
of God’s vision. 
Demonstrations of this vigilant type of moral agency were expressed as these 
women participated in the club movement. They sought to live out their faith in their 
efforts to build God’s Kingdom upon the earth. Their experiences provide a model for 
ethical reflection. Drawing from their examples, the experiences of Black women become 
important for doing womanist work. For Townes, this is because what undergirds 
womanist’s work is a piety that “speaks of the nature of being and survival,” that refuses 
to accept injustice in any form.
58
 It is an “embodied spirituality” or faith in practice that is 
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both personal and communal, which holds humanity and divinity in one frame. This 
praxis of faith provides the energy and framework that drives the agent toward the moral, 
specifically responsible action.  
Thus, in Townes’s work, she attempts to “bring together the historic force of 
African-American women’s spirituality with the demand of the Spirit to contextualize 
and live one’s faith.”59 This is implied in the four-part definition Alice Walker gives to 
womanist. Implied in the four-part definition of womanist is an inevitable demand for 
praxis of vision, a holy boldness and advocacy for all oppressed people, something that is 
reflected throughout Townes’s work. In short, it is a vigilant type of moral agency geared 
toward transforming the world in the hope of bringing about a “new heaven and a new 
earth,” a goal that is analogous to the building of King’s Beloved Community (or 
Townes’s apocalyptic vision). For Townes, it is through such praxis of faith that the 
experience of these women forms the framework for womanist Christian ethical 
reflection. Their faith in practice encompasses both intellectual and practical aims, 
disrupts all habitual affirmation of the status quo, distinguishes appearance from reality, 
and exposes the roots of what is.
60
  
In so doing, the club women’s experiences become the lens for seeing and 
interpreting the world, and their thoughts and actions become the prescription for a new 
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ethic. This is due to the fact that, like other liberationists, womanists value the uniqueness 
of their own experiences as being significant to their own situation. Such experiences are 
captured in the struggle of Black women as they are presented in the Black literary 
tradition, in histories, biographies, autobiographies, songs, poems, hymns, stories, tales, 
and so on.
61
 It is from these literary sources that the uniqueness of Black women’s 
experiences becomes essential for understanding both the moral life and human nature. 
They provide the micro histories that not only reclaim our past, but allow us to know that 
the story of our lives as a people can be told another way. They also provide a much-
needed source for the reframing of dominant histories so that we could get at the truth, 
specifically the true-true—the truth in memory, the truth as one sees it.62 This chapter 
explores the essential role these fragments play in womanist thought, in light of an ethics 
of vision. Employing this methodology, a methodology that reclaims the experience of 
Black women, gives us a fuller conception of moral agency and what it means to be a 
human person.
63
 To do so broadens our moral vision. Next, I will discuss the club 
movement and its influence upon Townes’s writings. 
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The Black Women’s Club Movement 
Townes is inspired by nineteenth-century Black women’s religious experience, 
which united the romanticism of domesticity and maternity with the efforts of the secular 
woman’s movement to encounter the “sexually exclusive spheres.” 64 This movement 
showed Townes that women’s vigilant moral agency began with a powerful private 
religious experience involving a “call to salvation,” and they took that call to salvation 
into the public domain to transform an unethical social world.
65
 Referring to the club 
movement, Anthony Pinn states,  
African American women were obligated to exercise their domestic influence so 
that the requirements for progress would be taken seriously by a new generation. 
The Black community would achieve its objectives if Black Women made full use 
of their internal resources—their strength, fortitude, and domestic influence. 
Women were asked to seek independence and, if necessary, to die in the 
struggle.
66
 
 
Through their efforts, they emphasized commitment to what they believed to be God’s 
vision for their lives by the use of biblical figures, such as Ruth and Mary Magdalene. 
Their efforts in giving voice to the experience and perspectives of Black women affirmed 
for Townes and other womanists their instrumental role in the community. These women 
understood the importance of Black women’s influences and create a distinct role for 
them which brought about the emergence of a “collective Black female consciousness.”67  
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One of the movement’s most committed advocates was Ida B. Wells-Barnett. 
Wells-Barnett provided the source material for Townes’s Womanist Justice and 
Womanist Hope, which lays the framework for a new womanist Christian social ethics. 
Townes argues that Wells-Barnett’s concerns were also the concerns of “the majority of 
the women in her day. She upheld the need for women to be the moral guardians of 
African-American society.”68 Townes explains, 
She was far from immune to the ideology and rhetoric of the cult of true 
womanhood. Temperance, morality, education, domesticity, social uplift were of 
deep concern to her, as she wrote and agitated for justice in the United States in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
69
  
 
In this effort, the club movement pulled their own attention toward the elevation of rustic 
women and the enhancement of Negro everyday life.
70
 For example, one of the club’s 
main goals was to present the moral values of Victorian family life into the cottages of 
Georgia and Alabama sharecroppers. Sharecroppers were tenant farmers who shared their 
produce from their crops with their land owners for the privilege to grow crops on their 
land.  
According to Townes, the club women connected personal and communal 
transformation to affect salvation in an effort to bring in the new heaven and new earth.
71
 
What makes their efforts unique is that social agency took a special shape among Black 
club women, as they lived by consent in harmony with their beliefs in the Divine. These 
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women “rejected the racist and classist connotation in Victorian ethics. To counter they 
argued that Black women were true women; it was their historical situation that 
determined their condition.”72 As vigilant moral agents, these women sought perfection 
and advocated social reform in the framework of a piety that esteemed life and took 
seriously their responsibility to help craft and preserve an impartial and ethical communal 
mandate.  
Although they maintained the traditional roles handed to them, these women lived 
a piety that led them to reshape and reform those roles in harmony with their beliefs in 
the Divine.
73
 For example, Townes explained that, “as ministers of their homes and the 
moral guardians of their families, their religious beliefs revolved around the dictum that a 
‘woman’s true calling is to make people’s lives better,’ which led to an aggressive 
campaign to convert the ‘fallen woman’ and public denunciation of any man who 
frequented her company.”74 In so doing, they conflicted very little with the teaching of 
the Black church, which declared women essentially domestic beings. However, through 
a praxis of vision, they pulled their attention toward God’s vision of justice and directed 
that vision toward the conditions of their time and what was required of them to 
transform such conditions to bring God’ s vision of love, hope, and justice to the world. 
This means that Black women used God’s vision of justice to impart middle class values 
to the Black community in a way to uplift the moral standing of Blacks. As a result, the 
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club women enlarged the concept of family life to include other areas of interests which 
involved discussions on children, culture, and social purity.  
In summary, the club women saw themselves as the moral guardians of the 
community, specifically the Black community, and sought to live out God’s vision of 
justice and God’s command of justice for the Black community in concrete ways. It is 
this understanding of their roles that began to lay the grounds of their vigilant moral 
agency and their understanding of the Bible. The Bible became a weapon for them and a 
tool to moral agency as they modeled themselves after biblical characters like Paul, 
Deborah, and so on. 
They described themselves both as “homemakers and soldiers.”75 These women 
were obligated by a profound faith to exercise a vigilant moral agency that mirrored “the 
values of their piety,” in which their combined efforts became the communal “expression 
of the individual work” they did in the home and the moral teaching of “children and 
husbands.”76 In short, these women’s vigilant moral agency was in direct response to the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century religious revival, in which Protestants directed 
their efforts to counter the “religious indifference, rationalism, and Catholicism of the 
day” to form a lasting ethical “social order.”77  
The club “women took up the challenge to spread the promise of salvation on 
earth” through their call to shape the “moral fabric of society through family.”78 In 
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demonstrating this praxis of vision, their notion of God’s vision provided a way to order 
their priorities and their lives on earth. A praxis of vision enabled these women to trust in 
a power separate from the domain of men—“to eliminate the sin of licentiousness, which 
appeared in the lust of men and the prostitution of women” and to “reform and resurrect 
fallen women.”79 The focus of the club women was on the local as an arena to solve 
larger universal problems. Christian symbols helped them make sense of their 
experiences of marginality, and built and kept alive a hope for salvation through 
freedom.
80
 For example, “The heavy identification with the Exodus story and the 
suffering servant Jesus became poignant touchstones for people enduring [oppression].”81 
It is clear that the club women’s demonstration of vigilant agency provides the grounds 
for Townes to enter into the moral debate. 
Townes’s Conversation and Debate Partners and Their Influence 
Townes discusses the multidimensional oppression experienced by oppressed 
people. In so doing, she admits that she is in debt to a host of womanist scholars, 
including Jacquelyn Grant, Katie Cannon, Shawn Copeland, Karen Baker-Fletcher, 
Patricia Hunter, Delores Williams, Frances Wood, Leslie Williams, Joan Martin, 
Jacquelyn Renita Bynum, and Barbara Christian. She sustains a long admiration for the 
womanist social witness agenda and for the power of the way it addresses multilevel 
dimensions of oppression, as well as affirming her stress on particularity as she 
demonstrates throughout her work.  
                                                 
79
 Ibid. 
 
80
 Ibid. 
 
81
 Ibid., 24. See Dolores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-
Talk (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013). 
 
181 
Townes puts her own multilayered experiences in dialogue with the wisdom of 
the womanist community. She recognizes that womanist wisdom springs out of the 
experiences of African American women as they have been daughters, wives, partners, 
aunts, grandmothers, and mothers and reaches to those experiences as they are depicted 
in autobiographies, narratives, stories, songs, folklore, poetry, and so on. Recognizing the 
multilayered experiences of other Black women in contrast to her own helps her to see 
that the stories of Black life in America not only consist of fragments, but can be told in 
many ways. Although each fragment is a story of survival, each story represents a piece 
of a larger narrative and provides a window into Black life. Thus, recognizing that their 
collective experience is unique and that each woman’s experience is necessary because it 
forms its own angle of vision, she engages in dialogue with the broader womanist 
community, using as a standard the multilayered experiences of her ancestors, 
specifically Black women in the club movement.
82
  
Townes sustains a lifelong admiration for the power of Ida B. Wells-Barnett’s 
ethical agenda and for the power of the way Wells-Barnett does womanist work in not 
only a highly literary and expressive way, but also with a social agenda for the oppressed. 
She recognizes Wells-Barnett as a fearless anti-lynching crusader, suffragist, and 
women’s rights advocate and journalist, who, she contends, exercised an 
uncompromising leadership and devotion to democracy. In doing so, Wells-Barnett 
                                                 
82
 The collective experience of Black women is unique because they have experienced multilayers 
of oppression, more so than any other group on earth. However, each individual’s experience is not unique 
but necessary. Black women’s experience adds immeasurably to the fabric of social ethics and is necessary 
and may also challenge some of the major priorities of “standard” (white male) ethics. The point is that, as 
a group, no other group of women has suffered such oppression. This is what makes their collective 
experience unique but their individual experiences necessary. See Dolores S. Williams, Sisters in the 
Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013). 
 
182 
provides not only inspiration for Townes, but also acts as a mentor and role model for 
doing womanist work. Wells also offers Townes a model for doing contemporary 
ethics.
83
 Townes likewise stresses a similar admiration for folklorist and novelist Zora 
Neale Hurston (1891-1960), whom she also holds as one of the pre-eminent writers of the 
twentieth century. Other womanists that have helped to shape Townes’s life are Katie 
Cannon, Jacquelyn Grant, Delores S. Williams, and Patricia Collins. They remain 
significant and deeply influential in her understanding of the moral life.  
The next sets of dialogue partners for Townes are the many voices in her 
community who passed on wisdom. As Townes notes, throughout her work she draws 
from the wisdom and humanity of a community of “old souls” that have influenced her 
along life’s journey.84 These include her family, friends, church members, and a variety 
of individuals from academic and nonacademic communities, specifically people of faith, 
including her father, mother, aunts and uncles, and her cousins Willie Mae, Mrs. Wayne, 
Mr. Butler, Miss Rosie, and Mrs. Montez. Joining these extensive influences is the 
particularity of the Black church. These people help her to see, be responsible, and 
appreciate life.  
The next set of dialogue partners for Townes include a wide variety of 
philosophical, theological, literary, sociological, historical, and psychological “partners in 
discourse” that Townes has engaged across the last four decades and this breadth of 
argument and perspective is one of the main reasons that Townes’s project is so creative 
and distinctive.  She holds that good writers help her to see new worlds. Her work is 
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poetic and prophetic. For instance, her most recent book, Womanist Ethics and the 
Cultural Production of Evil is described by Dwight N. Hopkins and Linda E. Thomas as 
a book of dancing words and a thinking book.
85
 For example, they contend that “the 
words dance as they coax, berate, and persuade as we encounter hope in argument and 
artistic pose,” direct and sideways. It is dancing words in the tradition of enslaved 
African Americans who approached the Bible as a talking book. Although they could not 
read or write, these enslaved African Americans listen to the words dance from the 
speaker’s mouth to their ears and hearts. Her writing is tight, loving, and envisioning a 
better world. Townes’s choice of writers helps her to see writing as a spiritual enterprise 
that involves fighting and loving and envisioning that a better world is possible, 
powerful, meaningful, and challenging. Among the cluster of writers she reaches to 
include literary greats like James Baldwin, Carter G. Woodson, W. E. B. Du Bois, 
Booker T. Washington, Franklin E. Frazier, Alice Walker, and Toni Morrison.  
For Townes, Du Bois provides an excellent example of Black counter-memory as 
reconstructive strategy. Recognizing that history subordinated the Black experience to the 
point of making it virtually unknown in dominant history writing, Du Bois set out to 
reconstitute this history by providing a clear picture of the facts of Black life. Drawing on 
Baldwin, she elaborates on the struggles and joys of humanity used to understand evil.  
Using his “Many Thousands Gone,” she explores the rise and fall of capitalism and what 
it means to be a Negro, and she concludes with Baldwin that “dehumanization is not a 
one way street [and] that the loss of identity has consequences far beyond those who are 
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the immediate victims.”86 Like, Baldwin, she sees the loss of identity as “a crime against 
ourselves.”87 The essay affirms for her that the story of Blacks in America is an 
unattractive story. It is what Baldwin calls a “story of shadows that exist in the dark 
places of our minds.”88 It portrays Black life as a social project, viewed as a set of 
statistics. Townes brings this conversation to a contemporary study of evil and its impact 
on identity that takes on different texture, shapes, tones, and tastes in the way of icons 
and stereotypes. Baldwin’s essay allows her to see that everyone is impacted by 
structures of violence in one way or another. Throughout her writing, she employs 
Howard Thurman’s notion of blending head and heart in her efforts to shape a “world of 
justice and peace.”89  
Townes is also influenced by both Greek and Roman mythology. She learned a 
great deal about poets, as can be seen in her writings, specifically from those who do not 
deal with dense theo-ethical discourse and reflection. She learned about poets and writers 
such as Elizabeth Alexander, Tina McElroy Ansa, Nikky Finney, Alice Walker, William 
Faulkner, Ernest Hemingway, Ayn Rand, Carson McCullers, and the list goes on.  
Several of the most significant writers I see in her work include: Toni Morrison, 
who introduces her to a dancing mind, a place where two equally open minds meet to 
discuss issues of life; James Baldwin, who affirms her vision; Marcia Riggs, who offers 
the term mediating as process that is so important to her work; Alice Walker, whose 
literary work provides an entry point for engaging contemporary issues; and H. Richard 
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Niebuhr, who offers a model that provides structure to her thoughts in the way of his 
responsibility ethic.  
With her novel The Color Purple, Alice Walker helps Townes to reflect on the 
nature of creation, the social witness that flows from it, and its relation to gender roles in 
the Black community. As she places emphasis on the nature of seeing, Townes reaches to 
Walker in order to help her understand “cultural images and the ways in which the 
influence of such images molded and reshaped Black society, and societies as a whole.
90
  
Paule Marshall, through her novel Praise Song for the Widow, helps Townes 
addresses the issue of “identity and the impact of the color caste system within the 
African-American community” as well as its impact upon “self-worth and self-esteem” 
through the use of “images of Blackness.”91 It is through an exploration of such imagery 
that Townes is able to begin to create a womanist response to what it means to be a moral 
agent.  
In creating an ethic of care, in the midst of a community experiencing a health and 
healthcare crisis, Townes reaches to Nel Noddings, Mary Jeanne Larrabee, and Nancy N. 
Rue. Noddings, Larrabee, and Rue provide for her insight on the nature of care and caring 
to help her create an ethic of care based on compassion and justice. Additionally, she 
draws from John McKnight and Jon Kretzmann, who help her explore ways community-
based approaches can address issues of health and heath care.
92
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In her exploration of evil, she is influenced by the Harlem Renaissance and the 
Black consciousness moment as she draws on James Baldwin, Patrick Chamoiseau, June 
Jordan, Toni Morrison, Sonia Sanchez, and Harriet Beecher Stowe in order to understand 
the interior worlds of evil and the impact that such evil have on people lives. Her goal is 
to dismantle it. To discuss memory and history, she reaches to Jacque Le Goff and Matt 
Matsudo, who writes from the perspective that history and memory are subjective, and 
expands French historian Pierre Nora’s work. Morrison helps her to set the context for 
two key aspects of her project, its subject nature and its understanding of evil as a cultural 
production. Townes combines the interplay of history and memory with the help of 
Michel Foucault’s understanding of imagination and Antonio Gramsci’s use of 
hegemony. They help her to explore how the imagination plays with history and memory 
to spawn cultural productions. Baldwin’s essay “Many Thousand Gone” helps her to 
explore identity as commodity as she contends that race is an ill-conceived and arbitrary 
notion. Morrison’s “Unspeakable Things Unspoken” and Patrick Chamoiseau’s novel 
Texaco help to contextualize the reparations debate within the reality of empire, while she 
explores the lack of recognition given to women’s moral autonomy and its actualization 
in communal formations and public policy. She draws from poet Sonia Sanchez’s “haiku 
6” and the Black matriarch and welfare Queen.93  
Finally, in displaying her ethics of vision, Townes turns to her own poetic voice 
and responds to the wisdom of a sermon found in Toni Morrison’s book Beloved. 
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Through this novel, Morrison helps Townes to explore the nature of being and survival, 
which raises questions about the reformation of the nature of ontology and how this 
becomes a means to understanding the nature of violence in African American life. The 
novel allows her to respond to the existing issues of environmental violence and the 
Black neo-conservative radical restructuring of violent structures in the United States. 
For example, it allows her to respond to environmental racism—the 
disproportionate dumping of toxic waste into Black and Hispanic communities 
throughout the United States. Townes discusses toxic waste dumping as a form of 
contemporary lynching and encourages us to love our own hearts, as a way of fighting 
back structures of domination. She also shows us that to love our hearts is to care about 
other people’s lives in crucial times.  
Next, she shows us that the reality of African American life—social economic 
and political, is not as simple as it may seem. She demonstrates this with the help of 
sociologist William Julius Wilson who shows us that each socioeconomic class within 
African American society faces particular manifestations of racism, sexism, and classism, 
which impacts the accuracy of neoconservatives’ critiques on Black life and the benefit 
that public policy provides as a panacea for the injustices and structured social inequality 
faced by Blacks in the United States. 
Vision and an Ethic of Care 
One of the distinct roles that vision plays in Townes’s work is returning both the 
individual and the community to God. Townes demonstrates this role in Breaking the 
Fine Rain of Death, as she employs Joel’s vision as a theo-ethical response to the health 
care crisis in the United States in order to create an “ethic of care” over an “ethic of 
188 
death.” In this work, She writes 
I propose a womanist methodology in which race gender and class are necessary 
theoretical tools to carry out developing an ethics of care that takes into 
consideration gender, but as a part of a more rigorous theoethical analysis that 
seeks a realism about the social order that then moves to a consideration of the 
steps needed for transformation.
94
  
 
She does this by first presenting a realistic depiction of the dilapidated health care system 
in the United States; she traces its development; she examines its inadequacies, using an 
interstructural analysis which allows her to examine the intersections of race, class and 
sex in order to expose its oppressive structures of violence.  She then explores cultural 
models of healing and wellness and employs Joel’s vision as a communal response to the 
crisis. 
In this effort, an ethics of vision fuels her work as she, with the help of Joel, 
encourages people to see, in the moral sense of see. For her, Joel’s vision helps to shape a 
vision of ourselves as we become attuned to the world around us and Joel’s vision “helps 
the community to see the health care crisis as manageable and bearable.”95 Townes sees 
Joel’s vision as having a deep moral character that also help us to acknowledge and to 
experience the fullness of our suffering. And, lastly, it moves us to responsible faith—one 
of praise and thanksgiving and also grief and mourning,” as it helps us to ask questions of 
justice and keeps the question of justice visible and legitimate.
96
 Townes then, uses 
“God’s vision of justice” as the criterion for responsible action, as it is reflected in the 
vision of Joel. Central to this thought is a demand for people to attend to God. The 
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community is in a crisis. A plague is in the land and the antidote to defeat it is only within 
God’s power. Thus, seeing the problem as a communal problem, Joel calls the 
community together to lament. In doing so, he directs their attention to God. In this 
process, “attention,” is the key. It perceives responsible action. On this note, Townes 
writes, 
The lament of affliction is directed toward God in the Hebrew Bible, for it is God 
who can change their suffering, the source(s) of the crisis. Joel’s cry of lament 
recognizes the power and timelessness of God and the finite quality of his 
existence…. Humanity’s ability to stop the devastation sits mute as Joel calls the 
people to realize that human schemes cannot control the scope of this devastation. 
Rather Judah must return to God.
97
   
 
The implication is that attention to God brings with it radical transformation and 
clear vision as a result of God’s grace. God’s grace empowers the moral agent and orients 
the agent toward the divine. Attention clearly leads to responsible actions. If people could 
see not only with their eyes but with their hearts, through “genuine repentance,”98 
responsible faith would bring with it power to transform the evil system of health and 
healthcare in the United States. She writes,  
We live in structures of evil and wickedness that make us ill. We must name them 
and seek to repent from the heart. It is only then that we can begin to heal.
99
 
 
She names the problems: mistrust, murder, withholding treatment, unaffordable 
healthcare, teen pregnancy, exclusion from medical trails, lack of Medicare coverage, and 
so on. Townes writes, 
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We are naming the illnesses, the evils, the realities, and the need to seek salvation 
from the parts of our health-care delivery system that are inhumane and fueled by 
a crass drive for greater profitability that disregards the preciousness of life.
100
 
 
In this way, Townes joins Joel as she contends that we must return to God—that 
is, focus one’s attention on God. With the help of Joel’s vision, she presents to us a 
communal hope that is in God’s grace, which will heal us. For her, grounded in the 
divine, this hope sustains our lives and overcomes skepticism and doubt. She writes, 
because we know that God interrupts the mundane and comfortable in us and calls to us 
to move beyond ourselves and accept a new agenda for living, our efforts demand a 
covenant and commitment that order and shape our lives in ways that are not always 
predictable, not always safe, and rarely conventional. She holds that just as this was the 
case in Joel’s day, it is still the case today. Thus, she contends that God’s grace will drive 
us to protest with prophetic fury the sins of an inequitable health care system.  Grace 
enables us to find our ways out of “darkness. . .”. This is the case if we in faith direct our 
attention to God. 
Here, I contend that Townes employs a type of ethics of vision and responsibility 
as “she turns to the broader social constructs of health and healthcare” to develop an ethic 
of care.
101
 Her goal is to develop an ethic of care in response to the contemporary debates 
regarding the health care system in the United States.  She employs a praxeological 
(reflection and action) methodology in order to address the issues in a rigorous manner.
102
 
Such a methodology allows her to raise the question central to Niebuhr’s responsibility 
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ethic: What is going on?
103
 She raises this question in order to find out what is happening 
with the healthcare system prior to demonstrating responsible action. The approach 
allows her to realistically describe, name, and rightly respond to conditions in our 
dysfunctional healthcare system.  In so doing, the question of vision provides concrete 
practices for the focusing of attention for a sense of responsibility. 
She argues that “it is only through employing such a methodology that the 
possibilities for a relevant ethic of care can emerge.”104 She proposes a womanist 
methodology, a methodology fueled by an ethics of vision and framed by an ethic of 
responsibility, in which race, gender, and class are necessary theoretical tools. She 
examines race and sees that many Blacks suffer from racial concerns. She examines class 
and sees that many Blacks suffer from classist concerns. She examines gender and sees 
that many Black women suffer from gender concerns. She shows us that the health care 
crisis is not as simple as it may seem if we investigated the problem from only race or 
perhaps gender. For her, all of these violent structures play a role in destroying health.  
So she examines multi dimensions of the problem in order to develop an ethic that 
seriously considers a realistic depiction of the world that reaches beyond gender in a 
rigorous theo-ethical analysis. Through this interstructural approach, an approach that 
allows her to examine the problem in layers, she addresses issues of diversity that may 
exist as blinding forces in the process of developing her ethic of care. She then goes on to 
consider the steps necessary for transformation, such as recognizing the conditions, 
naming the conditions, identifying cultural sensitive models of health that are appropriate 
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to the situation and so on. For example, Townes writes 
There are important questions that need to be ask: how are the doctors 
compensated? What are the review policies? Can the insured go outside the 
system? If they can, what is the reimbursement rate?  What hospitals are 
involved? And so on.
105
 
 
For her, this reflection and action framework employs an “interdisciplinary 
methodology.”106 It includes social ethics, biblical hermeneutics, philosophical ethics, 
social history, public health, and sociology, all tools she contends are necessary to 
“address the health care system” in order to “shape a womanist ethic of care.”107 Here, 
the African-American community is a “test case” to frame her attempt to accomplish 
womanist theo-ethical analysis. She begins with the local and moves to the universal as 
she conveys that what has happened in the Black community can happen in other 
communities as well. 
 An ethics of vision allows her to “paint a more accurate and encompassing 
picture of African-American life in order to set the backdrop for an ethic of care that is 
both descriptive and prescriptive.”108 The concerns of social ethics provide her a lens to 
consider the nature of health and healthcare. She sees that people have been focusing on 
rights and privileges for so long that the community is in crisis and the people have 
forgotten what it is like to come together as a community and face such a crisis. She 
notes, “Just as the whole community of Judah must lament, so all of us are in this 
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together.”109 The ethic emerges out of the biblical theme of communal lament from the 
book of Joel in the Hebrew Bible. In summary, she rests her argument upon the notion 
that genuine “lament,” both individual and corporate, precedes healing. Here, lament is 
used as an educational tool to help people see. For Townes, lament is designed to open 
eyes and transform hearts. In a way, this notion of transformation parallels Murdoch’s 
notion of unselfing, because it energizes, redirects, and changes the agent’s attention in 
ways that transform the agent’s reality.110 
Thus, she explores “lament in an integrated way to shape a womanist ethic of care 
that moves beyond concerns centered solely on identity politics that are exclusively 
gendered, economic, or racial.”111 Instead, she focuses on an ethics centered on care and 
hope. In so doing, Townes examines approaches to healing that are culturally and socially 
sensitive in hopes to build a “foundation” that not only has “universal dimensions,” but 
with both educational and pragmatic concerns.
112
 She hopes to improve learning in the 
academy and to provide insight by employing an interdisciplinary exploration that directs 
the pathway to a laborious methodology. She chooses a methodology relevant to the 
needs of the Black community and church.  
The emphasis is not on health-giving medication that targets and identifies illness 
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and returns one’s wellbeing. Rather, the emphasis is on both private and communal 
aspects of health. Under such a view, she argues that “health is a cultural production in 
that health and illness alike are social constructs and dependent on social networks, 
biology, and environment.”113  
Health also includes the “integration of the spiritual”—one’s relationship with 
God, the psychological or the ability of humans to feel and think—with the corporal, or 
our biological make up.
114
 The subtext throughout her work focuses on the ways the 
United States is rapidly moving to an “individualistic medical model that obscures . . . the 
communal aspect of our health.”115 She contends that healthcare is centered upon wealth 
and that most disadvantaged people have little access to adequate healthcare because of 
their lack of wealth.
116
 In order to show this, Townes reaches to Joel in the Hebrew Bible 
and constructs a “context and a pretext” for exploring the rudimentary components one 
would need to build an ethic of care.
117
 
In developing a womanist ethic of care, she presents an example of a “communal 
lament from Joel” that she holds can help shape our vision as we become increasingly 
familiar with the world around us; it is a vision that has a yearning ethical appeal that 
supports the work of social ethics.
118
 To demonstrate this, she uses history and culture as 
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analytical tools to explore “healthcare as a cultural production.”119 Beginning with slave 
culture, Townes explores the certainties, “assumptions and stereotypes that have 
impacted the Black body–arguing that such continues today.”120 She then addresses their 
realities. She explores three dimensions of healthcare in the African-American 
community. First, she explores the Tuskegee Syphilis study, which, she believes, 
crystalizes the structural blindness and is one key reason distrust and suspicion exist 
among African Americans when it comes to the medical establishment in the United 
States.
121
 Next, using a historical approach, Townes explores how sexist ideologies were 
reified in medical opinion, practice, and prescription surrounding clinical trials and the 
alarming inaccessibility and absence of women in these trials. She concludes that the 
disproportionate attention given to these women is one of the key reasons that the impact 
of HIV/AIDS in the Black community is at an alarming level.
122
 Finally, using the Black 
body as an icon, she explores the alarming statistics of AIDS cases, as well as issues of 
sexuality and drug abuse in relation to HIV/AIDS, in African-American life and the ways 
HIV/AIDS has global dimensions. She then concludes that the “lack of HIV/AIDS 
research for women may be sowing the seeds of Black genocide,” and the Black Church 
must meet the needs of the Black community resulting from the increasing impact of 
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AIDS on Black bodies.
123
 These are some of the hegemonic forces encountered by 
Townes in developing an ethic of care. These issues are concrete forces through which 
the praxis of vision and responsibility must navigate because these forces bring about a 
pulling away of attention to the self in ways that are detrimental to the individual and the 
community—resulting in brokenness, hardship, pain, and suffering. Townes redirects our 
attention through concrete practices to overcome such blinding forces. She redirects our 
attention toward God. 
To address such structural forces, Townes turns to “Communal Repentance.”124 
Like unselfing, Communal Repentance is a device for transforming an individual living 
in a community. It has a concern for both self-interest and common interest. She turns to 
Communal Repentance to develop an ethic of care that responds to the theo-ethical issues 
raised in the book Breaking the Fine Rain of Death. In this effort, she develops a praxis 
of vision and responsibility to address the problems discovered in the debate. For her, the 
issues discovered in the debate have led to a healthcare crisis in the Black community. 
She identifies, describes, and names these issues of violence leading to this crisis and 
suggests that we begin a “process of awareness and repentance.”125  
For her, transformation comes by awareness and repentance. It is only out of 
repentance that mourning and suffering are genuine.  With this, one can begin the process 
of healing with a vision of hope and care. Like Joel, she calls for a radical transformation 
of the social order. Genuine repentance with a culturally based strategy that seeks to 
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maintain an interstructural analysis based on race, gender, and class can help to bring an 
ethic of care. She holds that an interstructural analysis can help communities address 
issues of care that pull attention to both body and soul. To demonstrate this, she directs 
our attention to a number of sermons; then, with an interplay between academic and 
linear discourse, both lyrical and metaphorical in nature, she develops an ethic of care. In 
doing so, she employs an ethics of vision to make her ethic of care realistic regarding the 
realities of social conditions and the impact that such conditions have on Black health. 
She includes transformative themes and practices that encourage a form of caring that 
heals the corporate body and soul involving themes of eschatology, salvation, despair, 
and hope.
126
  
On this note, she writes that, “unlike other prophets, Joel does not mention 
Judah’s departure from God, nor condemn Judah for its injustices, but Judah laments and 
sees the problem differently.”127 In other words, Joel did not mention the irresponsible 
actions demonstrated by the people that led to their brokenness nor did he condemn them 
for being irresponsible in demonstrating justice; rather, he lamented with them and they 
saw the problem differently. She writes, 
The problem is not what Judah had done or not done, the problem is the 
inhumanity and evil of others toward the people of Israel. Joel’s is a plea to God 
to come to the aid of those who trust in [the Divine,] no matter what the trials and 
tribulations they face, no matter what the adversity, [he contends that it is time for 
a lament] about repentance.
128
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According to Townes, “Joel tells the folk to turn to God.”129 That is, Joel in the 
prophetic tradition tells the people to direct their attention to God. In so many words, Joel 
declares, attend to God with a genuine heart, and God will save. For Townes, Joel pulls 
their attention away from their brokenness and directs it to God. In doing so, Joel knows 
that God will respond with hope. She shows that the book of Joel demonstrates “genuine 
lament and repentance.”130 Implied is the notion of unselfing; if one returns to God, 
divine transformation is inevitable because God will save.
131
 This is due to the fact that, 
according to her ethics of vision, the Divine is a God of justice, hope, and peace. 
However, because Townes’s understanding of morality is “we centered” instead of “I 
centered” or instead of an individualistic understanding of morality, turning one’s 
attention to God means turning one’s attention toward the self. This is because God is 
found within the heart of the agent. So to turn one’s attention toward God is to 
simultaneously turn one’s attention to the self and then outward toward the community. 
Here, there is a unique bond where common interest and self-interest are one. Unselfing 
takes place within the dynamics of this bonding. There is no dualism. “It involves a 
relationship that is beyond and within who we are.” This is best understood as Shug 
teaches Celie in Walker’s The Color Purple.  
To begin to believe in a God beyond gender, a God who is Spirit and intimately 
connected to the fabric of our existences. This fuller understanding of God is not 
dependent on human beings to be present, to care, to love, to create beauty, to live 
out the Spirit. This is a God of grace and grit that loves and angers, that expands 
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our understanding of sexuality and loving, that is angered when we fail to see the 
beauty of creation, in ourselves, and in one another.
132
 
 
Unlike Murdoch, who shares an individualist understanding of a reality in which 
the self is separate from the divine, the Divine is found in Townes’s agent. In this way, 
Townes’s understanding of God creates a gender based, race, and class construct that 
serves as a companion and confederate to the struggle of Black women’s liberation. And, 
attention, for Townes, in contrast to attention in the work of Murdoch, represents two 
diametrically opposing processes associated with unselfing. However, Townes teaches 
after genuine repentance, God will answer with hope. This is where divine transformation 
takes place as a result of correct seeing, with the help of God’s grace. Joel’s vision 
provides a framework for Townes to understand the moral life. The people are directed 
by Joel’s vision. Their response to Joel implies their response to God. In other words, 
Joel is an advocate for the Divine, who gives him a vision through which the people 
respond. However, the people only respond after they gain a truthful picture of what God 
required through Joel’s vision. God required genuine repentance from the heart. 
Interestingly, it is clear here that clear vision or right seeing is an achievement as it is for 
Murdoch. She shows us that one must come to see God’s vision through faith in practice. 
Thus, reaching to the Bible, Townes concludes that lament “marks the beginning 
of the healing process” and people need and want to be healed. If we learn anything from 
Joel, it is to know that healing of “brokenness and injustice, social sin and degradation, 
spiritual doubt and fear begins with unrestrained lament.”133 Before healing takes place, 
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one must exercise the “lament of faith to the God of faith” in a way that coveys that one 
sincerely needs help.
134
 Townes argues that the key for Joel is that “the lament be a 
matter of the heart,” genuine lament, and repentance.135 Ethics is matter of both the head 
and the heart. Townes writes:  
God chooses salvation for all; the plague withdraws; the land becomes fertile 
again; and the covenant is restored. The future is one of blessings . . . God’s spirit 
is poured out on all flesh. Joel announces a radical transformation of the social 
order. All people will become prophets, visionaries, and seers . . . the new people 
of God, [and] all will live their lives into the future in an intimate relationship 
with God.
136
 
 
The true sophistication of Townes’s moral outlook rests in her portrait of the individual’s 
ability to see and respond harmoniously within a divine–human relationship that 
expresses the agent’s piety in bringing about a new world complete with hope and justice. 
For Townes, this new world is a world of wholeness. To bring it about requires an 
endless communal effort between the agent and the fabric of the universe. In the next 
section, I explore the roles vision and responsibility play in Townes’s work to show that 
her work is fueled by an ethics of vision and framed by an ethics of responsibility. 
Vision and Responsibility in Townes’s Work 
In a Blaze of Glory, Townes further affirms her use of vision and responsibility as 
she develops the “paradigm for a mediating ethic embodied in the club movement.”137 
The club movement clearly demonstrates a praxis of vision as the club women navigate 
                                                 
134
 Ibid. 
 
135
 Ibid., 20. 
 
136
 Ibid., 22–23. 
 
137
 Townes, In a Blaze of Glory, 30-67.  Drawing from Marcia Riggs, I use this language because I 
believe that it expresses Townes’s notion of confrontation and affirms her notion of partnership. For 
valuable discussion, see Riggs, Awake, Arise & Act, 78-91. 
 
201 
structural violence according to their notion of God’s vision of justice and God’s 
command of justice for the Black community.
138
 As Marcia Riggs notes, 
The club women’s belief in the justice of God and justice for Blacks as a 
command of God specifies the content of the theological assertion that God of 
Christ is a liberator of the oppressed. To paraphrase Niebuhr from the club 
women’s perspective, “God is acting out of God’s justice in all actions upon you. 
So respond to all actions upon you as to respond to God’s justice.”139 
 
Implied in Rigg’s statement is an affirmation of Murdoch’s ethics of vision. This 
is due to the fact that clearly the club women must see before they can rightly respond to 
God. In fact, as discussed earlier, the club women were driven by an internal drive to do 
the will God. In this way, the movement was fueled by the club women’s notion of God’s 
vision and their notion of responsibility. This is noted in the work of Riggs, who contends 
that responsibility is theologically and socio-historically defined by and in the community 
of the oppressed.
140
 As noted in an earlier section, responsibility is a core element in 
womanist thought. 
Here, the elements for a mediating ethic are developed by bringing the club 
women’s understanding of socio-religious ethical responsibility, the mainstream ethical 
tradition of responsibility, the ethical thought of H. Richard Niebuhr, and Black religious 
liberation and womanist thought into creative interaction. In so doing, this sharpens not 
only Murdoch’s understanding of vision, but Niebuhr’s understanding of responsibility, 
while demonstrating that there is an intrinsic relationship between Murdoch’s 
understanding of vision and Niebuhr’s conception of responsibility as a response to 
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God’s action upon us.  
The club women sought to make God’s vision of justice and God’s command of 
justice for the Black community a reality in the world based on their ability to see and act 
through sustained attention and careful vision.
141
 As a result, their hearts, minds, souls, 
hands, and feet became tools for a social witness undergirded by a theo-ethic to do the 
will of God. They did this by “living in tension with” one another, but only after really 
“seeing.”142 Attention empowered them not only to see, but to survive—to live in the 
everydayness of moral acts. 
For club women, “attention” (to paraphrase Murdoch, attention is prayer to God) 
became a tool for liberation, improving morally, dismantling structures of violence and 
changing the world.
143
 As embodied persons, their understanding of the moral life was 
not shaped by abstract ideals, rules, or laws; rather, their understanding of the moral life 
was shaped by vision and their concrete lived experiences of oppression and suffering 
provided the guides as they encountered structures of racial, gender, and class violence. 
Their ability to see and describe the reality of their surroundings, with their ability to 
make a heartfelt response, resulted in fitting action. This praxis of vision brought together 
thought and action, through which they created a milieu in order to bring about God’s 
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vision of a “new heaven and a new earth.”144 
In light of an ethics of vision, what drives womanist efforts to navigate and to 
dismantle structural violence is a belief in God and a belief in a divine apocalyptic vision. 
In Townes’s work, this is an eschatological vision that grows from “crisis and martyrdom 
by a theo-ethical, socio-political manifesto that refuses to tolerate injustice.”145 It is an 
exercise of vigilant moral agency designed to overcome the illusions and the inconsistent 
(and attendant foolishness) amid whatever is real and whatever ought to be real. That is, 
its focus is analogous to that of an ethic of vision in that it seeks to engage the world not 
only as it is but also as it should be by focusing on the inconsistency between experiential 
reality and genuine anticipations. That is, like the works of King, it speaks “prophecy and 
cautions the pyramided towers of evil to beware.” 146 If you do not abide by the laws of 
the universe (analogous to King’s words), there are consequences. That is, if we do not 
pull our attention toward God and respond fittingly, irresponsible actions bring 
consequences. Focusing on the corporate context, Townes reaches to Alice Walker’s 
novel and writes:  
[Womanist social witness] re-appropriates [the character] Miss Celie’s words to 
Mr. [in Alice walker’s novel The Color Purple] for the corporate context. [She 
writes,] “I curse you, I say . . . I say, Until you do right by me, I say, everything 
you touch will crumble . . . Until you do right by me, I say, everything you even 
dream about will fail.”147  
 
In other words, Walker conveys that, in the corporate context as members in a 
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community, responsible action is essential in the present, but it also has past, present, and 
future significances. What this means is that our moral agency is closely and intricately 
related to creation. We are part of the fabric of the universe. In this way, vigilant moral 
agency demands that we stare down and dismantle structural violence through fitting 
action as responsible agents beginning with the experience of Black women and men. It 
is a radical form of moral agency that displays vigilance against all modes of oppression 
including gender, class, ableness, sexuality, ageism, and militarism. As demonstrated by 
club women, vigilant agency is concrete, particular, universal, relevant, relentless, self-
critical, and communal.  
Womanist moral agency is a vigilant praxis of vision, but it is “not monolithic.” It 
is an inclusive moral agency designed to help individuals live in communities and enable 
them to embrace and appreciate diversity. In the work of Townes, this vigilant praxis of 
vision enables the efforts of Black women to move with characters like Miss Celie, Shug, 
and Albert in Alice Walker’s novel, The Color Purple, as they discover ways to live in 
the midst of structural violence.
148
 In Townes’s words, “it dances with Baby Suggs in the 
Clearing, and it is made whole with Avey Johnson.”149  
In other words, womanist’s beliefs and practices “hold all these individual and 
corporate realities [concrete, particular, universal, relevant, relentless, self-critical, and 
communal] in a rigorous hermeneutical circle that moves beyond the known to the 
unknown and pushes for a rock-steady testament of the faithful who refuse to accept a 
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world interpreted through the eyes of hegemony.”150 That is, womanists are determined to 
insistently inquire about the excessive amount of misery that is the portion of the 
oppressed as a result of sexism, classism, racism, ageism, militarism, life, and death, 
using a praxis of vision that is concrete, particular, universal, relevant, relentless, self-
critical, and communal. In this way, the agent’s practical application of belief and 
practice is challenged and carried into a renewed understanding of God’s love and God’s 
divine actions in history. This is to say that, like King, the progressive revelation of 
God’s love manifests itself in work to end oppressions. In this way, womanist ethical 
reflection builds upon the work of King in bringing about a beloved community. It is 
built upon the words of writer and social activist Ida B. Wells-Barnett and many of those 
before and after her, who raised questions on the nature of suffering. For example, Wells 
writes,  
I have been listening to you for nearly two hours. You have talked, and sung, and 
prayed about dying, and forgiving your enemies, and of feeling sure you are going 
to be received in the New Jerusalem . . .  But why don’t you pray to live and ask 
to be freed? . . . Let all of your songs and prayers hereafter be songs of faith and 
hope that God will set you free. . . . Quit talking about dying; if you believe your 
God is all powerful, believe he is powerful enough to open these prison doors, and 
say so. . . . Pray to live and believe you are going to get out.
151
  
 
A womanist “social witness stresses that commitment to God’s moral vision” 
directs one to living and to believing in a concept of “justice” and hope that “stare[s] 
down suffering” with a vision of what is morally right, just visions.152 That is, God’s 
moral vision “does not exhort a kind of fascination of a [‘pie in the sky’] reality distant 
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from” the cares and hopes of the present, in which individuals have to deal with the 
struggle of the everyday.
153
 God’s moral prophecy speaks annihilation to “indecisions,” 
what King describes as “just as evil as evil itself.”154 It casts off certainty and selects life 
beyond destruction, recognizing that injustices anywhere threaten the whole community. 
In other words, the passion of “womanist ethics poses the question much as Micah [of the 
Bible] poses the question: ‘Is it not for us to know justice?’” 155 In other words, is it not 
for us to know that the arc of the universe leans toward justice – that by instinct, the 
world should be built upon a world of love? It does not appeal to the wrathful God of 
Martin Luther or John Calvin; it appeals to the loving God of King, who is a protecting 
parent, who conserves the greatest value, his children.
156
 
Throughout her writings, Townes contends that immortality and salvation come to 
those who direct their attention to Divinity. On this note, she holds that attention to God 
can combat nuclear-powered extinction or environmental recklessness.  It brings about a 
“paradise,” a new heaven and a new earth controlled by the love of God where prevailing 
norms are tested and demystified, and where a renewed reality and mission for humanity 
appear. 
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Townes and Murdoch 
In summary, Townes characterizes a vigilant praxis of moral agency witness that 
expresses a devoted and thoughtful attitude that is vigorous and challenging. This praxis 
of vision reflects from the local to the universal and does not assume the universal in 
considering the particular if there has been no thoughtful reflection on the possibility of 
praxis used. In other words, Townes expresses a piety that focuses on the contextual 
experiences of Black women in the African American community and relates these 
experiences to the broader world; and, in considering views of the broader world, she 
does not impose broader views upon the Black community without thoughtful 
consideration. In this way, the womanist social witness sharpens Murdoch’s 
understanding of vision. A womanist moral vision, according to Townes, demands 
thoroughness in scholarship and an obligation to the Black community. A commitment to 
achieve such a vision has a wide terrain to explore; it seeks for serious dialogue that 
challenges the limits.
157
 
That is, a commitment to achieve such a vision involves an eschatological 
framework that envisions God accomplishing divine plans within the context of human 
history and also by means of humans as demonstrated by the club women. In Townes’s 
words, “God acts within political events and through those in leadership to effect justice 
in creation.”158 Townes’s praxis of vision places the “prophetic and apocalyptic” in 
tension. In this way, she responds to the crisis in the Black community to offer an 
alternative picture of reality and to direct the attention of the community to that reality. 
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Like King, it is clear that her praxis of vision is concerned for life, a life which consists of 
comfort and hope. 
In this way, Townes contends that a “womanist social witness informs the church 
and “stands as a protest against the demeaning and death-dealing status quo. It seeks 
justice in the midst of evil, peace in the midst of violence, freedom as a counterbalance to 
oppression, and community rather than injustice.”159 The womanist social witness, 
because it implies unselfing, sharpens Murdoch’s vision because it seeks to tease through 
the possibilities for renewal and transformation to bring about a more just society for all 
who seek to live into an apocalyptic vision. For those who seek to live into an apocalyptic 
vision, historical and spiritual perspectives are keys. These are woven throughout 
Townes’s writings. Townes makes clear that it is God’s salvation and revelation that 
empower her praxis of vision and point her toward justice making. Concerning the 
realization of such justice, she writes: 
The master narrative of equal opportunity, equal access, and equality for all in an 
unjust social order, demands a radical witness against such cruel and death- 
dealing distortions of the pain and suffering too many of us must endure. [Here,] 
womanist spirituality console[s] and challenge[s], and offer[s] comfort and 
demand[s] protest in times like these.
160
  
 
Townes’s efforts clearly demonstrate that the vigilant moral agent is driven by what she 
sees and is energized while turning her attention to an inner calling that directs her action, 
intensifies her concern for hope and justice, and unites her with the reality of both a 
visible and an invisible world. In this view, everything is sacred. Townes’s efforts affirm 
the notion that all is moral and, as a result, demands responsible action. However, 
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responsible action can rightly be achieved only when the agent sees clearly beyond 
structures of violence that tend to block our way. With God’s grace, responsible action is 
achievable. In the next section, I examine how Townes addresses structures of violence 
as cultural productions.  I employ an ethics of vision and responsibility to understand 
Townes’s moral outlook as she encounters such structures. 
Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil 
Townes’s most recent work, Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of 
Evil, is a theo-ethical, social political, and cultural endeavor that engages in Niebuhr’s 
responsibility ethic throughout. It is an exploration of the interior life of evil designed to 
explore, understand, and dismantle evil. Like Breaking the Fine Rain of Death and In a 
Blaze of Glory, Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil is fueled by the 
concept of vision. At the core of this work is the need to see and interpret what is 
happening in the world before one can act appropriately. Only through seeing can one 
begin to interpret what is going on, which involves not only describing the conditions but 
naming them prior to acting on them. In this way, Townes affirms for both Murdoch and 
Niebuhr that “seeing” is an essential aspect of the moral life. However, Townes does not 
stop here; rather, she also makes use of Niebuhr’s understanding of response, 
interpretation, accountability, and solidarity in ways that are not only central to a 
womanist understanding of ethical reflection but that also marvelously support her claim 
to be a Niebuhrian. Here, I focus my attention upon her most recent work to illustrate 
how vision is used in Townes’s writings. 
She begins Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil by stating that 
womanist work is done in the classroom, academy, and church as we reflect on ways we 
210 
see.
161
 Seeing is essential to her work for truth-telling, especially when it comes to telling 
our stories as we see them in order to avoid truncated narratives. For years, truncated 
narratives have provided a false depiction of Black life that through hegemony have 
distorted the truth of Black experiences in America. For Townes, telling our stories as we 
see them allows our experience to be taken seriously, something that is essential to 
womanists’ ethical reflection. In this way, Townes contextualizes her ethics by beginning 
with the local and moving to the universal, something that is prevalent in her work. The 
current work, Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil, is more expansive 
and builds upon her earlier work in its attempt to embrace a more global reflection upon 
human agency. It demonstrates how a contextual understanding of the moral life that 
focuses upon the concerns of Black women can be used to bring universal hope and 
transformation to the world.  
The newest book is an ongoing attempt to see the world and to reconfigure it, 
while inviting others who are looking for common ground to participate in the process as 
they seek hope and justice. It is an exploration grounded upon a focus on particularity. 
Townes employs this methodology as she studies the particularity of the communities in 
the United States.  For Townes, this is an intra-communal task in which she strives to find 
ways to understand the assortment of African American life. She holds that Black life is 
shared with a compendium of coalitions who are not Black Americans. There are Black 
communities outside of the United States, in places like Africa, the Caribbean, and Brazil 
and the list go on.  But when we investigate Black life, because Black life has been a life 
of oppression, an exploration of Black life is a discussion about evil. Therefore, because 
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oppression usually accompanied by misery and structures of violence, Townes contends 
that a key way to study misery is to focus upon particularities.  
In this work, she is interested in exploring the depth of male and female African 
American life as epistemology. She explores how human life and culture become 
commodities, “marked and consumed: made in American caste hierarchy,” an 
“unacknowledged and explored . . . connection between empire and reparation . . . 
genderized and racialized, moralizations into the global marketplace,” and the need to 
“recognize women’s moral autonomy [as a] factor in developing public policy.”162 
Particularity challenges her to explore gender to get at her hope for wholeness and to 
understand how age and body and history that contain stereotypes continue to saturate 
American culture in video, television, music as well as in the pulpit. She contends that 
these negative images rest in the imagination of Americans and must be deconstructed 
and understood as to how they are made into memory and history, especially among 
those who have suffered from multilayers of oppression and continue to suffer. This is 
the case for Townes as a womanist; of that, she is very clear. She explores socio-
economics, class, and globalization in Black life, paying attention to the environment in 
which we live. Her main argument is that “the key way to understand the arithmetic of 
misery that evil invokes and provokes is to concentrate on particularities rather than 
universals.”163 
Townes strives to know people on their terms, particularly with regard to how 
they survived. She holds that she must listen to geographies, bodies, and health to 
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understand how religion has shaped her and her communities. She does this through the 
particularities of the womanist dancing mind—an expression she uses to signify the 
intellectual engagement of two equally opened minds, which challenges her to look at 
“isms” that are imposed on her and that she turns back on others. She tries to see herself 
through the eyes of others. She engages in interstructured analysis. She explores evil as a 
cultural production to understand it and to dismantle it. This leads her to exploring 
truncated narratives designed to control and dehumanize others and to support and 
perpetuate structural inequality and forms of social oppression. It is an interdisciplinary 
task, something rooted in her childhood.  
One example of Townes’s affirmation of an ethics of vision is demonstrated in 
Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil. In this work, Townes reaches to 
Toni Morrison’s essay “The Site of Memory” to explain several major themes in chapter 
two of Townes’s work. Morrison helps to introduce imagination, history, the fantastic, 
and the power of images and memory; all terms that are essential to an ethic of vision.
164
 
Beginning with a discussion of slave narrative, Morrison strives to help see “sordid” life 
proceedings of the oppressed that, in her words, are to terrible to relate.
165
 She observed 
that when the particularity of slave narratives are contrasted with autobiographical 
narratives of church martyrs, the slave narratives are categorized as biased, inflammatory, 
and improbable, while the latter are described as experiences of redemptions. For 
Morrison, such analysis hides truths by distorting reality or covering it up. Morrison 
concludes that the narratives were written to be acceptable and thus were silent about 
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many things. This leads her to an exploration of truth and fiction. Morrison concludes 
that truth is random but fiction is not and that the way to know truth is to move from the 
image to the text as opposed to from text to the image.
166
 Beginning with the image 
provides for her a better perception of truth.  
Townes employs this methodology in Womanist Ethics and the Cultural 
Production of Evil as she explores five stereotypes that were created to help shape the 
mindset of the American public. In so doing, she affirms Murdoch’s work on vision. In 
addition, she declares herself to be a Niebuhrian in the introduction of her latest work, 
posing the question, “What is happening?”167 Throughout the work, she moves from the 
image to the text as she mirrors Morrison’s methodology in getting to the interior worlds 
of those who endure structural evil, as well as the interior worlds of structural evil itself, 
to discover what truths may be found there.
168
 She uses “interplay between forms of 
structural evil stereotypes of Black womanhood and [the] literary guides that frame [her] 
book to serve as a way to encourage the dialogue that Niebuhr so wished to engage in 
with moral decision making.”169  She states,  
[Niebuhr] believes like I do, that we must pay attention to what is happening 
around us and look long beyond the surface of events, theories, and positions. 
Topsy and other stereotypes I deal with point out that our failure to live and 
engage in responsible life often produces fractured stories that serve to maintain a 
grasping social order that consumes us in its desire to possess and control 
creation.
170
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For her, moving from the image to the text is the suitable terrain of womanist 
discourse, which is to unmask and understand the internal realms of those who suffer 
structural violence as well as the interior worlds of structural violence itself in order to 
see “what truths may originate there.”171 For Townes, such discourse is based on an 
interstructural analysis that includes race, sex, and class within the framework of social 
ethics. This means that problems are examined in layers from every dimension possible 
beginning with class, sex and race before a conclusion is drawn regarding the problem 
and a recommendation is made. For her, it is to explore what she calls the cultural 
productions of evil—“critical and analytical ways . . . in which a society can create 
misery and suffering in . . . systematic . . . ways.”172 The concept of vision is important to 
her because the “images come first and tell her what the memory is about.”173 Drawing 
from Morrison, she recognizes that memory points to the truth of proceedings that may 
have been too terrible to relate, but must be told. An image of Black women as Aunt 
Jemima, for example, demands her attention throughout this work. Such images act as 
“conductors and seeresses.”174 They conjure up memory, history, and counter-memory as 
tools and possible strategies for discovering the truths found in the interior life of evil—
how evil is created, shaped, maintained, and dismantled.
175
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Uncovering the truth of these images, just as uncovering the truth when it is 
hidden in geopolitical, social-cultural, and theo-ethical struggles, can help, in the words 
of Townes, “bring together justice-making and peace-making to dismantle evil.”176 
Employing an ethics of vision and responsibility enables Townes to respond by telling 
the truth as she sees it, something that she holds cannot be achieved in isolation if justice-
making and peace-making are to dismantle evil. Truth telling must be done in community 
using a mediating ethic framed by an ethic of responsibility. For Townes, this can be 
achieved only through a mediating ethic involving H. Richard Niebuhr’s “Web of 
creations” that conveys “we are responsible for each other and ourselves.”177 She writes, 
We have to give an accounting of our actions and inactions. [We are not alone in 
this life, and] we are responsible for what goes on in our names. We see that there 
are false accusations lining the fabric of our lives, accusations that we are 
involved in an ill designed and misbegotten contest that is deadly. We have 
expectations, dreams, possibilities, and hope.
178
  
 
Moral agency is a call to respond to the challenge and hope inborn individually 
and collectively. The hope lies in those who refuse to submit to stereotypes and exercise 
the ability to strategize to resist inaccurate and harrowing definitions of fantastic 
hegemonic imagination. The hope also is grounded in responsibility to future generations. 
This hope attaches the human spirit to the present clear vision and truth and pulls the 
promise of the future into the present—combining challenge and hope to make it possible 
for us to see the world as it can be, to move us to new places and turn us into a new 
people. We exercise an enduring hope when we live for tomorrow as we live today. 
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Moral agency requires that we stare down cultural productions of evil as we strive to live 
out the everydayness of moral acts. 
Conclusion: Townes’s Ethics of Vision and Murdoch 
Unlike the modern ethicists who search for universal truths, Townes as a 
womanist reflects from the particularity of her own experience, as she understands it, in 
light of the experience of Black women. She specifically draws on the Black Women’s 
Club Movement.
179
 This nineteenth-century reform movement provides not only the 
grounds, but also the entry point for Townes in doing womanist ethical reflection. 
Reaching to the Black Women’s Club Movement, Townes identifies with Ida B. Wells, 
whom she sees as a mentor and role model for doing the work of ethics. In short, in 
deepening her understanding of the moral life, it is the particularities of the experiences 
of her heritage, under critical analysis, as opposed to universal truths, that form the 
foundation of her ethical reflection. For example, in Womanist Ethics and the Cultural 
Production of Evil, she writes, “if there are universal truths” in her work, “they are 
unintentional.”180 This is due to the fact that, although Townes seeks to speak consciously 
for particularity, in some cases, this particularity “manifests dimensions of 
universality.”181 In short, it is the particularity from her own spiritual pilgrimage that 
grounds her work and creates the framework for her understanding of womanist ethical 
reflection.   
Townes, then, builds upon this particularity with the experience of others within 
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the context of the Black community. This allows her to contextualize her faith as a 
member of a living community which she played a role in shaping. In this way, there is 
no separation between her faith and that of the community of which she is a member. She 
shapes the community as the community shapes her. In so doing, she reaches to a variety 
of sources, including various religious institutions and people of faith, such as her 
grandmother, father, mother, aunts, uncles, and cousins, as well as the particularity of the 
Black church and the men and women who craft it.
182
 Like other womanists, Townes’s 
spiritual witness grows out of a “people’s struggle and determination” and in response to 
the question, “Do you want to be healed?”183 This question forms the core of Townes’s 
work, beginning with Joel’s call for repentance in Breaking the Fine Rain of Death and 
continuing through Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil, in her efforts to 
create an “ethic of care,” as opposed to an “ethic of death.”184 The micro stories used to 
provide the source for these books clearly demonstrate stories of struggles encountered 
by her community. In fact, Townes’s womanist ethic of care and healing is “Searching 
for Paradise in a World of Theme Parks,” a topic that she takes from the biblical book of 
Hebrews 10:19–11:3, which tells a story of a community struggling for wholeness and 
health.
185
 
Thus, for Townes, a womanist ethic, because it is concerned about the 
dismantling of structural violence, becomes an ethic concerned with wholeness and thus 
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transcends race, sex, and class, in an effort to address simultaneously all forms of 
oppression through the conceptualized experiences of Black women.
186
 It localizes 
ethical reflection in the Black community with a specific concern for Black women, then 
men and children. It is then her hope that such an effort to achieve wholeness would help 
other marginalized communities globally, something that is best captured in Townes’s 
most recent work Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil. Employing the 
work of Niebuhr, this work expands upon womanist ethical reflection as it seeks to 
dismantle the system that impacts the global marketplace. As in her other works, central 
to her efforts is a renewed conception of God, one that emphasizes the parenthood of God 
as opposed to the maleness of God, which has been used historically as a tool to 
subjugate women. For Townes, emphasizing the parenthood of God brings with it 
“possibilities, in spite of the bleak realities of how we are with one another, and opens up 
the way to do the work of justice.”187 It creates a hope toward one vision for all of 
humanity of a new heaven and a new earth, akin to King’s Beloved Community, in that a 
hopeful “vision” of God would move us toward a Beloved Community controlled by the 
love of God.  
Such a vision extends love to self and to others and “enables us to cross the 
yawning chasm of hatreds, prejudice,” and “oppressions into a deeper and richer love of 
God as we experience Jesus in our lives.”188 For Townes, this is the type of love that 
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“holds a community together.”189 In fact, she argues that this is the type of love that 
“holds together the individual and the community in a soulful relationship that cannot 
dwell more on one than the other partner of the relation, but holds both in the same 
frame.”190 For her, the “wisdom” that expresses this type of love is “found in the moral 
wisdom of African-American women” and has its roots deep within African American 
heritage.
191
 It is a communal understanding of God’s love that sees no dualism between 
the personal interest of agency and the common interest of the community. They are one 
and the same. One good example includes the literary works and the life of writer Zora 
Neale Hurston as they are captured in the work of Katie G. Cannon.
192
 In her struggle for 
justice, Hurston shared similar concerns as did the women of her day. Another such 
example is Wells-Barnett, which is one of the major reasons Townes finds Well-Barnett a 
role model for doing womanist work.  
What makes Townes’s work significant in this study is that it is fueled by a vision 
of God that impacts the real lives of people, something that is illustrated throughout her 
work. For example, Townes’s Breaking the Fine Rain of Death is “fueled” by a concept 
of God’s justice from the book of Joel in the Hebrew Bible, while In a Blaze of Glory is 
fueled by a vision of “God’s justice and God’s command of justice for the Black 
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community,” as demonstrated in the club movement.193 Additionally, in Womanist Ethics 
and the Cultural Production of Evil, she contends that “the story can be told another 
way” and asserts that “our world needs a new vision modeled after justice and peace.”194  
Thus, central to Townes’s work is “God’s vision,” a vision that directs and guides 
people to God. It is this vision that creates the framework for the role vision plays in 
Townes’s work. Vision directs our attention to God while, at the same time, uniting God 
to the concrete realities of human existence through perception. For instance, in Breaking 
the Fine Rain of Death, God speaks through the prophet to the people, and the people 
listen to what God has to say. In this way, the people respond to God’s actions upon 
them. In so doing, two truths emerge: God’s concern for concrete reality, that is, the 
people and their well-being, and humanity’s recognition of God’s vision and God’s 
requirement for their obedience.
195
 Although this is not unique to Townes, it helps us to 
better understand the structure of her work and it highlights the significance of Niebuhr’s 
work. 
Murdoch’s ethics of vision provides a helpful way for understanding themes in 
Townes’s work. Murdoch’s work provides structure to Townes’s work as Townes’s work 
sharpens Murdoch’s roughly general depiction of vision. For instance, Townes is 
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interested in the real-world import of Joel’s vision upon the lives of people. God calls the 
people to return to God. Here, experience plays a major role because God is not only 
concerned about the thoughts and actions of humans; rather, God is concerned about 
processes that take place between an individual’s thoughts and subsequent decisions to 
act or not act.  Evidence of this is in God’s call for a genuine heart. It is this genuine heart 
that expresses the sensitivity of the moral agent. Townes strives to be sensitive 
throughout her work and points out the insensitivity of the modern and postmodern 
accounts of agency. Through her use of an interstructural approach to understanding the 
moral life, she shows that she is sensitive to multiple issues impacting human agency 
including classism, racism, sexism, ageism, and homophobia and so on. She is sensitive 
in that as she engages structural violence she must also check the hegemony that is in her 
and that she too may be committing violence. She is sensitive in recognizing the need for 
an approach to the moral life that provides a safe space where two equally open minds 
can engage one another to tease through life’s issues, and where two equally open minds 
can work in tension with one another as a solution to an issue as oppose to coming up 
with some fixed answer. She is sensitive as she calls us to love our hearts, that is, our 
hands, feet, neck, shoulders and so on because others really don’t like us.  And lastly, she 
shows her sensitivity as she calls moderns to not only recognize the voices of Black 
women but to move beyond intellectualizing the Black experience, because blacks are 
more complex than what was previously thought. 
God is interested in a state of being, the significant moments between decision 
points and choices that make up not only the agent’s experience, but the agent’s history. 
According to Murdoch, as also reflected in the work of Townes, this is where the moral 
222 
work is done.
196
 Here, the agent’s moral outlook governs the agent’s thoughts and 
actions. In other words, God does not only call the people to return, but God calls people 
to express sensitivity in that they are to return with a genuine heart, identify their 
predicament, and share this experience with their children from one generation to the 
next. Here, the significant role of vision and experience play a major part in how one 
conducts one’s affairs.  
There is a call to focus one’s attention to mobilize one’s responsibility. Vision, 
attention, experience, and responsibility all play key roles in Townes’s work, as they 
relate to the moral life. Right action accommodates right vision. In short, attention directs 
one to right action, not the other way around. As a result, Townes’s work neatly fits into 
the framework of Murdoch’s work on vision.  
When it comes to Townes’s use of vision and Niebuhr, Townes, like many other 
womanists, argues that one cannot adequately engage oneself in the world morally 
without first posing the question of vision. “What is going on?” is a question that is 
central to responsibility ethics. She writes, 
I have been engaging in H. Richard Niebuhr’s responsibility ethics as I have tried 
to discern his basics question “What is going on?” by looking at identity as 
property, uninterrogated coloredness, empire and reparations, and religious values 
and public policy.
197
  
 
Thus, such a question not only leads Townes to the work of H. Richard Niebuhr, 
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but it also leads her to declare that she is a Niebuhrian.
198
 Thus, we can see a clear 
relationship between womanist ethics and the ethic of responsibility, in that, according to 
the womanist agenda, “the womanist must, recognize her social location and 
responsibility in a community.”199 However, this is no surprise because implied in the 
definition of the term womanist, as stated earlier, is an ethics of responsibility 
“Interchangeable with another black folk expression: ‘You trying to be grown.’ 
Responsible. In charge. Serious.”200 Thus, Townes, like Marcia Riggs and many other 
womanists, grounds her understanding of the moral life upon the historical experiences of 
the Black Women’s Club Movement. As Riggs rightly suggests, 
The club women’s ethic was an ethic of responsibility premised upon God’s 
justice; intragroup social responsibility was a core value in a mediating ethic for 
Black liberation derived from the central concept of sociohistoric relationality. 
The ethics thus mediated between the universal and the particular within the 
struggle for Black liberation. 
201
 
 
It is in this same light that womanists see themselves as responding to a call from 
God to not only live a moral life, but to actively involve them in bringing about a new 
heaven and a new earth—in other words, to engage in Townes’s “search for paradise.”202 
Thus, Townes, like Murdoch and Niebuhr, understands the moral life as a type of vision 
to be lived out in community with others. As Riggs suggests, 
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There was a theocentric view of justice at the heart of the club movement’s 
understanding of responsibility. Their understanding of moral good and evil 
centered upon God’s justice motivated their work for the alleviation of Black 
oppression from a self-critical stance.
203
 
 
Such a view allows Townes to draw from Niebuhr’s understanding of 
interpretation, responsibility, accountability, and social solidarity. Through Niebuhr’s 
“understanding of interpretations, [Townes has] tried to make sense of structural evil by 
categorizing and looking for patterns and meaning of life as we have currently 
constructed it.”204 Having such a vision allows her to see “cultural productions” and the 
impact of cultural productions upon the lives of people.
205
 Thus, the act of posing the 
question of vision and grounding her understanding of reality in experience causes 
Townes to insist that morality begins with “self-examination, self-exploration, and self-
reflection.”206 It is to ground the “individual in love, love of self, love of community, love 
of worlds of Black women, [and] love of the Spirit, all held together in one bond.”207  
Thus, drawing from Niebuhr’s view of solidarity and his emphasis on 
relationships, Townes, like King, sees the moral life as being relational. For her, this 
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understanding of social solidarity is the most pressing part of Niebuhr’s ethics.208 It 
conveys her understanding that “life and wholeness are found in our individual 
interactions with our communities and the social worlds, people, and life beyond our 
immediate terrains.”209 It also implies that “responsibility is possible [only] if all the 
members of a community of moral agents maintain a relatively consistent scheme of 
interpretations of what is going on.”210 This focus on knowing what is going on implies 
the necessity for seeing, naming, interpreting, and stating conditions clearly. 
Based on this view, Niebuhr is aligned with Townes in asserting that “we must 
pay attention to what is happening around us and look long beyond the surface of events, 
theories, or positions, of many communities,” something that “makes us historical 
people.”211 In this way, analogous to Murdoch, Townes’s understanding of the moral life 
has much to do with sustained and trained habit and clear vision. Here, history is 
important because it consists of documented evidence of experiences that allow us to 
construct the past through the use of multiple sources, such as biographies, 
autobiographies, stories, narratives, poems, and so on. Such materials on Ida B. Wells 
Barnett provide the source material for Townes’s Womanist Justice and Womanist Hope, 
which lays the framework for a new womanist Christian social ethics.
212
 She helps us to 
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see the necessity for upholding the need for women to be the moral guardians of African 
American society.
213
 Through her experience, we can see, for example, why “temperance, 
morality, education, domesticity, and social uplift were of deep concern” to women 
called by God.
214
  
In this way, Townes draws from her past history, spirit, community, and person 
and finds they are held together in a “wondrous, if not faithful, circle pointing toward 
wholeness and hope.”215 It is this bond that begins to lay the criteria of the moral. That is, 
the dynamic way Townes’s past history, spirit, community, and person are held together 
creates the framework for her understanding of the moral life. It forms the root and 
conveys the essential aspects of Townes’s understanding of morality: “love, relationships, 
God, power, community, individuality, solidarity, responsibility, accountability,” and so 
on. Thus, in declaring that she is a “Niebuhrian,”216 Townes shows that she not only has a 
womanist understanding of the moral life grounded in the experience of Black women, 
but also that her understanding of the moral life, like King’s understanding, has much to 
do with an ethics of vision.  
It is this demonstration of Townes’s conception of the moral life that begins to 
show us that “vision” plays a major role in womanist ethical reflection. First, it shows 
that womanist ethical reflection is not built upon choices. Instead, womanist ethical 
reflection is built upon seeing, looking, and attending to the world around us. Second, it 
implies that a womanist understanding of the world has much to do with encountering 
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and being encountered by the world, and that such encounters have had a tremendous 
impact in shaping our world. This is clearly demonstrated in Townes’s works. As such, 
an “ethics of vision” can be useful in giving a more adequate account of her 
understanding of morality as opposed to an ethic of choice. Thus, Townes sees the world 
as a mystery, full of truths and revelations needing to be discovered because they are 
unknown, uncovered because they are hidden, and rediscovered because they are 
forgotten. An ethics of vision exposes truths that are otherwise hidden. It brings to light 
experiences, mysteries, perceptions, and seeings that, in many cases, may be too terrible 
to talk about. It exposes encounters and helps us to discern, direct, and channel our 
energies to better bring about a world framed by love, justice, and peace.  
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CONCLUSION 
AN ETHICS OF WINDOWS 
In this chapter, I draw from my findings in the previous three chapters. This 
includes a further correlation of ethics of vision with Chapters Two and Three. I then 
introduce a new concept, “window ethics,” and elaborate on my findings in light of this 
new concept.  
Throughout this project, I have demonstrated that the ethics of vision and 
responsibility are helpful and novel paradigms for understanding moral action and the 
moral life, and I have explored the importance of the “ethics of vision” for Christian 
ethical reflection. In so doing, I demonstrated that an ethics of vision and responsibility, 
as opposed to an ethics of choice, illuminates aspects of the moral life that deontological 
and teleological approaches fail to elucidate. I also demonstrate that when a correlation of 
the works of Iris Murdoch and H. Richard Niebuhr is considered with the works of 
liberationist thinkers like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Emilie M. Townes, the power of 
ethics of vision and responsibility is realized. This is because the works of Murdoch and 
Niebuhr illuminate the works of King and Townes and vice versa. A correlation of the 
works of Murdoch and Niebuhr, with the works of liberationist thinkers like King and 
Townes, enriches our understanding of vision and responsibility in both theory and 
practice. This is illustrated in this study, as Murdoch introduces an individualistic 
understanding of vision and demonstrates how sustained attention, trained habit, and 
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careful vision defeat egoism. While Murdoch’s general depiction of vision shows little 
interest in the social aspects of human agency as it relates to social justice issues as 
suggested by Martha Nussbaum, Niebuhr affirms Murdoch’s use of vision and expands 
its focus to include the social dimension of human agency. Niebuhr sees vision as a 
prerequisite to any morally responsible action on the part of the agent whose efforts to be 
responsible are driven by divine grace toward issues of social justice. Ethics of vision and 
responsibility illuminate the relational aspect of human agency and expose its dialogus 
nature.
1
 Niebuhr presents the human person as a responsive creature, who is called to 
respond to actions taken upon her in an ongoing pattern of interaction as a member of a 
living community.  
A moral agent is called to interpret what is going on, to be accountable for her 
actions, and to respond in solidarity with the community to which she is a member by 
means of a fitting response as though she is responding to God in harmony by consent. 
God is the ultimate authority. Human beings participate in a global relational web under 
God’s governing action. This rather general depiction of human agency illuminates the 
work of King as he employs vision as an educational tool to get people to see through the 
use of dramatic demonstrations—marches, boycotts, and strikes—modeled after 
Mahatma Gandhi and the Quit Indian movement. Like Gandhi, King used the Gandhian 
concept of satyagraha and a double unmasking effort, which is a double educational 
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outreach effort to draw the attention of Whites to the suffering they have long inflicted 
upon Blacks.
2
  
King’s usage of attention as an educational tool, fueled by Gandhi’s concept of 
love and nonviolence, created new ways for people to see and solidifies Murdoch’s stress 
on vision and Niebuhr’s stress on responsibility, while demonstrating the importance of 
several aspects of the moral life highlighted by Murdoch as necessary tools for moral 
agency ignored by deontological and teleological approaches to agency, namely, the 
inner life, one’s experience, love, freedom, and justice.3 King, by pulling the attention of 
White racists away from themselves to the suffering of Blacks through methods of 
nonviolence demonstrated that, in the words of Murdoch, a loving and just gaze directed 
away from oneself toward others under the authority of God without prejudice can 
transform the agent and the environment the agent shares with those around her. Such 
transformation supports Murdoch’s notion of unselfing as well as Niebuhr’s relational 
web, and illuminates important characteristics of human agency, including 
interrelatedness, interdependency, and interconnectedness.  
The use of vision and responsibility in King’s work not only illuminates structures 
of violence, but it also provides the antidote to dismantling the violence that distorts 
reality and provides a way for people to see and respond neighborly or fittingly. Townes 
enriches King’s vision by demonstrating that blinding violence resides in all of us. 
Instead of focusing on race as does King, Townes pulls our attention to something that is 
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even more deadly—hegemony. Joining other liberationist scholars, she reframes King’s 
vision as she identifies the intersection of racism, classism, sexism, and homophobia as 
windows to not only understanding the structures of violence that distort our vision, but 
also to unmasking the interior worlds of evil as they relate to cultural productions 
involving a concern for health and human agency. Townes’s efforts confirm that one 
form of oppression is as deadly as another. Grounding her work on the tri-level suffering 
of Black women supports Murdoch’s and Niebuhr’s notion that experience is the key to 
the moral life as well as to understanding human agency. While pulling our attention 
toward the importance of particularity, Townes further affirms the importance of vision 
and responsibility and demonstrates that these concepts have deep roots in Black 
thinking. She sees human agency as trans-generational and calls us to be accountable to 
past, present, and future generations of people. For her, humanity has been called to draw 
from the past to inform how we should live in the present to make life better. This is a 
way of living out God’s vision of justice in the world. In fact, a correlation of the works 
of Murdoch, Niebuhr, King, and Townes demonstrates that Townes’s work, like the work 
of many womanists, is fueled by an ethics of vision and shaped by an ethics of 
responsibility. With the help of Marcia Riggs, she confirms that responsibility is defined 
in oppressed communities as it was defined by Black women’s club participants in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
4
 Central to the efforts of these women was 
their ability to see, to interpret the needs around them, and to respond creatively and 
appropriately to the world as they navigated structures of violence. Their ability to 
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respond to God’s call, to interpret the reality of their world, to be accountable for their 
actions, to navigate structures of violence, and to not only respond in solidarity but to 
work in tension with each other in spite of their differences as a form of mediation affirm 
Niebuhr’s vision and his ethics of responsibility. It also draws our attention to the 
importance of the inner life as God’s call through grace changes the agent’s personality 
and drives her toward a vigilant demonstration of the moral and the aspects of the moral 
life that further escape deontological and teleological approaches to the moral life. 
  What does all of this mean? It means that we must consider an enriched 
understanding of vision and responsibility as an approach that can help us improve 
morally and give us a better account of what it means to be human. This is something that 
is also reflected in the works of contemporary race theorist like Maureen H. O’Connell, 
George Yancy, and Joe Feagin.
5
 Their efforts express an enriched understanding of vision 
and responsibility as it is demonstrated in the works of liberationist thinkers like King 
and Townes. For example, recognizing the importance of vision and responsibility in 
virtue ethics and the failure of deontological approaches as adequate responses to the 
moral life, O’Connell, along with other race theorists, recommends virtue ethics—
another name for an ethics of vision and responsibility—as the adequate approach to 
defeat racism; however, she contends that before virtue ethics could achieve such a task, 
it must rid itself of “whiteness.”6 In fact, O’Connell argues that just as feminists use 
                                                          
5
 Maureen H. O’Connell, “After White Supremacy? The Viability of Virtue Ethics for Racial 
Justice” in Journal of Moral Theology: Virtue, eds, David Cloutier and William C. Mattison III, (Vol 3, No. 
1, January 2014), 83-104. 
 
6
 Bryan Massingale contends that “whiteness is a culture in that it is learned, formative, 
informative, and symbolic.” See Bryan N. Massingale, Racial Justice and the Catholic Church (Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 2010), 21-33. 
 
233 
virtue ethics to illumine structures of violence that oppress women, race theorists point 
out that it is important for “Whites committed to racial justice to see continually that ‘all 
actors in a racialized society are affected materially and ideologically by the racial 
structure’ and to take ‘responsibility for [one’s] unwilling participation in these practices 
and begin a new life committed to the goal of achieving racial equality’.”7 In this way, 
the ethics of vision and responsibility in the efforts of race theorists are synonymous to 
those of King and Townes in bringing about a new earth and a new heaven. Yancy goes 
so far as to “exhort Whites to ‘become anti-racist racists’.”8 For O’Connell, “This strikes 
her as the language of virtue and leads her to conclude that so long as we diligently attend 
to its pervasive whiteness, virtue ethics offers the optimal moral approach for Whites to 
employ when it comes to racial justice.”9 One reason she suggests is that “virtue ethics 
take seriously the emotions, whether as expressions of cognitive reasoning or motivations 
for moral actions, stereotypes, prejudices, and evasive behavior” (dimensions of moral 
agency that are highlighted in our correlation with King and Townes).
10
  
An enriched ethics of vision and responsibility, because of its sensitive approach 
to the moral life, locates the sentiments and temperament allied with whiteness, such as 
“fear and guilt, innocence and ignorance, superiority and inferiority,” as the optimal place 
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to begin the process of deconstructing what Feagin calls “the White racial frame.”11 An 
enriched ethics of vision and responsibility can easily explain unnoticed sensitive 
dimensions of White supremacy that need to be mediated in order to move toward racial 
justice as these unnoticed sensitive dimensions of White supremacy are reflected in the 
work of Feagin.
12
 In fact, Feagin affirms the work of King and Townes as he suggests, 
“Naming and examining these emotions provides an important place to begin the process 
of inculcating alternative dispositions” (Murdoch’s states of mind, such as stubborn 
nostalgia, antipathy, imperviousness, defensiveness, fear and so on).
13
  
An enriched ethics of vision and responsibility can provide dominant groups who 
are committed to social justice with a “fluid, adaptable or even morph-able approach to 
thinking and likewise to human character that has historically been characteristic” of 
people who have been forced to navigate blinding structures of violence, be it race, sex, 
or class.
14
 For example, virtue ethics provides Whites committed to racial justice with 
what Willie Jennings calls a “‘fluid, adaptable or even morph-able’ approach to thinking 
and likewise human character that has historically been characteristic” of Black life.15  
An enriched ethics of vision and responsibility can also provide dominant groups who are 
committed to social justice the possibility of transcending the inelasticity of the 
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dominating frame and the aptitudes to adjust their imaginative dimensions to practices 
generally rejected in dominating groups, but embraced in diverse ways of knowing and 
being. Just as liberationists turned to an ethics of vision and responsibility to challenge an 
unjust moral social order, dominant groups who are committed to social justice “might 
use a search for and recovery of the meaning of their own personal and collective 
identities to begin the necessary work of recovering from the ‘cultural suicide’ of 
becoming bleached and embrace the ethical dispositions and practices of their own 
distinct heritages.”16  
In this way, an enriched ethics of vision and responsibility rejects the “arbitrary 
binaries of whiteness or blackness, (as well as other exclusionary characteristics that 
undermine human dignity) and illuminate instead a moral multivalent and adaptable 
context and character of multiculturalism.”17 This is what I call an ethics of windows, 
because it is a way of grounding our understanding of the moral life upon the moral 
outlook of many diverse communities, contexts, and understandings of human agency. I 
believe that an enriched ethics of vision and responsibility approach to morality 
consisting of a series of diverse windows of understanding can lead us to adapt a context 
and character of multiculturalism. This is due to the fact that dominant groups who seek 
societal justice cannot claim to be just and loving by pointing to a specific set of 
strategies or goals; rather, dominant groups who seek societal justice must continually 
desire to become just and loving people themselves by seeing and being responsible. The 
diverse works of Murdoch, Niebuhr, King, and Townes can remove exclusionary 
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characteristics that undermine human dignity, including the whiteness of virtue ethics, 
and enable agents to see imaginatively. Note that Murdoch is a White non-Christian 
female, Niebuhr is a White Christian male, King is a Black Christian male, and Townes is 
a Black Christian lesbian. They represent a broad range of diversity.  
What does this illustrate? The broad range of diversity included herein, and its 
ability to remove exclusionary characteristics that undermine human dignity, including 
the whiteness of virtue ethics, affirm the importance of the collected works of Murdoch, 
Niebuhr, King, and Townes as a possible approach to moral improvement. In doing so, 
this approach localizes our understanding of human agency and stresses the significance 
of context and diversity. It also illustrates the complexity of the moral life.  
Each context provides a window for developing a deeper understanding of the 
moral life. For example, Townes uses the window metaphor consistently throughout her 
work as she employs it to represent the intersections of race, class, and gender in her 
interstructured analysis in order to gain a greater understanding of the world of evil and 
the blinding violence that accompanies it. She then uses a series of windows as “leaning 
posts” to build a greater understanding of vigilant moral agency as it is reflected in 
womanist thinking, which provides for us a larger window for understanding the 
experience of Black women. In my view, Townes’s work, along with that of Murdoch, 
Niebuhr, and King, and the efforts of race theorists provides a display of windows in 
many shapes and sizes to give us an ethics of windows, something I call window ethics. 
This is due to the fact that each contextual understanding of the moral life, be it that of 
King, Townes, or race theorists, presents a picture of the moral life that provides a 
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glimpse into their worlds to which the window metaphor, just as the vision metaphor in 
Murdoch’s work, serves as a natural device for understanding the moral life.  
However, Townes does not fully develop the phrase as an approach to ethical 
reflection. She only uses it as an epistemological tool for seeing. For her, the window 
metaphor frames different ways of seeing that exposes the agent to new worlds. In this 
way, different writers and poets provide spaces that, for Townes, illustrate different ways 
of seeing and open up possibilities for understanding diversity. She often contends that a 
series of windows are needed in order to understand diverse and complex dimensions of 
reality. When I view her work from this perspective, it demonstrates to me a type of 
window ethics or an ethics of windows, which is to say that her understanding of the 
world is drawn from a consummation of many dimensions of reality. Furthermore, to 
understand reality, window ethics is a necessity, especially when it comes to the 
experience of Black women and moving beyond structures of violence. This is illustrated 
as Townes explores the impacts of multiple dimensions of reality.  
 An ethics of windows can help deepen our understanding of reality as we are 
exposed to the worlds of others and become aware of their different situations. It can also 
help us to see and understand the attempts of particular communities to improve morally 
while, at the same time, moving us toward a new heaven and a new earth, King’s beloved 
community. In this way, the use of the ethics of windows is a necessity, especially for 
drawing our attention toward diversity. As demonstrated in this study, an ethics of 
windows is essential to our understanding of sensitivity and how such sensitivity can be 
used to improve our moral understanding or human agency. An ethics of windows allows 
us to ground our understanding of the moral life in multiple voices in order to highlight 
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the diversity, richness, and power of the ideas of a diverse community that embrace and 
appreciate differences as part of a long standing intellectual community. It heightens our 
abilities to recognize and dismantle the structures of violence that distort our vision and 
blind us. It can assist us in creating and identifying models of agency that will lead us 
toward appreciating the diversity amongst us. As race theorists have suggested, it will 
sharpen our senses to perhaps reframe our understanding of virtue as something fluid and 
complex.
18
 
Just as virtue ethics is recommended by O’Connell as the approach for 
dismantling racism, an enriched ethics of vision and responsibility approaches built upon 
diversity can be recommended to address the issues of class, sex, and homophobia that 
exist among those who not only perpetrate such violence but suffer from it. The goal 
would be to rid ourselves of all forms of hegemony. Window ethics as an approach 
allows for a framing and reframing of vision and responsibility. For example, each 
window can provide for us, first and foremost, a way of making meaning about the self, 
others, and social reality. It will present a way of framing or unifying perceptions that 
help with cognition and understanding with varying levels of intentionality that embrace 
Niebuhr’s responsibility model. It will be rooted in the multiple voices of a diverse 
community, framed on hope, justice, and equality, which draws on the notion of respect, 
dignity, and positive ideas—emotions, and images of all people regardless of their 
differences.
19
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When we employ an ethic of windows, the notion of process, as O’Connell 
suggests, “offers the promise of personal and social liberation through a gradually 
transformative conversion that is never fully complete.”20 We begin to understand the 
complexity of the moral life, in all of its diversity and work toward identifying and 
creating models of agency consistent with recognizing and appreciating diversity. In this 
effort, we begin to grasp what Murdoch suggests, that we respond differently because we 
see different worlds. One responds according to the world of which one is a member. 
One’s fitting response, with the help of God’s grace, follows one’s vision, not the other 
way around. This means that cultural studies and comparative ethics are essential to the 
moral life and human agency. Such work enriches our vision and directs us toward 
universalizing certain moral precepts, such as respecting the dignity of every human life, 
recognizing the sacredness of life, the need to protect the environment, and the need to 
express benevolence, while giving us a greater understanding of what it means to be 
human. A work of this nature should be a full life endeavor—from grade school through 
the university.  
Like King and Townes, recognizing the role of vision and responsibility in the 
moral life at a young age can destine an agent toward creating a world of justice and hope 
through the display of a vigilant moral agency. This effort would be undertaken as a 
corrective to oppressive frameworks that have aggressively propagated and adopted 
blinding structures of violence and that to some degree penetrate the minds of people 
with hegemony—be it race, sex, or class. It would be an effort through which people of 
diversity can make a model of their own as they engage other diverse communities in a 
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global world. In this way, an enriched ethics of vision and responsibility will function as 
a kind of filtering system that sifts out conflicting material or experiences that preserve 
“stereotypical emotions and judgments, and reject discriminatory treatment of people in 
interpersonal, social, and institutional contexts in an effort to bring about a just society.”21 
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